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PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF THE 
CONSDIVIER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT 
Antonin Scalia* 
Frank Goodman'''* 
The Consumer Product Safety Act1 is the first legislation 
since the days of the New Deal to create an independent com-
mission for the purpose of imposing federal regulation on an estab-
lished area of commercial activity. 2 In the intervening period, 
there have been significant changes in our conception of the ap-
propriate structure, functions, and procedures of independent reg-
ulatory agencies. Several of these fresh approaches to regula-
tory theory are reflected in the new legislation-among them in-
creased public participation in the administrative process, de-
tailed judicial oversight, the concept of the "private attorney gen-
eral", broad public access to agency information, increased agency 
self-sufficiency, and independence from presidential control. In 
'~ Chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States; Professor 
of Law, University of Virginia; A.B. 1957, Georgetown University; LL.B. 1960, 
Harvard Law School. 
H Resea rch Director, Admin istrative Conference of the United States; 
Visiting Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School; A.B. 1954, 
Harvard University; B.A. 1956, Magdalen College, Oxfo rd University; LL.D. 
1959, Harvard Law SchooL 
This Atiicle is the outgrowth of a study undertaken by the Administrative 
Confet·ence of the United States pursuant to its responsibility to provide advice 
to fede ral administrative agencies. The views expressed, however, arc solely 
those of the authors and do not represent the official position of the Administra-
tive Conference. Parts II and V of the Article are indebted to the work of Mr. 
Richard K. Berg, Executive Sec re tary of the Conference; his advice is reflected 
throughout. 
1 Pub. La1.v No. 92573 (Oct. 2R, 1972). The entire text of the Act is 
included in the appendix following this Article. Although the Act has been 
codified (15 U.S.C.A. §§ 2051-81 (1970)), it will hereinafter be cited to the 
public law section numbe ;· only. 
:.! The Ato mic Energv Commission , established bv the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1946, 42 U .S.C. ~§ 20~ll-2282 (1970), was origin~lly more conccrn e~l· with 
re sea •·ch, developmen t, maimfactnring, and opera tional functions than wi th 
regul at ion , and those activities still constitute a large part of its function. The 
Fede ral Maritime Commission, established by Reorganization Plan No. 7 of J% 1, 
merely received a transfer of regulatory functions £rum p 1·ccx istin g age:Kics. as 
die! its predecessor, the Federal Maritime Board, established by Rcorg:mizntiun 
Plan No. 21 of 1950. 
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thus departing from well-worn paths the Act raises interesting and 
important questions of Congressional intent and of the most ap-
propriate means for administrative implementation. It is the 
purpose of the present Article to examine some of the novel prob-
lems of administrative procedu re posed by the new kgislat\on 
with the hope cf assisting in their early resolution. 
I. H ISTORY AND O V E RVIEW OF TfU: CON ~ IJ~, l !:!~. 
P RODUCT SA F ETY AcT 
F or neatly two decades before enactment of the statute, Con-
gress had legislated on product safety in a piecemeal fa shion, 
adopt ing-usually in the wake of a widely publicized tragedy-
a variety of specialized measures such as the F lammable Fabrics 
Act/ the Poison Prevention Packaging Act/ and the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act.~ The result was "a patch-
work of laws which, in combination, extend to only a small por-
tion of the products produced for consumers."(; R ecognizing 
the problem, Congress created, in November 1967 , the National 
Commission on Product Safe ty (NCPS) and instructed it to 
"conduct a comprehensive study and investigation of the scope 
and adequacy of measures now employed to protect consumers 
aga inst unreasonable risk of injuries which may be caused by 
hazardous housel-wld products."' The Commission labored more 
than two years, holding several widely publicized informational 
hearings in which it received evidence from more than 225 wit-
nesses and compiled a hearing record in excess of 7,000 pages. 8 
T his effort culminated in a final report transmitted to the Presi-
dent and Congress in July 1970. :> 
The Commission found that 20,000,000 Americans were 
i!1jured each year in the home as a result of acciden ts connected 
with consumer products; that industry self-regulation, the com-
mon la\v, existing federal programs, and state and local agencies 
:: 15 u.s.c. § § 1191-1204 (1970). 
1 15 U .S. C. § § 1471-76 (1970). 
'' 15 U.S.C. §§ 13 81 -1431 (1970). Other examples are the Fede ral 
Hazard ous Substances Act, 15 U.S.C. § § 12 61 -73 ( 1970); Child Protection and 
Toy Safety Ac t, 15 U.S.C. § § 1261, 1262, 1274 (1970); Refrigerato r Safety /\ct. 
15 U.S.C. § § 1211- 14 (1970); Radiation Control for Hc<:lth and Safety Act of 
1968,42 u.s.c. § § 263b-72 (1968). 
" H.R. REP. No. 1153, 92d Cong., 2d Scss. 22 ( 1972). 
7 S.J. Re s. 33 , Pub. Law No. 90-146, 8 1 Stat. 467 ( 1970 ) . 
~ H.R. R EP. No. 1153, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1 972 ) . 
~ . ' R epublished in H earings on H.R. 8110, H.R. 8157, fl.!?. 260 (and iden -
ricu l hills), f-.l.R. 3813 (and identical bills) Before the Subconun. on C om111 erce 
and Finr:ncc o f !h e !louse Comm. on ! n tersta!e and Fa rl'ign Cnm111 erce, 92d 
Cung., 1st & 2d Scss. 31 9-5 33 ( 1971 -72). 
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were inadequate to protect the public from this excessive haz-
arcl;1 (' and that comprehensive federal legislation was essent ial. 
Accord ingly, the Comm ission recommended creation of an inde-
pendent, highl y visible, multi-member Commission with author-
ity to develop and set mandatory product safety standards, en-
furce compliance with th ose s tandards through a broad range of 
ci\il and crimin ~ll :; anctions, seek injun ctio ns against the market-
ing nf spec i fie products clcemccl unreaso n ab I y het z~1 rcl uus , con-
dt:'.:l hr:a rings and investigations, <mel disscmin::1 tc information 
tc1 the public. 11 It further proposed appointment by the Presiden t 
of a consumer safety advocate to represent tbr:: ii1ter:::sts of the 
cons umer before the Product Safety Commiss ion. 1 ~ Specil'ic leg-
islation was proposed to carry o ut these objectives. 
Congress was quick to respond Y3 Bills designed to imple-
ment the NCPS recommendation were introduced in the sununer 
of 1970 as the 91 st Congress drew to a close .H Early the fol-
lowing year, Senator Magnuson and Representative ·Moss sub-
mitted identical bills 1 ~ (hereinafter, the "NCPS bill") substanti-
ally tracking the NCPS proposal. The Administration offered a 
proposal of its own, 1 n calling for the establishment of a product 
safety program within the Department of Health , Education, 
and Welfare, r ather than the creation of a new agency. A t com-
mit tee hearings in both Houses, 17 industry spokesmen generally 
sponsored the HEW approach; consumer representatives usu-
ally supported the separate agency proposal. The responsible 
comm ittees of the two Houses chose the latter, but they differed 
as to the mode of implementation. The Senate Commerce Com-
mittee approved , and in June 1972 the Senate passed, a bill pro-
viding, for the establishment of an independent Food, Drug, and 
Safety Agency headed by a single admin istrator, with authority 
to regulate all consumer goods and to exercise funct ions trans-
ferred from other agencies, including the Food and Drug Adminis-
10 Id. at 333 -3 5. 
11 Jd. at 337 -38, 445-47. 
1:! !d . at 337-38, 446. 
l~ For a general accoun t of the evolution of the law, see BuRE.\ U or N.n·L 
r\FF,\ I RS, TH E CONSU?-.1ER P RODUCT SAFETY ACT 26-34 (] 973) . 
H E.g., H.R. 18208, 9lst Cong., 2d Sess. (1970) ; S. 4054, 91st Cong .. 2d 
Sess . ( 1970). 
1 ~ S. 983, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (197 1) ; H .R. 8157, 92d Cong ., 1st S·~ss . 
( 197 1). 
n; S. 1797, 92d Cong., Jst Sess. (1971); H.R. 8110, 92cl Cong., 1st Sess . 
( 197 I) . 
17 H earings on H.R. 8110, J-I.R. 8157, H. R. 260 (and idcniicu! bi!ls), H.R. 
38 I 3 (and idelli ica! bills) Before ;/!e Subco111m . on Commerce w;d Finu::cc: of 
rhc House Conun. on Int erstate and Foreign Commerce, 92cl Co;~g., 1st & 2cl. 
Scss . (! 97 I-n l; !-! caring1 on S. 9~3. S. 1685, S . 1797 Before ;he Scna1c Conznz. 
on Conznzc rce, 92d Cong ., 1st Sess. (1971) . 
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tration. 18 ·1'he House Con1n1erce Con1111ittee approved, a11d in 
Septen1bcr 1972 the House adopted, a bill more closely modeled 
on the NCPS proposal, providing for a multi-member regula-
tory cumrnission with transferred functions not including those 
0{~ T !1 ~ 1=" r-'1 .6 l ': _1 .!.. LliV ~ ,1__./j )., ~Jcithcr the House 11or the Senc~tc bill IJrovided for 
PS hacl recornincndcd. ~~; 
.1972, rese111blcd th e } --iuu~1~~ 
appl.CJ '/Scl by both 
and th..::rcforc the 
NCPS Lll in nearly all important respects. 
The reach of the new Act extends to all consumer prod-
ucts--~t term thJt is circularly defined to include ~111 articles or 
compunei1ts produced or distributed for sale to, or use by, a con-
sumer. :c 1 Exceptions are made for tobacco, firearms, and for 
certain products already regulated under other legislation, no-
tably rnotor vehicles, economic poisons, aircraft, boats, drugs 
and cosmetics, and food products.~~ 
The Act establishes a Consumer Product Safety Commission 
of five men:;bers, appointed for seven-year terms, 23 and authorizes 
appropriations, at prescribed ceilings, 21 only through fiscal 
lS S. 3419. 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); 118 CoNG. REc. S. 9901-41 (daily 
ed. June 21. 1972). 
lD H.R. 15003. 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); 118 CONG. REc. H. 8565-8607 
(daily eel. Sept. 20, !972). 
~u The House Commerce Committee dropped the provision for a consumer 
advocate during its drafting sessions on the bill, explaining that the question of 
representation was being taken care of in separate legislation. The bill orig-
inally approved by the Senate Commerce Committee provided for appointment 
of a consumer counsel to represent the consumer interest in ruiemclking pro-
ceedings be fore the Commission. The Commitiee indicated, however, that if a 
separate consumer advocacy agency were created, reliance should be placed on 
atton~eys furnished by that agency. S. REP. No. 749 , 92d Cong .• 2nd Scss. 19 
(1972). The bill was subsequel1tly referred tG the Senate Labor Commitu::c for 
its consideration; in the process, the provision for a consumer advocate was dis-
carded. As it turned out, the proposal for a separate consumer protection agency 
to perform the advocacy function died late in the l972 session. It was revived in 
the 93rd C ongn::ss and, [n several variations. is prc: ceittly pending. S. 707, S. 1160, 
l -!.R. 1-+ , I---i. -t-~. 21. H.R. 564, 93cl C\_ntg., l5t Sess. ( 1973 ). 
~1 Section 3(a)(l) . 
. -,.-. Jd. 
~:: Sectioils 4(a), 4(b) (1). 
~~ Section 32. The ceilings arc $55 million for fiscal 1973, $59 million 
for fiscal 1974, and $64 million fo1· fiscal 1975. The appropri~.tions h•1itations 
do net ;q;ply to fund s for planning and constructing rese:arcb_ and testing fac!litit:: :s. 
~fhe pra ::~ic~d ·~~ff·.:c:t of these lirniL1tions 1~; to as~ure co:1sc~ous action by the Ci1tirc 
Co:~grc s s. r~tthcr than n1erely an appropriatior;s cc-'n1111itte -~ or subcon1r~1;t:ce. in 
order to increase the level of the Commission"s activities or to extend them beyond 
fiscal 1975. -rhis is highly ur:usua1. /~~.i1 oL!J.-=:r l::gislat!on establishing pcrrnanent 
agencies except : it is believed, that applicable to the _Adrninistrativc Conference. 
authorizes the appropriation of "such sums as arc necessary"; C':en the Ad-
ministrative Conference is limited only as to tbc le\el of appropriations amhority 
and not as to its duration . 
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year 1975. The new Commission will assume m~ny of the 
product safety duties fo rmerly performed by other agencies. How-
ever, product risks cov~ red by the major preexisting product safe ty 
legislation ca n be regulated only in accordance with the provi sions 
O c t 1 "' !"' r;j<;htl:On 11' 1 ;£'<:;'; ·l]' O''P p··o·VJ:,-i,·>i''" "' l'P fo·· 'lt1U ;.,.,:),~ ,-., . . l( ' :•,:, f. l lll -\...·.::::> . .... .._"'.. ·· ~ -- l - • -' ···.J tl ..) .....- .r-' l .) _ \.... _t..) (l ~ _ .... . tltL. --~----lU(., C. 
T he func ti ons of the Commission are essentially twofold: 
( 1) T\.> dc':dc!p . tl1r• ~::.:>.11 research and test in g, to col kct. ~mel to 
',. 1 1 I . I l ' ,. I I 1 ' 
P'...lDl!~ f! n:1.ta re . ~rt ~ng tc~ t 1e cause anc prevent io n or C.;.C~ttn an~ .. i Jn -
j ury ::-tttribut~1blc to co nsu rncr products, ::G and ( 2) to develop, 
P ,. ,., ]. i 1 11ar, t " r:r;r\ f'n+'nrr r C•1 tl'"lll1'te·· pr·oduct Sro t""'ty s·, t;;'}Q
1 '1l'dS "~n ' [ . ..._ v i.~ . • :,:: v .......... '-- ··'-·- .... . . ,_, . _.. _ _, '- . .. ) _ L Ll .._, L ..... t ~.... u 1..... 
b::-tns.~' T he Cor:11nission's powers include the ::-tbili ty to se ize 
imminentiy hnarclo us products thro ugh court action ,"c' to require 
information concerning new products before their distribution , ::!u 
to require certification and labeling indicating compliance with 
safety s tandards,::o to impose obligations of notification and of re-
pair, repl acement, or refund with respect to products sold in vio-
lation of standards or bans,:n and to conduct inspections and re-
01· uire detailed recordlceening.:;~ Violat ion of the Commiss ion 's 
~ ~ 
rules and orders and failure to provide required access or to fur -
nish requi red information are made subject to civil and (if the non-
compliance is willful) to criminal penalties_ :n 
P rivate citizens are given the power to sue for damages sus-
tained by reasc)r;, of violation of Commission rules or orders/ ~ and 
~:J Section 30(d) . 
~G Sections 5-6. 
:.!7 Sections 7-11. 
:.: s Section 12. 
:2!1 Section 13. 
:>o Sect ion 14. 
: ~.1 Section 15. 
·) ·) Section 16. 
·'·.) Sections 19-2 l. 
:.;.; Section 23. While Commission action can thus be usc u as a sword , 
othe r prov isio ns seek to preven t its use as a shield in state · la11· p roceedings. 
Sectio n 25 (a) provides th at com pliance w ith Commission standarus "shall not 
relie ve an y pe rson from liability at common law o r li Ede r sta te statuto ry law." 
Quaere, whether th is means that ev idence of such co mpli ar>ce canno t be introd uced 
as one c:lcme1>t o f tl'.e p rcof of due care-or merely th a t it cannot be co nclusive 
of the iss ue . Qua ere , further, whether this provision is m eant as an absolu te ban 
-or ra the r as a me re cl:uification that no fed e ral preempt ion of s ta te law in this 
regard is intenclcc!, so th at a state legislature might, if it wi shed , pnwidc th a t co;n-
pliance with Com mission standards is rele vant to the defense . If, as seem s 
lih:•.: ly, the former is intended in each case, quacrr: as to Congress' powe r to 
pre ve nt the states fmrn referring to fede ral law in trad itio nal to rt or warranty 
actions. The mos t appealing case against such power is one in \\ hicl1 tb<.: plain tiffs 
inju ry was caused by a product feature positive ly required by Co mmi ss ion ruk. 
Perhaps simila r doub t concern ing Congressional power e\is ts with respec t to 
Sectio n 25 (b), which decrees that the f:lilure of the Commission to taKe <lc-
tiun shall not be admi ssible in evidence in litigat ion gover:1ed bv state law. 
T he m ost appealing case here is one in which the pb intif[ ( thougll not su ing 
upon the feder all y created c'wse of action) h as asserted violation of the federal 
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to sue for enforcemen t of Commission standards and bans by 
court injun ct ion if the Commission itself decl ines such enforce-
ment .:;, A procedure is also p rovided whereby any person can 
cause a United States District Court to compel Commission initia-
tio n of a rulemaking proceedin g.:~•) 
The i-\ct establishes a fifteen -membe r Product Sa.fety Ad-
\ ' i (;y·y Cm:nci! to ~lci vi ~c the Cum:ni s<; i, .,L cumpo~cci of five mem-
beL·s c~:c ll from governmen tal agencies, consumer prociuct indus-
tJi •2s, ~md consumer organiza tions. :7 There is specific provision 
fu r cOOtJ :::ration \Vi th state agencies , in ·..: lucli ng commiss ion ing of 
st ,lte em.ployees as Commiss ion officers for purposes of conduct-
ins; exm~1inations, investigations , and inspcctions .:; s The federal 
standards, however, cannot ordinarily be exceeded by state prod-
uct safety requirements. '10 
II. ROLE OF THE CHAIRMAN 
While Section 4 of the Act, which establishes the structure 
of the Commission, generally parallels legislative provisions ap-
plicable to the other principal independent regulatory commis-
sions, there are some significant differences. The commissioners 
are removable only for "neglect of duty or malfeasance in office"; 
the usual statutory grounds are " inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office. " 40 Omission of " inefficiency" in the pres-
ent statute is a concrete expression of the importance Congress 
attached to protecting the Commission's independence. The 
practical significance of the om iss ion is dubim1s, hmvever, be-
cause even under the more permissive standard, no member of 
an independent regulatory commiss ion has ever been removed by 
the President since the Supreme Court established Congress' right 
to insulate such agencies from executive control in 1935.11 
standard ::~s evidence of neg li gence, whe re the Commissio n has in fact decli ned 
to prosecute on the basis of an express determination of compl iance . 
Of at least as much importance to the pe rsona l injury bar as the new 
federal cause of action is the public av::~ il ab ility of the Co mmissio n's research 
projects and acciden t reports. See Section 25( c) . 
···• Section 24. 
:;•; Sect ion 10. 
:; ' Section 28. 
:;s Section 29. 
:::J Section 26. 
:n See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 41 ( 1970 ) (Fccleral Trade Commission); 49 U .S.C. 
s II (!970) (Inte rstate Comme rce Commission); 49 U.S.C. § 132\(a) (1970) 
(Civil Ae ronaut ics Board); 49 U.S.C. § 165 4( 11) ( 1970) (National T raff ic Safety 
Board) . 
41 Hu mphrey's Ex'r v. Uni ted States. 295 U.S. 602 (193 5) . That is 
to say, there is no instance in which the Pres ident forma lly and publicly ex-
e rcised such remova l power. It is highl y probable, however, th at re signation s 
have been prec ipi tated by the \ Vhite House . Sa , e.g., I'ARM ET, E rsENHOWER 
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The Presid ent is to designate one of the members as Chair-
man of the Comm iss ion, who shall serve in that capacity until the 
expiration of his tt:rm of office as a commissioner.u Tb is last 
provisio n is a deviation from the practice in the other indepen-
dent r:?gulatory agencies. where the designee's tenure as Ch~tirman 
(though !1L1t as ~1 commissione r) is ordinarily at the plecl:>urc of 
the Pr-csic!e1H .' ·. Still Zl!hli.hc;· dcvi,tti on fr om the norm i;; th,_: 
vi:;iun tl1 ctt rc:;crves tc the Cnmmission members th e r ight tn el ect 
a V i c c-Ch::tirm~w ::tnnua!iy. ~ ~ For those other regul atory ::tgcn-
cics tL:.1t h~~\"C a statuto r\' Vice-Chairman, it is ordin ari lv nrnvided 
.I ,.,· .l 
that l1c also be designated by the President. { ~ 
The role of the Chairman is defined in Section 4 ( t ). 
He is the principal executive offi cer of the Commission and ex-
ercises all of its executive and administrative functions, including 
appointment and supervision of personnel, distribution of busi-
ness <:mwng the units of the Commission, and the use of funds. 
These provisions closely track reorganization plans presently gov-
erning the structure of most of the independent regulatory com-
r.'1i ss ionsY: One point of difference, however, is that 'Nhereas 
those plans require collegial approval for the appointment of "the 
heads of major administrative units", the Consumer P roduct 
Safety Ac t specifies only five individual officers whose appoint-
ment is subject to Commission approval.H One might reason-
ably infer from this th at other appointments (except, of course , the 
staff of the individual commissioners) are to be made by the 
Chairman alone. This would give the Chairman somewhat 
greater authority respecting personnel decisions than is the prac-
tice in those ::1gencies operating under the reorganization plans. 
On the other hand, Section 4(f)(2) contains the impor-
tant qualification that in the exercise of a11 his executive and 
AND THE Ai\ l ERiC\N C RUSADES 520 ( 1972). Pres ident Eisenhower asserted , u n-
successfully, authority to remove a member of the War C laims Comm iss io ;1 
without a fir.din g of cause . V/ic ner v. Un ited States, 357 U.S. 349 ( i 95 8 ) . 
-!:.! Section 4(a). 
-1:; Exceptions to th is genera l rule are the Chairman of th e C ivi l ;'\emnaut ic s 
Board who se rve s for o r. e year (49 U.S.C. § 1321 ( 1970 ) ), and the Ch~1i rm an of 
the Bo::~ rcl of Governo rs of th e F ede ral Reserve System who se! rves foi· fo ut· yc,trs 
(12 U.S C. ~ 242 ( 1970) ) . 
1·1 Sect ion 4(d). 
! G E .g., 42 U .S. C. §~ 2000(e) -4(a) ( 1970) (Equal Employment Oppor-
llmiti cs Commission) ; 49 U.S.C. ~ 132 1 (a) ( 1970) (C ivil Ae rona utics E<)ard); 
49 U.S.C. ~ 165-+ (j ) ( 1970) (1"\ational T raf fic Safety Board). 
fli See, e.g. , 15 U.S.C. $ 4 1, 1950 REORG. PLAN No. 8 § J ( 1970) i Fcdentl 
T rade Commi:ision); 15 USC. s 78cl, 1950 H. EORG. PLAN No. 10 § I ( 1970 ) 
(Securi ties and Exchange Commission); 16 U.S.C. § 792, REORC. PLAN No. 9 ,,f 
19 50 s J (1970) (Federa l Powe r Commiss ion); 49 U.S .C. § 1 !, R EORC . 1' 1. \ N 
No. I of 1969 :~ I ( 1970) (lntcrstatc Cum me rcc C ommission ) . 
"' Secti on 4(g) ( I ). 
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administrative fun ctions, the Chairman must be governed by "gen-
eral policies of the Commiss ion. " Although there has not been 
any authoritative determination of the extent to which such a pro-
vision authorizes the members of an age_ncy to outvote the C ha ir-
man on adm inistrative and person nel questions, the legislativ,2 
histo ry or the 1950 reorgan iz::.tion plans supports the ~lrgumcnt 
th ~l t ~tr;;.: q:.Jcstion is cn1,: (; [ ~: - :i 1~~: r ~d pol icy it the :11ert1b ~~ r :_; n :~ ::1-l ·..; 
~tgcncy ch ~__; osc to 111akc .it so . - 1 ·~ One :.=:lcnlCilt \Vl1ici1 l1as unUuuLJt-
cdly tended to avoid tests ol' strength between Clnirmen ~:ml 
thei r ccnlulissionets l1~ts been thG iact that l11 existiag agencies the 
Chairman is the choice of the incumbent President and is ~llmn st 
invariably of the same po litic al affiliat ion as the majority of 
agency members . Since Section 4 (a) of the Act cre <:w:s the 
possibility of a Cha irman who possesses neither the confidence of 
the President nor the political sympathy of a majority of his col-
leagues, disputes may well a rise. 
III. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY RULES 
The heart of the C onsumer Product Safety Act is contained 
in Sections 7, 8, and 9, which provide for the Commission's adop-
tion of product safety rules. These are of tv.;o types: product safety 
standards and product bans. Section 9 sets forth requirements 
applicable to the adoption, amendment, and revocation of rules 
of both types, while Sections 7 and 8 provide what might be 
termed pre-rulemaking requirements for standards and bans, re-
spectively. Sections 7 and 8, in oth•cr words, establish the con-
ditions and procedures for developing the proposed product 
safety standards (Section 7) and proposed product b ans (Sec-
tion 8) to be considered for adoption under Section 9. \Vhilc the 
rulemaking procedures of Section 9 arc fairly standard , the pre · 
rulemak:ing requirements of Section 8 and (especially) Section 7 
are umquc. 
A. Section 7- Development of Product Safety Standard Pro-
posals 
1. General Description of Provisions 
In ordinary informal rulemaking (so-called "notice and com-
ment'' rulemaking, governed by 5 U.S. C . § 553), the fit·st re-
quired step is the agency's publication of .its propo~al i!1 tllc F:· tf .. 
era! R egister for comment by in teres ted persons. Section 7 the 
Consumer Product Safety Act takes the innovative step of intro-
4S See, e.g., 96 CoKG . R EC. 7163-64,7362 (1950) . 
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ducing structured requiiements at an earlier stage, when the 
agency is still in the process of developing its own initial propos::ll. 
Under the provisions of this section, the first recmired stec is that 
~ L 
the Commission publish in the Federal Register not a proposed 
1 
1 , , 1 C , . . I . . , 
rue out "tne ommJSsiGn's ueternmut10n tn at a consumer prod-
uct safety standard is n c c·.~ s sary" \Vith respect to a particular prod-
uct 0n d ri s K.- ~ ·-~ .--r l~:~~ t puhlicatiorl 111ust include an in t:on for 
any LY2 ~· ~ on , includin~ .:1ny state or fe:derat agenc)'··, to s ~i b ; 1 1 i t ~1n 
cxistin2 stztndetrd 2_>; th ~  ~~ ri _) i1 ) Cised r-u1c or to develoo a J1C\V stanci·-.._.. .. .. .1.. 
ard. Unless the Cc :;uni:o:sion determines that an existing go'lem-
mentai or priv:1te st:mcbrcl would, if adopted, suffice, it n:ust ac-
cept at least one of the respons ible offers to develop ;::t proposal. 
The Commission m::1y agree to contribute to the development 
cost, 00 and it must prescribe regulations governing the de~elop­
ment ·which include provision for "notice and opportunity by in-
terested persons (including representatives of consumers and con-
sumer organizations ) to participate in the development . . . ." 
and for the maintenance of public records disclosing the course 
of the development and the comments received. 51 
During the period fixed for development of the proposed 
standard by the offeror ( se t forth in the Commission's invitation 
-150 days unless the Commission for good reason specifies oth-
erwise':; 2), the Commission may not itself proceed with develop-
ment, except that the Conunission may proceed simultaneously if 
the only development offer accepted is one by a manufacturer, 
distributor, or retailer of the product in question. 53 Not more 
than 210 days after publication of its original notice5 ~1 (unless the 
Commission extends the time by public notice stating gcocl cause), 
the Commission must publish a notice in the Federal R egister 
1a Section 7(b)(2). 
50 Section 7(d) (2) requires the Commission to adopt regulati ons setting 
forth "the items of cost in which it may participate." While rulema!::ng o f this 
type would fall within the so-ca ll ed "proprie tary" exemption to non11a l rule-
making requi rements of the Ad ministrative Procedure Act (5 USC s 553(a)(2) 
( 1970)), it is undes irable for the agency to rely upon that exemption when com-
pliance with the requirements would not othenvise be "impracticabl-e, tl:>i>ecc ::sary, 
or contrary to the public inte res t" (the standard established for the more limited 
exemotion from S USC. § 553(b) (1970)) , See Administrative Conference 
of th~ United States, Recommendation 69-8 (October, 1969), The practice of 
most ::t f:cncics is in accord with this principle . 
01- Section 7(d)(3)(B) & (C). 
"~ Sc:ction 7(b), 
50 Si'!ction 7(e)(2), 
~ -1 This period would normally give the Commission thirty cL>ys in which 
to consider and re vise the offeror-developed stand::nd-that is, the po:tion of the 
210 c!avs remaining after expiration of the required period for submission of 
offers (thirty cby$) an d the normal period fo r the successful offe ror's develop-
ment of a standard (150 days) . 
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either withdrawing its initial notice of proceeding or setting forth 
a proposed product safety stand ard or ban and thereby initiating 
a norm al section 553 rulemaking proceecling. 5 '' 
2. Basic Approaches 
Depending upon how they are interpreted and Z~p p licd. the 
"prc-rukm :d~ ing prcJCcd u, ~ :; ·' uf Section 7 may constitut .:: ~my­
thillg from the very cure of the rulemaking process to a set of 
troublesome but inconsequential preliminaries. In and uf LiJcrn-
selves, these procedures have little operative effect. They do not 
produce a rule, or even a proposed rule, but rather a pc"lJ,)~ · :: ~11 
for a proposed rule-which, if accepted by the Commission, then 
becomes nothing more than the basis for debate in the rulemak-
ing proceeding under Section 9. 
One of the major issues of procedural policy the Commiss ion 
will face is the importance it wishes to assign the Section 7 stage 
of the rulemaking process. Obviously, the Commission must re-
serve to itself, and accept responsibility for, the ultimate deter-
mination concerning the appropriate standards to be adopted. It 
may approach this task, however, in either of two ways. It may 
rely heavily upon its selection of an appropriate developer and 
upon its specification of development procedures (pursuZ~nt to 
Section 7 (d) (3)) to assure a proposal which can ord inarily 
be adopted without substantial independent work. Or it may in-
stead plan to devote a large portion of its own resources to stand-
ard development, and treat Section 7 as essentially a means of plac-
ing useful private suggestions before its staff. 
The statute can be read to permit either approach. Al-
though the Commission itself is precluded from developing its own 
standards during the "development period" in which a private 
offeror is making satisfactory progress, it may do so immediately 
thereafter. And it is clear that even during the development 
period, the Commission can prepare to evaluate the pending pro-
posal by conducting research which will in all likelihood be the 
same research needed to develop a proposal on its mvn_ ,-,e 1·11ore-
over, the ban on Commission formulation of a standard during 
the development period has a major exception which, depending 
upon hmv it is interpreted, may almost succeed in swallowing the 
55 Sect ion 7 (f) . 
5G H.R. REP. No. 1593, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 45 ( 1972): "These provisions 
should not be interp reted ... as preventing the Commission o r its staff-while 
awaiting the submission of recommended standard s-from devel oping o r acqui 1·ing 
the technical capability necessary to properly evaluate the stand ards rc co mm:::nded 
to it. " 
1973] CONSUlvJER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT 909 
rule. "' On the other hand, the intricate requirements of Sec-
tion 7-ancl particularly the provisions of subsection (d) (3) 
for recordkeeping a nd for participation by "interested persons" 
in the offeror's develo pment process-are inexplicable unless they 
were meant to re:;ult in proposals that generally would be evalu-
ated and (if necessary) rcvi sccl witho ut major independent work. 
A second :<l~ti <l r i:<; u~: u i :·roc'edur~11 policy which the Com-
mi s<o:1 \'.ill have tn confro nt i:; t h:1t n!' 11 '/zen its major evaluatic1n 
of p:·oposals clc-·. ·.:: lqJcc! under s ,:c·t ion 7 is to be made. Is it to 
take pbce irnm::c!i:1tely upon tcrmin:-ttion of the Section 7 process. 
and before a pmpos::ll is set for rulemaking-so that the stand-
ard not!cecl for comment in the normal section 553 rulemaking 
proceediug (Section 9 of the Act) is the Commission's own best 
approximation of the ideal? Or is the Commission's judgment sub-
stantially to be exercised only upon termination of the Section 9 
proceeding, when it de term incs what final standard to promul-
gate? 
Once again, these pos itions are polar, and there are innu-
merable gradations betvve-en them. Obvio usly the second of them 
is more consonant with an approach that seeks to accord great 
weight to the private developer's efforts. It has the advantage 
of avoiding the appearance, and perhaps even the substance, of 
the Commission's having made up its mind before the Section 9 
rulemaking is commenced. The rulemaking process has frequently 
been criticized on the ground that the agency's real decision-mak-
ing occurs in the formulation of the proposed rule, which is done 
vvithout public participation, and that the subsequent public pro-
ceeding to establish the final rule is often an empty show in which 
parties vainly try to reverse judgments already made. The pro-
cedure of Section 7 of the present Act provides a means of avoid-
ing such agency precomm it:nent if the privately developed pro-
posals are not intensively evaluated by the Commission until the 
conclus ion of the Sectiun 9 stage. On the other hand, the 
Section 9 proceeding is wasted if it is addressed to a proposal sub-
stantiall y different from that which the Commission ultimately 
wishes to adopt; there is indeed case law voiding rules which sig-
nificantly depart from the agency action fairly forewarned in the 
rulemaking notice.'' 8 from the sole standpo int of focusing dis-
~7 See text accompany in g notes 72-79 infra. 
5 S S ee Wag;1cr Eke. Curp . v. Vo lpe, 466 F.2d 1013 ( 3d C ir. 1972). Such 
invalidation can ;1 iways be avoided by conducting a fu:thcr rulemaking when-
ever, at the terminat io n of the Secti o n 9 pmcccding. the Commission finds 
that it prefe rs a course subs tan ti a lly different from ::mything noticed o r di s-
cussed; but this proced ure :Jwulcl ce rta inly be a last re so rt : athe r tha n a regui<H 
practice. 
. "· ' 
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cussion m a Section 9 proceeding, it is undoubtedly preferable 
for the Commiss ion to make substantial evaluation and revi-
sion of the Section 7 -developed standard as soon as possible. 
In practice, the Commi ssion' s manner of operation may lie 
somewhere betv;een ( 1) <1u tom ~1 ticdly noticing the Secti on 7 -de-
velcmccl m onos :.ll fo r Scct[on 9 rulemaking and (2) fullv refining 
_l.. J._ ..._ '-" .J .._, 
thr~ Cornn;. .iss io11 ~s 0 \\'11 p c1:-; it~ l ~ ;: bcfc rG C CH1111l~.l1C C 111C nt of the Sec-
tion 9 proceed in~ . There :.:i"<.:: ;;::::: ~t;J:.; by w11ich the Commission 
can focus the Section 9 irq:Jiry upon the issues it deems signifi-
C[tnt vvithout Cil tirely d ~ finin g its O\VI1 stanclard : 'lll1cn publish-
ing the privately developed standard, it can ident ify ccrtelin 
features as problems which it v:oulcl ll..l.;:e to have addressed; and 
its own staff may make written and oral comments in the proceed-
ing which channel the discussion still further. 
3. Necessary Findings 
The commencement of a Section 7 proceeding requires a 
determination by the Commission that "a consumer product safety 
standard is necessary to eliminate or reduce the risk of injury.""() 
No procedures are set forth by vvhich this determination is to be 
made, and presumably it can be done informally by the Commis-
sion's internal process vvithout public consultation. 
After the Commission has received (or developed on its 
own) a proposed product safety standard, it may decide that it is 
not worthwhile to proceed into the Section 9 stage of the rulemak-
ing, and abort the proceeding .immediately. 00 A lthough the Act 
does not set fo rth any particular determination which must be 
made in order to do this, it would be exceedingly strange to 
terminate the proceeding without giving any reason. No mat-
ter the terms in which that reason is expressed (for example, in-
feasibility of establishing a standard, excessive social cost of in-
creased product prices) , it must in fact boil down to a contra-
diction of the earlier determination that a standard vvas "neces-
sary." Since that is so, it can be expected th at the Commission's 
initial determinations of necess ity will be couched in tentative 
terms-for cxamp1e, "on the bets is of information now available to 
it, the Commission has tcr;.t<ltiveiy determined, etc ." 
4. Selection of Offeror 
vVhen the Comr.:.1ission receives offers to develop product 
safety standards under Section 7, there are several important de-
59 Section 7(b) (2). 
co Section 7(f). 
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terminations it must make. First is the determination that 
"the offeror is tecbn iccllly competent, is likely to develop an ap-
propriate stanci::lrd within the period specified in the invitation 
... and will comply with the regulations of the Commission 
[ . ' I . I ·1 ,.,., 0 1 ·c l . governmg stanc12ru c:cve_opment_. · ·· n.y H t :ese requEe-
mcnts arc not IW~ L ccm the C ommiss ion decline all of fers and mo-. 
the Conlrnis .s iou ~ u ~~ :..J ·J }Jt f ;2g~il~itl CiJS dr2 fining ~1S scccific011y ~l ~: 
O .S;bl a t!-1 ~ ::t- -..,. ...... 1- ... : .. l C ... , ... "' ..... ....,y.--"),, l r-." 1·t- -": rill ·-n l : .... ("'), ,....Ji~ ::-.... -p s l tlJ ;,c ll,\. J:l!!Cdt Ud·}A.-lGt vC c '"~ lC ·,lcliLt, . L.lt '.:..' C gc: n-
1 I . '1 b 1 j b ·c· . era1 regu"ations c•,j L!HJ e ::; upp1cmentcr y spccmc rcq'cnrcments 
set forth in the not!r:e inviting offers in the particubr case. Tile 
House Committee report nlukes clear that the offeror need not 
have p ast stanciard-writ!ng experience or particular knowledge of 
the product for which the standard is intended, and that universi-
ties and research laboratories are potential candidates. 62 The 
Commiss ion's authority to contribute to the offeror's cost of de-
veloping a standardn:3 is intended to enable consumer organiza-
tions and other groups without economic resources to play a role 
in the development process. 04 
The statute does not prevent the Commission from choosing 
more than one qualified offeror and provides no criteria for pre-
ferring one to another. The choice apparently need not be sup-
ported by reasons, and is probably n ot judicially reviewable a bsent 
an extraordinary abuse such as bribery or racial discrimination. 
5. Regulations Governing Development of Proposed Consumer 
Product Safety Standards by Offerors 
The provision of the Act requiring the Commission to pre-
scribe regulations compelling "notice and opportunity by inter-
ested persons . . . to participate in the development of stand-
ards" 05 provides a useful means of promoting truly broad-based 
private proposo.1s. If not intelligently applied, however, it could 
seriously hamper the operation of an already cumbersome rule-
making procedure. 
It js not clear from the ]anguage of the Act that all inter-
ested persons must be allovvecl to p8.rticipate-and indeed, jf that 
\Vere the case we would have a ru1emaking on the rulemaking-
that is, a full-fledged public proceeding under Section 7 in order to 
develop the proposal that will be the subject of a full-fledged 
Gl Section 7 ( cl) ( .1 ) . 
G~ H.R. R EP . No. 1153, 92cl Cong., 2d Sess. l5 (1972). 
G3 Section 7(d)(2). 
6·! H.R. R EP. No. 1153, 92d Cong., 2d Scss. 15 (1972). 
GG Section 7 (d)(3)(B) . 
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public proceeding under Sec tion 9. This result can only be avoided 
by the Commission's exercise of reasonable d iscretion in l imiting 
the number of "interested persons" who m ay participate and the 
m anner of their p arti cipation . T his seems permiss ible w ith in 
the language of the sta tute . It wo uld prob ably be best achieved 
by the Commis s \on · ~ inc\ ucl ii1 g in the general regulat io ns adop ted 
under Scc tiorl 7 \ d ) ( _; i ~ L c:ros:; --rd crcnc 2 ro spec ifi c ; :~:·u v i :c ),_ , n• ; 
• 'rl " " \ . . :11 b ~ ·tpnlt-"·1 •·c· , ., , .'t, " '• r· • :, .Lt.l'l l- p l··oc c " d l. r1 c:r 'lll d l. llc l·, l·" · 't i ··· L ul \! c; '-- y \..- Ll l ' l.- d .. 1- 1 i J '--L :,.! ....., '-- . ~,.~ .::::;, '-- .t. u o.._._ ..._... ..._ ... _l l 
the Com m iss io n's no tice solicit ing offe rs . Thus, the general reg-
ulation migh t mcrdy sta[c th at the offeror sh all g ive n u tice of h is 
project to such inclividu::ds and organizations as the C omm ission 
may specify in its no tice, and th at h e shall permit such of those 
individu als and organi zations to p articipate as the Commiss ion 
may subsequently direct after receipt of their request to do so . 
The number and ident ity of participants in each case could thereby 
be regulated by the Commission , rather than left to the discretion 
of the offe ror or to th e clearly unsatisfactory determination of cir-
cumstance. 
The A ct does not describe what "opportunity to p artici-
pate" consists of, and it will be up to the Commission to give 
content to the term. It certainly means more than just being in-
formed-and must be interpreted to include some ability to make 
comments and suggestions. On the other hand, it probably can-
not be read to give persons other than the developer fin al say on 
any issue. n6 But with in these broad limits , there are widely vary-
ing manners and degrees of "participation" that the Commission 
might requi re . Obviously, its willingness to put " teeth" into the 
participation requirements should vary directly with the degree 
of reli ance it intends to place upon the private development pro-
cess.r;' 
If the num ber a nd identity of participants is res tr icted as 
suggested above, one model for implementing the p articipation re-
q uirement might be the following : The Comm issio n's g:: ner ~ll 
regulations might conta in requi rements for weekly m eetings at 
wl1ich the developer would give p rogress reports to representa-
tives of the oJrtici pants ztnd receive their cornrn et!ts CJ1 C ~ s u g: ~es-• . ~~ 
tions. T his model- and any m odel wh ich envi:;; ic ns so me o ral 
proceedings-r~tis cs the issue of recordkeeping . The Act requires 
GG The beg inni ng of Sec ti o n 7(cl) ( 3 ) refers to regu la tions "go verning th e 
develop men t o f pro posed C\l i; su m er produ ct safety sta nd a rds by persons •;·hose 
offers are accepred'' (em phasis added). M oreo ver, the p roh ibi tion aga[:;st th e 
Commission 's co ntra ct ing with third part ies duri ng the develop men t period 
(Sectio:~ 7 (c ) (2) (B )) lvuulC: be nuga to ry if the Comm iss ion coul d co mpel th e 
develope r to accep t th e t.k l e r mi r: a~i o n s of (>lh e rs. 
6 7 See text acco m pa ny ing no te s 56-5 8 supra. 
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the ''maintenance of records ... to disclose ... the comments 
and other i n fo nn~t i on submitted by any person in connection with 
such development. " 08 The Commission's regulations might well 
specify that comm ents and information will not be deemed "sub-
mitted" fo r thG purposes of thi s provision unless provided to the de-
veloper in \'.T ittcn form. Th e courts would likely give defer ence 
to th r::. C:m;:: ic., i :' n int e rp r <2t ~1t i o n of the statute rather than im-
fJ OYi.n 8 th e ii1 1[1i. ~ t t...:t i c a l ~uH.L sr:cn1 ingly u nn cc ~~::-< t r ~-.l rcqu ircn1cnt 
of verba.t im ti·;msc riprs lor a ll oral presen tations. 
T he A.ct dc)cs not set fo rth the procedures by which the de -
velopment regubt ions required by Section 7(d)(3) are to be 
adopted. In the absence of specification, the "notice-and-com-
ment" info rmal rulemaking procedures of the Administrative 
Procedure Act wo uld normally apply. r;o It is arguable, however, 
that these regulations fall within the "proprietary" exemption70 or 
the "procedural" ex em ption71 to this provision of the AP A . 
Even if th ese exemptions could validly be applied, it would be 
ext remely unfortunate not to follow the section 553 procedures 
for the adoption of regulations so central to the functioning of the 
regulatory scheme. 
6. Special Provision for Offeror Who is a "Manufacturer, Dis-
tributor, or Retailer" 
As noted above, the Commission cannot develop its own 
standard while an offeror is proceeding satisfactorily with his de-
velopment. This restriction , insubstantial in any case, does not 
even apply when "the sole offeror whose offer is accepted . . . is 
the manufacturer, distributor , or retailer of a consumer product 
proposed to be regulated by the coilsumer product safety 
stand ard . , .,~ T he language of this exception poses a difficulty: 
D oes the exception to the prohibition of Commission development 
apply when the offeror is a trade association or a combination of 
manufacturers, dis tri butors, or ret ailers? 
Str ictly interpreted, the langu age of the except ion would not 
cov:::r a tr8cle association , since "manufacturer" , "di stribu to r" , 
and "retailer" are dehned terms that do not include such an or-
ganization. 'c' Whether this strict interpretation should be fol-
lowed depends upon what the purpose of the exception is consid-
GS Section 7 (d )( 3)(C). 
() !) 5 u.s.c. § 553 (1970) . 
10 5 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2 ) (1 97 0). 
71 Part (A) of the las t sentence of 5 U.S.C. § 55 3(b ) . 
<:! Secti on 7( e ) (2 ) . 
' 0 Sections 3 (a ) (4 ) . 3( a) (5J, & 3(a)(6). 
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erect to be. If it is seen as an expression of skepticism that a bus-
inessman can be expected to develop a really "tough" standard for 
his own product, then clear1y a trade association should be treated 
like ili'1 individual manufacturer. Orr the other hand, the pro-
vision might have quite Q different purpose-namely, not to pro-
tect the pL!blic ::l _?: tir; st businessmen, bu t to protect businessmen 
against their co :'F'>·.:: t~ c::n:';. Tli ~l t is. it might be thou.::; ht C.\ceed-
ing!.y lll"l '."/ i:;c to g ~~. · ~ . l ·-:: !(.: r~~ ~ l. l~u ~·:-Jc tu rcr the o_p.poTtunity uf de-
l . . ' . . . l 1 . 1 1 . d ve opmg a prop o~::.;r_t st c.DCJarcl wlucn 1c Knows oruy ms pro uct, 
Both views f i!!d <;upport in th e legi slative history. T11e bill 
passed by the House \-Vould have barred the Commission from de-
veloping a proposnl once it had accepted a private offer to de-
velop one.74 The bill adopted by the Senate, on the other hand, 
contained two provisions designed to maximize the standard-set-
ting role of the Commission and minimize that of industry. The 
first, derived from the NCPS bill, 7 5 would have permitted the 
commissioners to develop p roposa1s even after accepting a private 
offer. 76 The second, an amendment added on the floor by Sena-
tor Nelson, would have precluded "a manufacturer, developer, 
or retailer or the ernployee of a manufacturer, developer or retailer 
of a consumer product" from offering to develop a standard with 
respect to that product." The purpose of this amendment, in 
Senator Nelson's words, was "to insure that, whenever the Con-
sumer Agency delegates to a nongovernment group the responsi-
bilities for suggesting proposed consumer product safety stand-
ards, that group or any of its members wou1cl not have an eco-
nomic stake in the manufacture or sale of the products involved. 
"
78 Tne bill which emerged from corJerence compromised 
the disagreement by permitting industry members to develop 
standards (contrary to the Senate provision) but allowing the 
Commission to proceed on its own when they do so (contrary to 
the House provision). From this much, one might reasonably 
7 ·1 H.R. 15003, 92d Cong., 2cl Sess. § 7(e)(2) (1972). 
75 S. 983 , 92d Cong., 1st Sess . § S(c) (1971); H.R. 815 7, 92cl Co ng., 1st 
Sess. § S(c) (1971) . 
7G S. 3419, 92d Cong. , 1st Sess . § 304 (1972). 
77 I d. § 303 (c ) ( 1 )( C) . 
78 11 8 CONG. l~E C. S. 9925 (d aily ed. June 21, 1972). Serwtor Nelso n 
furthe r described tho:: problem <ts fo llows: 
I d. 
The most se rious cond emnat ion of the vo lunta ty standard s system which 
emerged from tlH: slucEes of the Produ ct Safe ty Commiss ion a nd othe rs 
- u pon whose recommendatio ns this enti re bill is based-w ;:; s th e chronic 
tendency of the standards committees to be dom inated by co mpanies 
with an economic stake in the proc(nct. T he resu lt was that s tanda rd s 
generally m et the lowest commo-n denominato r in the ma rketplace . 
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infer that the exception from the prohibition of Commission de-
velopment was a limited response to the same problem addressed 
more drastically by the Nelson amendment-namely, the danger 
of lax, self-serving industry-developed standards--in which case 
it should be applicable to an offer from ct group or association of 
self-interested persons no less than to an offer frorn a single indi-
ferees, offered o. different explanation tor the conference compro-
mise: 
The conference version retains a very limited port io ~t o[ the 
Nelson an1.endn1cnt Dro\·iding that in th e v~rv 1itni t.:;cl si tuzlt ion 
wherein a manufacturer of a product is tl1e one ~mel only 
offeror in a bid to create a product standard, the Corm~;ission 
may concurrently invest igate and develop a similar standard. 
Such a provision is justified in that the Commission should 
have independent knO\vlcdge of the subject m ::t ttcr who::re only 
one outfit is working up a standard which will apply to its 
product and similar products of possible competito!·s. In all 
other cases the Commission is foreclosed from duplicating the 
work of offerors to avoid unnecessary double expense. 7 !l 
It should be noted that neither the J".J elson purpose nor the Broy-
hill purpose is wholly achieved by Section 7(e)(2), since the ex-
ception to the prohibition of Col1llllission standard development 
is never applicable when two or more offers are accepted, even 
though they all come from interested companies. In such a situ-
ation there remains intact both the danzer that the resuiting mo-
~ ~ L 
posals might be lax, for the benefit of the industry <:ts a vvhoJe, 
and the danger that they might be designed to favor the particu-
lar developers over their competitors. But it is at least within 
the Commission's power to avoid this situation, since there is no 
obligation to accept more than one qLwlified offer. 
The choice between these two positions is extremely close. 
The dialectic process of proposal and counterproposal out of 
which the provision emerged makes it almost inescapable to infer 
that it was a partial accommodation of Senator J'-.Telson's concern, 
rather than a response to an anti-competitive problem not pre-
viously discussed-and hence to conclude that standard develop-
ment by the Commission is no more precluded when the only ac-
cepted offer comes from a trade association than when it comes 
from an individual manufacturer. Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
disregard the only statement in the legislative history specifically 
directed to the point, especially vvhen made by a member of 
the conference committee in which the provision originated. 
~~ 118 CONG. REC. H. 9909 (daily ec!. Oct . 13, 1972). 
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7. Conclusion of Section 7 Portion of Proceeding 
Within 210 days after publication of its invitation, the Com-
mission must either (1) withdraw the notice of proceeding, (2) 
publish a proposed safety standard , or (3) publish a proposal 
to ban the relevant product. so A special problem arises when the 
Commission adopts the third alternative : Is such a publica-
·- · , ,,1 ,.,_~ : •' L,, )l"" t ) [4 "' ~. 1_,_,-.. ~.,~! ,,-. . ~ ,.- l • ; · t ~ r·! ~· · ·~·~tJ · -, .. j•·: ()L' (: ~, . -r- : .. ,- .. . , c~) 
t !.. ·~ . \.. l i. (. l u ~u i t '" ' _l ..._l_lt,d ll i ... ~\._ 1:_ Lt .d\... ~ r- 1 L. ' . . ... dU i ~\.. ) l .....;,_,\_- i.O 'J.;. l I l 
alone, or must it also comply \Vith Sec tion 8'? That is, mu st the 
publication be accompanied by the Section 8 findings that the 
product is distributed in commerce and presents an unreasonable 
risk of injury, and that no feasible product safety standard can 
eliminate the risk? Of course it is essential that the Commission 
consider these elements likely before commencing a product ban 
rulemaking-just as any agency, in proposing a rule, must con-
sider it likely that the rule is in the public interest; but that is a 
far cry from "finding" it to be correct in advance, which amounts 
to a formal prejudgment. 8 1 It is certainly arguabl e that Section 8 
sets forth not merely one means of issuing a proposed ban but 
procedures that must be followed whenever a proposed ban is 
issued. However, Section 8 is not in terms exclusive; nnd unless 
Section 7 were intended to provide an independent means of is-
suing a ban proposal, one would expect to find the phrase "pur-
suant to section 8" at the end of Section 7 (f). It may seem 
anomalous that a statute which expressly requires the Commission 
to make a finding of infeasibil ity, even wi thout h aving tried to 
develop a standard, should dispense with such a finding in cir-
cumstances where the effort has actually been made. But it is 
reasonable to view the scheme of the statute to be that before the 
Commission can commence a product ban r ulemaking, it must 
eith er mak·~ the findings requ ired by Section 8 or (as 2ct::quate as-
surance of the same careful deliberation) complete the pre-rule-
making procedures of Section 7. On balance, therefo re, it seems 
permissible for the Commission to take the des irable step of omit-
ting the Section 8 finding if it decides to issue a ban proposal 
upon conclusion of a Section 7 proceeding. There is, however, 
clearly no requirement that it do so . And as a matter of pure 
prophesy, it is diffi cult to envision its testing this legal point merely 
in order to avoid a technical prejudgment of the sort it may be 
making with some regulari ty in issuing ban proposals under Sec-
tion 8 alone. 
so Sect ion 7(£). 
Sl Sec text accompanying notes 90-9 1 infra. 
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B. Section 8-Development of Product Ban Proposols 
1. Consequences of Choice Between Standard and Ban 
Section 8 provides the procedure for developing a product 
ban proposal. Before discussing the details of that procedure, 
it might be well to point out the principal con sequences of adopt-
ing a produc t ban in stead of a product safety sumclard. Perhaps 
the most jmpurtan t pract ic ~ti cliflcr~::cc is tL~t t ~L b ~t:t ce1n k ill an 
entire product induc.try, whereas a standard-since it must be 
based, to the exccnt feasible, upon performance charac teris ticss~ 
-allows the product industry to work its way around the prob-
lem through txlmologictl in:10vation. In the days when bicy-
cles had the n1ther un stable configuration of a high front wheel 
and a tiny rear wheel, a product ban of bicycles would have pre-
vented, or at leas t retarded, development of the less dangerous 
velocipedes we now know; a product standard, on the other hand, 
requiring the vehicles to display certain stab ility characteristics, 
would in all likelihood have hastened technological progress. Of 
course, this particular distinction between ban and standard loses 
significance in direct proportion to the Commission's willingness 
( 1) to base bans, as well as standards , upon performance character-
istics, and (2) to reconsider bans not based on such characteristics 
when technology has enabled the product to be rendered safe. 
A second practical difference between a ban and a standard 
is that only the latter subjects manufacturers and private labelers 
to the certification, testing, and labeling requirements of the 
Act. s:> In some si tuati ons , then, bustncssmen might prefer 
a complete ban of a sub-product to a safety standard applicable 
to the broader product category. For example, modern manufac-
turers of bicycles might well prefer an 2.bsolute ban of high-
wheeled vehicles to a standard which in effect proscribes them by 
specifyi ng certain stability characteristics for all b~cycles. 
A third practical difference concerns the applicability of 
standards and bans to previously manufactured products. A 
standard can never be applied to products manufactured before its 
effective date;84 the retroactivi ty of product bans is not similarly 
restricted. The importance of this distinction should not be ex-
aggerated, however, since in serious cases the Commission can, 
without issuing a ban, seek a judicial declaration under Section 12 
that previous1y manufactured products are imminent hazards. 8 ~ 
82 See Section 7(a). 
83 See Section 14. 
S·l See Section 9(d) ( 1 ). 
S5 It is unclear whether the Commiss ion, wit ho ut proceeding in court under 
Section 12, can :1d0p[ both a standard applicable prospect ive ly to future output 
918 UCLA LAW R EVIEW [Vol. 20: 899 
Finally, under the Act it js only a standard that prevents 
states from generally adopting more stringent requirements. A 
stability standard for bicycles that effectively prohibits vehicles 
with wheels of more th an a thirty-six inch di ameter would be uni-
form and nation'Nide; no state would be able to adopt standards 
h · {"(" , · • · 1 • t c 1 t' ' t . I \ b t at m enect prorumt oJ::.me .ers 01 more tt1 cm ,il ir ':/ lrl C :1CS . .h . an 
Oir 1-.. jr'' rC} "'S ,• ,·i ·th , . .r ~ ' · ' :'"" ! r 1 ; ·; !--: ; :•t-.--.1· c· nf n ) r')r l~ tlJ ' •n t l l i;·;·'- · - ,~~ ~ \ 1'ncl1ee 
\,... ,__ / ·-" .. } '-../ ~ \ ~ l- ,\~t ;_ _,._, ._ ._!! •, ., o. L.l......-l•..-L. ) '-. ) .l ll l\.. · - ' -' '- · -'" ' • l ! I - . . . 1, 1 ._): 
on the other hand , co ul d b:: ':11:! p1cme;tted by sta t<::: ~ta n c!arcls or 
state bans that im po::: ·.: n1or(~ stringent rcqui rcm.cnts. (O f course 
there is no problem ::tbou t states prescribing less stringent require-
ments. 'Whether adopted by standard or by ban, the federal pro-
tection will establish a national minimLnn.8c) 
2. Scope of Commission Freedom in Selection Between Standard 
and Ban 
The choice between standard and ban poses an intriguing 
question under the Act: Is the selection to some extent dictated 
by the very nature of the safety result sought to be achieved; or is 
the Commission free in each case to use either device, depending 
upon its preference for Section 7 or for Section 8 pre-rulemaking 
procedures, and upon its desire to achieve or to avoid the practical 
results of standard-ma.l.cing just described? 
To present the problem more concretely: If the Commission 
were concerned about the use of poisonous beans in baby rat-
tles, it might choose to adopt a standard for baby rattles requiring 
that their contents be non-poisonous; but it might just as log-
ically adopt a ban on rattles which contain inedible contents. In-
stead of banning hand guns (a subject actualiy not within the scope 
of a product and a ban applicable retroactively to previou s output. The very 
ex[s tence of the standard can be said to preclude the f inding-esse nti al to a 
product ban under Section 8- that "no fe::tsible consumer pr·ocluct safety standard 
.. . would adequately protect the public." On the othe r hand , it can be asserted 
that the impermissibility of a retroacti ve standard is the stro ngest possible basis 
fo r a finding that nothing less than a ban "would adequ atel y protect the public" 
against dan gerous articles alr<~ ady in being. In implementing the latter view, the 
relevant product-widgets, fo r example- wo uld be descri bed differentl y in the 
sta nda rd and the ban; the standard would ap pl y to "a ll widgets", the ban to 
"nonconforming widgets m anufactured before the effective date of the stancl-
~Hd." It is doubtful, however, that the Com mission has th! s much flex ibility in 
defining the subject product, and in choos ing between sta ndard aml ban . See 
te xt accompanying notes 87-89 infra. 
SG It might be well to point out an ap pa rent but unreal di stinction relating to 
the effec tive date of standa rds and bans. Sect ion 9(cl) ( 1) provides th at only 
standards cannot be made effective sooner tha n thirty clays af te r their prom ulgation 
without good cause. The in fe rence that p rociuct bans ::t re not subject to a 
similar restric tion is erroneous, because a substantially identical provisio n is con-
tained in subsection 553(cl) of the Admi nistrative Procedure Act, which is 
applicable to both standards a nd ba;1s (Secti on 9(a) (2)) and which cannot 
be derogated from except "exp ress ly" (5 U.S.C. s 559 (1 970) ). 
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of the Act, 8 1 b ut irresistible as an example), it m ight just as ef-
fectively adopt a standard requiring all firearms to have thi ~· ty - s ix 
ill. ch b.-,··rels 'T'l, e ay ,-,]n"'1t :on oF th;s sor~ 1 ll· ~ trv 0 £ CO" [C: "' i n L1.a~ u.1 • 1_ 11 v . · .. }' J.. d l 1 L -... l L ~ .a. _)l u - ;, L ,_, u L~.._., , .\:-, l l i c L 
while a ban and a sta ~1 clarcl are in fact two different th ings \vhen 
they are applied to th e same product, a standard for produ ct A 
mJ.y really amount to th: ~ r; me thing as a b;:m of product B. 
where product B is a sub-:::t,:gory of product A . Unless son~,; Dc in-
c.iplc of lin1i t ~1 t i on is jrn r>n::: r::cl . tbe ciift'erc11Ce b etvvcc11 a _)i~: . ~! l:J~~.~· d 
and a ba11 n1ay reduce it ~.: t~ l f to no n1ore tl1a11 the Coninil ~-~ :~ io n ·· s 
1 . h 1 . . ,. , .1) 1 1 'b" \ ' . c l Ol CC w1 ct .1 cr to e':p ress 1tse l!: \ . oy c escn mg t11 e cna racu~ns -
tics a product must contai n or (2) by proscribing a prod1C:t th (t t 
contains or does not co11ta i11 c(::rta in characterist ics . T o LY~ ~ L~ ~- c ) 
some cases may lend themselves more naturally to one or the o ther 
fonn of treatment. But there is likely to be a large comm on 
d j • 1 1 d T • • b ' • l groun , w,1ere ertner a stanc1ar 1 or a oan m1ght e a w g:ca 
choice; and even the cases vvhich fall naturally into one category 
will often be compressible into the other. 
It seems extremeiy unlikely from the structure of the Act 
that Congress considered there to be no inherent difference betvveen 
a product standard and a product ban-that is, no difference 
other than the varying effects provided by the Act itself. I t ap-
pears that different treatment was accorded to what were deemed 
to be two different things , and not that different procedures and 
effects were intended to attach to two different ways of doing the 
same thing. 88 In short, there must be some objective m eans for 
determining what is appropriate for a standard and wh at is ap-
propria te for a ban other than the mere linguistic formula which 
the Commission chooses to use or the Commission's result-
oriented preference. 
The need for an external criterion to distinguish between 
standard and ban is much more easily recognized than supp1i sd . 
The answer probably lies in the direction of placing upon the 
phrase "consumer product" l imitations not explicitly set fo r th in 
S l .)ce Sectio n 3( a ) ( 1) (E) . 
ss If, to susta in th is poit: t, it is n ot suffici ent to cite th e Ian c:UC' '!C :ci; cl 
s tru ctu re of the en tire A ct, it mi ght be pointed ou t that the contrary i•~tc rrr-:: U! ' i on. 
if ap plied consi stently, a lmost can cels itself out. A lthough th ::t t interr ret at io n 
would giv.: the Com mission complete f reedom to p roceed under e ithCI" Sc ctior1 
7 or Section S, it would abo give the a ffected man ufac turer the ab il ity to negate 
the cho ice an cl co mpe l a Sect ion 7 p roceed ing . For in order to promu lg:\te a b~t n , 
the Comm ission mu st f ind that "no fe asib le consumer product safc: cy s tanda rd" 
would achie ve th e same ef fect. But if one adop ts the view th~: t th·: rc io; no 
difference betwee n a sta ;1c!ard an d a ban other than in the m a nner of '2 .'~ p :-c :; sion , 
the n eve ry Seccion 8 pmceeciing could be defeated and f orced b ack into Sect ion 7. 
Tbe m anufacturer of h aecl gur, s could quite easily demonst rate th 8t a feasible 
sa fe ty sta n d ~:rd fo r firearm s ( prescribing the length of their b8 rrc ~ s) ' ... ould 
achieve the same sal ut a ry effect as the absolu te ban. . 
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the definition Y.' Perh aps some such principle as the following 
would suffice: The "product" to which ei ther a standard or a ban is 
applied must include all items \Vithin a generally recognized con-
sumer goods ca tegory th at arc interchangeable for the same spe-
cific consumer use; and must not include any items not within 
that category and so interci<angcablc. Applying this princi pL: 
to our earl ia e:\ amp les : It \\C•u nnt be possible to apply a pru ~ l 
uct ban tn hahy nttles with incclihlc contents, because the rele -
va nt "J:nroduct" is a!! babv ra ttles-th ere is neither a gcncra1lv - ~ -
accepted category of, nor a specif ic consumer usc for, rattles with 
poisonous be::ms. Converse ly, it would not be possible to nd op t a 
product safety standard requiring all firearms to have thirty-s ix 
inch barrels, because firearms as a class do not constitute a "prod-
uct"-for even if fire arms are a consumer goods category (which 
may be doubtful), rifles are not interchangeable with hand guns 
for the same consumer use. To be sure, a limiting principle such 
as this could not be applied with mathematical precision. For 
example, there is surely some question whether rubber squeak-
toys can be joined with baby rattles in the product category of 
"crib toys"; and whether a proper "product" category of firearms 
is "long-bar rel sporting weapons", or rather "shotguns" an d "ri-
fles" broken o ut separately. But wi th a problem of this sort, ma the-
matical precision cannot be expected, and it is probably desirable 
that there be some degree of play in the joints. I n any case, the 
C ommission's good fa ith application of such a standard would 
likely satisfy the courts. 
3. Procedures Preliminary to Product Ban Rulemaking 
Compared with the intrica te procedures which must be fol -
lowed to develop a pro posal for a product safety stand ::~rd , !'n 
the procedures for developing a proposed product ban are simple. 
They are nonetheless unusnal; not often is an agency required to 
make specifk findings in order merely to commence a rulemaking 
proceeding. Sect ion 8 requires three findings: (1) T hat the 
product is or will be distributed in commerce; (2) that it pre-
se.nts a11 un.rca~;onai==Ie ri ~: k \).f lnju1~y; (3) that no fe~si ble consu!11er 
.) '"0 UU C t S" ;:,. 't \f '' t8 '1'1?r.r1 C ;' [1 rv· o•t,~ct '-' o--:> J· l, <: t th"' r1: ~ J.r rf]-., n,·oc -,_ t £v ..., .. '-'" '- .. "'.; v ..... J• . .. -l '"l ..... .I'J ....- ... t..l ,::, 'L ~-~ · ··"-' ...... , ;._"'\.., ~:. !• ..... 1 .... .. _.C 
1 [ } . ' ' c · j ' 1 1 . . "" ' c.m-e 'Y w 1~ cn tnt~sc un~ mgs are to oe mac.e 1s not specmeG; pre-
sumably it can be cl one informally, without public notice or con-
sultation . ,-fhese ini t!ai dctc rn1 inat! SJl :;: are, of COUr~~~ not judi -
c ially l·eviewab :e, since they result net in :.my fi n n! Commis<;ion :J.c-
sn See Section 3(a)(l). 
~) 0 S ee test acco rn pany ing riOtes 4~) - 55 supra . 
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tion, but merely in the commencement of a deliberative proceed-
ing looking towards possible action. 
I t seems strange to require the Commission to determine in 
advance the very issues that will be the subject of the rulernaking 
proceeding. All three of these findings , of course, must be "re-
found" in the Section 9 proceeding in order to promulgate a ban .!ll 
Thu,:, th e L:.r 1 ~·.:: ~ ~ gc o[ the st::1tute h::1s somethiug cf the fl::-tvor of 
"judgment first, tri:-tl i::ltcr." Of course at th e cio.::c of the pro-
ceeding the Cornmiss ion may determine that a h:1n is not appro-
pri a~e , but to do so it would have to reverse one or another of its 
earlier finding s. 
It may be possible for the Commission to avoid this formal 
prejudgment by declining to proceed under Section 8 and pro-
ceeding i~:.stcad under Section 7. As noted a.bovc, at the con-
clusion of the Section 7 proceedings, the Commiss[on may set 
for rulemaking, if it wishes, not a proposed standard but a 
proposed ban- -and it can arguably do so without m;.lking the 
Section 8 findi ngs. n:! This method of proceeding has the further 
advantage of generating for use in the Section 9 rulemaking what is 
presumably the most effective safety standard that could be adopted 
as an alternative to a ban; it is frankly difficult to see how the "in-
feasibility" of such an alternative can be established without some 
preliminary attempt at developing one. The only disadvantage of 
proceedi ng via Section 7 instead of Section 8 is the greater amount 
of time involved, by reason of the 150-day "development pe-
r iod ." But if the matter were truly urgent, the Commission would 
not proceed exclusively by rulemaking anyway, but would move 
in the courts under Section 12 to eliminate an "imminent haz-
ard."83 Section 8 does not produce an immediate ban; it merely 
"t The las t two of them must be specifically recited. Section 9 (c) (2) 
provides: 
The Commiss ion shall not promulgate a consumer p roduct safety n!le 
unless it finds (and includes su ch finding in the mle) -
(C) in the case of a mle declaring the product a banned hazardous pro-
duct, tha t no feas ible consumer product safety standard und er this Act 
would adequate ly protect the public from the unreasonable risk of inj ury 
associated with such a product. 
i\s for the fi rst of the findings-that the product is o :· wi ll be clistribu tcd 1n 
ccn~m ::: rce-it would seem essential in order to sustain the constitu; ional ity of 
federal act ion . F or the word "commerce" is defined (Sectio;, 3 (a) ( 12 )) to in-
clude not merely "trade, traffic, com merce or transpo rtation" which is between 
or among states, but also any o ther trade, traffic, co mmerce or tmnsportation 
whi ..: h ":1 ffe c~ s " Sl!Ch inte rst ate co mmerce. Thus "dist ribu tio n in commerce" unde r 
the Act amoH:1ts to the constitutiona i minimum, u nless it is thought possib le for 
inte;·:;t:1t.: comme rce to be affected, a nd for the defini ti on of "consumer produc t" 
(Section ~ (a)(!)) to be met , without any distribution (see Section 3(a)(ll)) in 
any !raJ <: , traffic, commerce or transportation. This seems most unlike ly, if not 
1 !tte:~-Iv i rnilo ~. ~;i b !c . 
~~~ S~e text accompanying no tes S0-81 supra. 
D~ Sec text accompanying note 183 infra. 
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commences what may be a protracted Section 9 proceeding. Time 
pressures, therefore, can justify use of the Section 8 procedure only 
when a lengthy delay is tolerable but the addition of 15 0 more days 
~o t. h2t d~: z:y '" 1~ot Such situations will be rare . 
C~. 
l .:' c/ Safety I\ rtlcs 
l. In Gen~ral 
Cbc.:: , IJ'\>n:L::mD.king stage of Section 7 ur 8 has bc:-~n 
completed, the. fundamental framework of procedure for adop-
tinn of produc t '<J.ft:ty rules is not unusuaL Sect ion 9 (a) provides 
.. l' · · s-..., " · _, " 1 k. 1 !or orumary scc: ~on ) :J notlce-anu-comment ru ema. ·mg-t1at 
is, a Drocsdure v;hereby a nroposecl r ul e is Dublishcd by the agencv 
"- .1.. .JI._ !.. ..__, J 
and interested p::rrti es are given an opportunity to file 'Nr itten com-
Ii1snts with in a specified period-with the added req uirement that 
parties be perE1 itted to make oral presentations .\) ·! Thi s is not an 
"on-the-record" proceeding, so that the Commission may properly 
consider i:1fo rmation which comes to its attention b y means other 
th ::m the brmal vvri tten responses and oral presentations. The 
Commission may receive ex parte presentations by some parties 
wi thout opportunity on the part of other parties to respond ; it is 
not necessary that those C ommission employees who m ake argu-
ment in the course of the oral presentation be separate and distinct 
from those who advise the Commission with respect to its final 
determination ; and it is not necessary that the oral proceeding be 
conducted by an adminis trative law judge . 
Of course, these Section 9 requirements for notice and com-
ment and oral presentation are merely minimums. The Commis-
sion may, if it \vishes, adopt additional procedures of various types, 
including c.n opp ortunity for the parties to comn1ent upon one 
~1.no ~b. c: r 's T; !·e:;e:ntc,t:ons. I t could even provide fo r a full-fledged 
tr ial-type prccceding like th.ose governed by sec tion ~; 554, 556, 
and 5 57 of the Administrative Procedure Act, though that would 
in most cases be clearly inappropriate.% 
!J ± Section 9(a)(2 ) . The requirement of oral presentation is perhaps the 
most com men inst:mce of what h as become a regular-and generally u ndesi rable-
Congressional ;; '·'lc tice of adding to the standard m andatory procedures of 
'cct ic :-' 55.3 cE the Admini strat ive Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 ( 1970). S ee 
J.-Tamiltc:1 . Procedures for the Adop tion o f Rules of G eneral Applicability: The 
A ced for i'rucedurd l nnc;·ation in A dministrat ive Rulemaking , 60 CALIF. L. REv. 
1277, 1313-30 ( ~ ~)72) . See also Admini stra tive Conference of the United States 
R eccnuncndutiOil 72-5; Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of G cneml App lica~ 
bility, pa;·. 2 (Dc:c . 1972) . 
~,;; See i\clrni nistra ti\·e Conference of the United States. Recommendation 
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2. Role of the Commission Staff 
A questio!l inm1.ecliately arises as to the role which the Com-
mission staff ~ohould play in Section 9 proceedings. Should they 
appear to argut in favor of the proposed rule, with or wjthout 
certain modifications? Or is jt more reasonable-especially in 
vic\v cf the f ;_-tct t :_ ·: ~lt t!·~e proposecl r1Jle 111ay not h av~ been devcl-
op~cl by tL ~ . .: (~· (,~;_: :. - .:~· - -- ~ -. - i_~. ~ f-~n ~_! S(~ the fJrG CCi.~ ~~l i ng ;.15 I ~ l' ~· ·; ··~ ly 
"!1 0r'C'>"i •' '1 +',". , .. , , . ,_, : , .::c• T • ', .·, !"'l'l ' ' ~ 1 ''l' t " 0-1" lJl'l.\r'lt·• ,, ~ .. c ; ,., ,. '' '' '1 ' u (.l ......- !.A0 ... v l_,_ _!_\__);_ !..\-.,~ '-' '- ~ !!.~ ;;:. l l<V -V t.l ... .._~~l.) .I .L. ' (. V l J <..ll Ll '...-.J~ \.1 .~ ~ ·- ~ l 
reserve t h~:: s f~l t'f ~ ~~ iri pl ~:- for a later stag~ \Vhe11 they \viti adv i:-c the 
Commission i tsr ii~ Ui l i~s fiaal decision? On balance, the former 
rl •' . , 'f . . bl proce.~ urP. seemc: p'· ·: I~l· s ote, L not mev1ta . e. 
The Act requires the courts to overturn a final rul e unle:~;~.; 
the Commission's underlying findings are "supported by substan-
tial evidence on the record ."% Although the artificial definition 
of "record" for th::lt p~l.tpose enables the Commission to bring to 
the court's attention matters not actually set forth in the proceed-
ings connected with the rulemaking,97 the plaintiff would almost 
surely be granted an opportunity to refute such new evidence 
through a court-ordered remand to the Commission for that pur-
pose.98 The Commission should therefore insure that the record 
made before it contains evidence which will support its final de-
terminations . It seems essential to this end that the staff make its 
own presentation. 
3. Necessity of Reason for I naction 
A gencies are not ordinarily required to g1ve reasons for in-
action. The CGns~uner Prod:.1ct Safety Act, hmvever, clirccts the 
Commission to EEke a specific finding if it chooses not to adoot 
- ~ L 
a uroduct s~1fct~/ r ~Jle after COll111!GI1cen1ent of a rulernakin g oro-
..~... o/ ........ .... 
rl . 0 ') ~ ' , 1 , • . , - 1 . 10 cee'"'mg. · lileteco, ue GecJSion not to proceect turt 1u· must 1tse r 
be mack "by r:.;le ."lrJ n \Vhik the necessary finding is of the most 
geJ1.(: r a1iz~:d ~-; G .rt (to \Vi! 5 that the lJroduct safety r~tle is 11 0 t 
"•-"'''<:rnr;hh,r ,., ,. 0 ,.;~ ~"'' ,._r 1· ,, tl1 P Pllbl1'c J:l,'L~ e· r·p.s t" 101 ) .J..''-"' '-t •_.J ~ _ (...i..} •~; - .a. '- _ ._,.._,,.J~ • ..l.~; e • • JJ.. • • • . .l.L _ .. -' ..._ 1 1...1 ' 
it will in all probability be subj ect to judicial reviev;. It is to be 
noted th2t l_y;;c::J.u se of possibly g:·e o. ter 2.menability to court chal .. 
1 f' . , ' . . . • • 1'' 1 1 1 c . enge oL act;o:l unc,,:: <' tn!s provisiOn, 1t 1s Jl--::e y t 1at t11e omm1s-
72-5: Procfdiircs f or the Adoption of Ru les of G f neral Applicr.bilily, prtr. 3 
Dec. 197:2 ) : l :.. . L\\ \'! 5. ADHlNISTRATl\ E LAW TREnrss § 6.06 (1958). 
OG SccLion J l(c) . 
H"i" Se \.:t iorl i l(a) . See text acc ~.J nlpunying notes 133-44 /nfra. 
~) S s ~ ct iO rt i 1 (b) ~ pcc~fica!! y pc rn1its app]ication for such ren1and. 
n ~J ~).~ction 9 ( <1) ( 1) (B) . 
100 Jd. 
1 o 1 I d. 
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s1on will be induced to abort a Section 7 proceeding before it 
reaches tbe Sec tion 9 stage, if the undes irability of a rule is by 
that time aircady clear. 1 0 c 
4. Ability to /',clopt Diffe rent Type of Product Rule From Type 
Noticed 
Notl·;~j1g iE s~>. .. :L~l i! 9 uf the i\ct cxpl icit.ly re: c_ iui r~.: s the :·u L: 
which is promulgated at the termi na tion of the proceedin g tu be of 
the same type (i. e., standard or ban) as that proposed in the 
notice. In fact, the statutory language seems to imply the con-
trary by r equiring the Commission to promulgate mereiy a con-
sumer product safety rule" 10 :3 rather than "a consumer product 
safety rule of the type published." 
As a matter of general administrative law, and aside from the 
peculiar prov isions of the present Act, all that is necessary to sus-
tain a rule is that the end product of the rulemaking proceeding 
be sufficiently similar to the action formally proposed (or raised 
as a possibility) in the notice as to have afforded interested per-
sons a realistic opportunity to address the issues relevant to the 
agency's final decision.1 01 It would seem that a product ban pro-
posal would automatically raise those issues relevant to adoption of 
a product standard-because one of the elements which must be 
established for a product ban determination is the infeas ibility 
of any product standard to eliminate the relevant risk. The con-
verse is c·~rtainly not tr:1e, however, since consideration and rejec-
tion of a product standard does not necessarily lead to the n'.:xt 
step of considering whether a complete ban is in the public inter-
est. I t would seem that the Commission could r emove all doub t 
of compliance with this requirement of general administrative 
law by explicitly setting forth in its notice, as one of the issues it 
vvishes to have: addrcs~cd, "whether, if the proposed [::: tandard] 
[ban] is 1..m d,~str 2.ble , some other product safety rule designed to 
meet the sarn:; r lsk, including a [different standard or a product 
b an] [prod uct s~fety standard] would be in the public interest." 
But ~',side from the requirements of general administrz,tive 
law, the peculiariti es of the Consumer Product Safety Act prob-
ably ma!.:e it impossible, even if adequate warning is given, to 
begin a Section 9 proceeding with a product ban proposal and to end 
by p::onu :lgating a producl safety standard. F or .if the Commis-
sion were allowed to operate in th at fashion, the private develop-
J o ~ See text accom panyi ng notes 152-57 infra. 
103 Section 9(a) ( 1) (A ) (emphasis added) . 
104 See Wagner Elcc. Corp. v. Volpe, 466 F.2d 1013 (Jcl C ir. 1972). 
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ment provisions of Section 7 could be evaded. Of course there 
is no problem where Section 7 proceedings have already been held 
and, because they produced no feasi ble standard, have resu lted in 
issuance of a ban proposal rather than a standard proposal under 
Section 7 (f) . 10 ~ But whe re the ban proposal has been clcv,2l · 
oped via the Section 8 rout e r:.tthcr tho.n the Sec tion 7 route, it wendel 
seem impermissible--and !< in ::_ny event ckar1y undes irablc-·- fo r 
the Section 9 proceeding [ll t<~ rminate in pw mul gation of a stancl-
arcl. This is an adcliti on,11 r c a~on for gcncc:l11y developing prod-
uct ban proposals under Section 7 rather than under Section 8. 
5. Identification of "Risk of Injury'' 
Section 9 (b) requires that the rule itself identify the risk 
of injury which it is designed to eliminate or reduce. Obviously, 
this risk will be susceptible of description with greater or lesser 
specificity. The more narrowly it is defined, the easier it becomes 
to challenge particular provi sions of the rule as unnecessary and 
therefore arbitrary. On the other hand, in the case of a product 
standard the more broadly the risk is described, the greater the 
danger that desirable state action \vill be inadvertently fo reclosed 
-since the risk description is the mecbanism that controls the 
preemption provisions of Sec tion 26 (a) . 
6. Stockpiling Provision 
The stockpiling provision of the Act is in one respect inart-
fully drawn. It states that the Commission may prohibit "a man-
ufacturer" from stockpi1 ing, so as to prevent "such manufacturer" 
from circumventing the purpose of the product safety rule. 1 0 a This 
language should not be interpreted as implying that the Commis-
sion may direc t such ac ti cn ag<linst one manufact urer alone, r ather 
than applying the provision to the entire relevant market. ror 
the action in question is to be taken " by rule", and a rulema.k::ing 
proceeding is clearly inappropriate for act ion directed punitively 
against a single individual or directed against him because he alone 
for some reason threatens to viola te the spiTit of the law. Although 
it must be acknowledged th at the definition of "rule" in the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act1 07 would make the word technically 
10"> See text accompanying note s 00-8 1 su pra. 
lOG Section 9(d) (2) (emphas is added) . 
10 7 5 U.S.C. § 55 1( 4) (1970) def ines "rule" as "the whole or a part of a n 
agency statement of ge neral or particular applicability and future effect de, igned 
to implement, interp;d, or prescribe law or pol icy .... " Recommendation 
No. 1 of the recent American Bar Associ ati on proposals for ame t~clment of the 
APA \·muld delete the words "or particu lar." S ee Th e 12 ABA Rcco!l1menda-
tions fo r Improved Procedures for Fed eral ASJencies, 24 AD. L. REV. 390-91 
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applicable to such action, common usage ::md con:.mon sense are 
opposed to such an interpretat ion. 
It js 11ot cntire1y c1 ear \\'hethcr the Cc1rlif.1 L)S lCll n1ay pro-
mulQ:ate an anti-stockuilin L: rule Df ~;rt i vers [l.l effect, ;:m,. Dlicable 
'-' ..... .._, ~ .1._ 
nroSI"'"'Ctl·ve'l" j·o ;11l lT·o:hct r, .. n; k'~ :"'."'' ;]ck·ntp:[· or \"h etl1.e r· i l ~ _, ._, l .) .. .._ .. _ .._ .1 -~ \... ~ ~ • .: -~- - ·- -~ . ...- •-' - \.-'. '- ~ ..- 1._ .._ _ - · -' l -' - -" ·- ;' ' - .... 
- 1 't , ' ' 1 . • -~· , . "' rt 111ust r~t t1 er taaor sucn _r:r :.Jl~ -~cntlc~:.5. :~pcc itiC GLly to proaucts 
co\·c rccl by lJro c.luc ·~ ·;.-L:; ; ~· :-: :! ·- .-, !;: s :;_i~:.t:.:: :_;c:.; or under 
consideration. The lat ter ii ·~~ ;.:,l-tJf:~~ ;-li iu:1 ~;,.>~ : ;!:; th\.::: 11toi·c pl0.usiblc. 
~fh e anti-stock1J ili11g pro·vj sio r:. of {b e sta tute is co111plet~ and self-
conta i11ecl and coulci stand e n its C\Yil .._ .. ,/ jLll·JU't l ut·tlter agcllCJ' elab-
oration except for two variabl e:~--r ::tte of permissib1e divergence 
l"rom b~ r)e Dn-1iod rat:" q<v l ir! :"1'Jt ii';r:' ]·inn of ly~rP perior11° 8-}eft '-.-L.. ..1_ V I.e; ' '- .1 .1..\.- ~o....~_.-L _ •• _l. ~'- -~ ~-"--' ~.1. - ..._. r..;.J ._, ~ - \,....;.. 
for later Commission cleterm[nation for the evident reason that 
their appropriate content is likely to change cons iderably from 
product to product and perhaps even from manufacturer to man-
ufacturer. Though the courts m ight defer to a different Com-
mission interpretation of its powers, application on a product-
by-product basis seems almost the unmistakable intent. 
Since application of stockpiling restrictions must be "by 
rule", the normal notice-and-comment procedures of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act must be followed, unless "the agency for 
good cause finds . . . [they] are impracticable, unnecessary, or 
contrary to the public interest." 1 0 !) Conceivably such a fi11ding 
could be made with respect to every stockpiling rule, but it would 
seem much more desirable and consonant with the principles of 
the Administrative Procedure Act for the C01nmission, 'Nhere it 
intends to apply anti-stockpil ing provisions to a particular prod-
uct safety rule, to give notice of this intention siamltaneously 
with the notice of the proposed ru1e, and to conduct a rulemak-
ing proceeding on both issues jointly. 
7. Amendment and Revocation of Rules 
All amendments of product ~; afety rules must be " by rule." 
This means tl1at normal notice-2,nd-comrnent procedures must 
be followed prjor to their adoption and that amendments cannot 
be effective sooner than thi rty cbys ~lfter thei r issuance in final 
fonn110-unless the Comm ission c;:m establi sh good cause for dis-
pensing with either or b oth of these requ irements. In addition 
to these normal requirements, "rnateri~ll" amendn1en ts of prod-
(1972). If the defin ition were so a mG11dcd, the word wou ld no t p rope rl y apply 
to n stockpiling prohibition d irected expitcit iy ::~gn ~n s t a sir"!gle ntanuhlct nrer. 
l OS Section 9 (cl ) (2). 
10 :1 5 us.c. § 553(b) (1970). 
110 5 U.S.C. § 553(d) (19 70). 
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uct safety rules are subject to the same p rocedures under Sec-
tions 7, 8, and 9 as are applicable to the Z~doption of product 
safety rules. 111 This means tlEtt even when a single "m aterial" 
alteration of a product safety standard is adopted , the entire "of-
fer" ceremony of Section 7 must be repeated; ::mel fo r all material 
amendments oral presentettior: s will h~we to be permitted in addi-
tion to written comment 
9 sinlilar to that 11e cess ~u:y roc ~:_d O LJf ~ Oll of the rule. R e;voca-
tion, l1o\vever, catl be decre~d ~J 1lly if tb ::; Co1I1mission detcrmi11Cs 
that the rule is not "reasonaoiy necessary to el iminate or reduce" 
tl ,,P. r·Plevc0 t -tl"L ,:,·s'.,.:- . 11 ~ T <·1is· r'.!"' "'i '· i•' t, C'tl,.i" ' l Sl 'J f ai 1s "o tr'.'C1" _.. ...,... ...._ _ ...... ..1. .l •~ .!. .• • \._1 Y _. ,-,.,)~L . ~ 1. .\_Jl - .; .._( .! .._ l _ l U. 1\.. 
Section 9(a) (1 ) (B), discussed earlier,w; which allows the Com-
mission, upon the conclusion of a Section 9 rulemaking p roceed-
ing, to withdraw the proposed rule before promulgation not 
only upon a determination that it is not "reasonably necessary" 
but also upon a determina tion th ~ t it is not "in the public inter-
est." I t is difficult to bdieve the verbal divergence was in-
tended to imply any substantive difference between the test for 
refusing to adopt a proposed rule and the test for agreeing to re-
voke an existing one. Perhaps harmony can be restored by con-
cluding that any rule not in the public interest is unreasonable 
and hence not "reasonably necessary." 
D. Section 1 0-Rulemaking by Court Order 
Section 10 of L'le Act prescribes a unique procedure for 
compelling the Commission to initiate rulemaking proceedings. 
Any interested person may petition the Commission "to commence 
a proceeding for the issuance, 2menclment, or revocation of a 
consumer product safety rul e." tu T he petition must set forth 
facts establishing the necessity for the desired action and a brief 
description of the substance of the rule if issuance or amend-
ment is requested . 11 ~ T he Commission may-but apparently 
need not-hold a public hearing or conduct an investigation. 11 0 
If it grants the petition, it must promptly commence "an appro-
priate proceeding under Section 7 or 8."117 If it denies the pe-
tition, it must publish its reasons for doing so in the Federal Reg-
111 Section 9 (e) . 
11 2 !d. 
11 8 See te xt accompanying notes 99 -102 supra. 
111 Section lO (a). 
115 Section lO(b). 
11G Section lO(c). 
117 Section lO(d). 
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ister, and its denial may be made the subject of comt action. 118 
In the latter event, when the court is satisfied by a preponderance 
of the evidence in a trial de novo that the pr oduct presents an 
unreasonable risk of injury and th at "the failure of the Commis-
sion to initiate a rulcmakin g proceeding under section 7 or 8" 
unreasonably endangers th e petit ioner or others, it must order 
the Commission to initi~ttc ··Llh.: ~Lction req uested by the pet it ion -
er. "·11 '·' The court has n u ~ tu thor i ty to ord er the promulgation of 
a rule, only the initiatio11 uf <i pnh.: c cding . 1 ~ " 
For the most part, these pro visions art: not novel. The A. .. d-
ministrati ve Procedure Act confers upon intel·cs ted persons the 
right to petition an agency fer the issuance, amendm ent, or repeal 
of a rule1 2 1 and requires a statement of grounds for the denial of 
such relief. 1 ~ 2 The judicial review provisions of Section 10, how-
ever, are without precedent. It is not clear under the APA whether 
denial of a rulemaking petition is reviewable at all; 1 ~ :o at most it 
is reviewable for arbitrariness or abuse of discretion. The re-
view provisions of Section 10 (c ) , contained neither in the NCPS 
nor the Administration bill, were added by the conference com-
mittee without explanation. 
It is natural to view the Section 10 procedure as a mech-
anism for consumer participation in the decision process. It should 
not be overlooked, however, that industry, too, can employ the pe-
tition device to secure amendment or revocation of product safety 
rules felt to be onerous. Indeed, experience under the National 
Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act1 :! 1 suggests that regulated 
companies may be the most frequent users of the petition proce-
dure and its principal beneficiariesY" 
1. Power of Court to Preclude Commission Choice Between 
Standard and Ban 
The operation of thi s Section is straightforward so long as 
the petitioner asks for a product standard rather than a product 
11 s Sections 10(d) & lO(e)(l). 
11 0 Section IO(e)(2). 
1 20 Section IO(e)(3). 
1 ~1 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1970). 
1 ~ 2 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) ( 1970). 
e 0 It has been categorically stated th at it is not. OFFICE OF T II E ATTORN EY 
GENERAL, MANUAL ON THE A D C.1I N I ST RATIVE P ROCEDURE A CT 39 ( 1947). 
124 15 u.s.c. § 1381 (1970). 
125 See Heffron, Federal Consumer Safety L egislation (S pecial R eport pre-
pared for th e NCPS) 52 ( 1970), republished in H earings 011 H.R. 8110, H.R. 
815 7, fl.R . 260 (and identical bills) , !-J .R. 3813 (and identical hills) Before the 
Subcomm. on Commerce an d Finance o f the H ouse Comnz. on Interstate and 
Foreign Commerce, 92d Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 598 ( 1971· 72) . 
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ban. Where a ban is requested, difficulties emerge . Would the 
Commission be granting or denying such a petition if it agreed to 
commence a product standard proceeding under Section 7 but re-
fused to propose a ban under Sections 8 and 9? If such action 
cunsti tutes a denial, the options open to a court under Sec-
tion J O(e)(2) would be clear: either to affirm the Comm ission 
ur r, -., urder it to commence a Section S rrocceci ing. The court's 
u pli• l ib would be anything but ck ~t l· , h ) \\ ·,_; v eL if th r: Comm is-
sion's denial too};: the form not of opening a s~ctiun -i prucecding 
jnstcad of the requested Section 8 action, but of refusing any ac-
tion on the ground that no product safety rule of any kind is 
called for. If it finds this action erroneous, what does the court 
do? tv! ust it order the commencement of a Section 8 proceeding, 
that being the "action requested by the petitioner"? 1 ::! 0 May it, 
at leas t, do so if satisfied that an effective standard cannot feas-
ibly be developed? Or must it simply order the Commission " to 
commence a proceeding for the issuance . . . of a consumer prod-
uct safety rule", 1 '" 7 that being the "action requested", leaving 
the Commission to decjde whether to proceed under Section 7 or 
Section 8? And if the more specific relief is in order-i.e., if the 
court can "second guess" the Commission's preference for Section 
7 over Section 8-is there any logical reason why Section 10 re-
lief should not be available even in situations where, at the time 
the petition is filed , the Commission bas already commenced a 
Section 7 proceeding or recently terminated one without propos-
ing a rule? 
The answers to these questions depend largely upon which 
of two alternative approaches to Section 10 one adopts . Under 
the broad view, the "action requested by the petitioner", the re-
lief to be granted or denied by the Commission and ultimately 
the court, is simply the "commencement of a proceeding for the 
issuance [or "amendment" or "revocation", as the case may be] 
of a consumer product safety ru le"128-nothing more specific 
than that. True, the petitioner must describe the rule he cla ims 
should be adopted; but this description in no way limits the 
Commiss ion's options. The fact that the petitioner would prefer 
a rule banning the product rather than one setting a standard does 
not mean that the Comnussion must proceed under Section 8 
rather than Section 7 in order to be deemed to have granted the pe-
tition; ei ther will do. Judicial review comes into pby only if the 
Commission refuses to ini tia te any proceeding; and in th::lt c~1s e the 
120 Section 10(e)(2). 
1 2 7 Section lO(a). 
12S !d. 
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court, though reversing, must let the Commission choose the type 
of product safety rule to consider. 
Th,~ alternative (narrow) view holds i:hat the relief petitioned 
for, the "action requested", is, specifically, either "'- product 
standard Droccedin£ under Section 7 or a orocluct b:.u1 proceed-
-'- ._,. _l ~ 
· 1 0 · 8 } · · r ' 1 · ··.c · ' mg tulC,:r vec tton ; t 1at a petltton ro~· tnc _,<:!: ter ;s eilC:Cttvciy 
dc ni~~d ii' t h·2 \~O n1 n1i ssior1 agr~:,es Il1:2rc1 y t:,) f-; r; ;_nlcl t"h. ~1t the; 
cotlr(. if ~:1tis ficcl th~t the Con1mission's ~:1:-_lcti ~;n c:c:.J.tes un.re:J.sort-
abl~ b az~;_n_i: n1~:y, j11deed n1ust, prescribe ::: S -~ {~t~ ;~ ·;· n S ;;r{;cc:ed ing 
r .... tl, ,,. t 1"'"''"' ... ·tve thP. Cornmu·ssi·on t11"" op{·inn l, ~ 1,. : . l .... . L - 11(.1 1 t .:::; -.. V -. _...._ '..J I. • ..JJ ~ . 
The broad interpre tation seems much more in keeping with 
the basic purposes of the Act, in particular th2.t of encouraging 
the experimental development of product safety standards . As 
noted earlier, it would generally be undesirable for the Com-
miss ion to ban a product without f irst having 2ttempted to 
develop a standard through the Section 7 process. vVithout ac-
tually having tried, the Commission, for aU its expertise, would be 
hard put to find that "no feasible consumer product safety 
standard .. . would adequately protect the public."129 A court, 
lacking the Commission's experience and technical n;sources, 
would be even less able to do so. Hence it would be doubly un-
desirable for the court to channel the rulemaJ::ing proceeding into 
Section 8 when the Commission prefers to proceed under Section 7. 
Certainly it should not do so merely because the petitioner has 
requested a product b an rather than a prod~1ct standard- espe-
cially since the Section 7 process may, in the end, res ult in a ban , 
and in any case will develop the evidence necessary for an in-
formed evaluation of the petitioner's request. Hence, unless the 
language of the Act were compellingly to dictate otherwise, 
Section 10 should be construed as leaving the choice of ban-or-
standard to the Commission. The language does not so dictate, 130 
12n Section 8(2). 
l:lo T hough admittedly it gives some diffi culty. The requi rement that the 
Comm ission , upon granting the petition, commence "an approp riate proceecii:'g 
under section 7 or 8" might be taken to mean "a procc·::di:1g appropriate for t!1c 
issuance of th e petitioner's desired rule"; and "action req uested by the petitioner" 
m ight , in a s imiiar vein , be constmed as referring specifica liy to either a Section 7 
or &ction 8 proceed ing. It is no great strain, howeve r, to read the phrase "appro-
pi·iate proceeding" as meaning a "proceeding deemed appro priate by the Com-
mission" o r, a lterna tively, "proceeding for the issuan ce, amendment , or re voca-
tion of a product safety rule, whichever is approp riate" ; ::n.J to co::strw~ "action 
requested by the pe ti tioner" as distinguishing mere];/ b•:ocwecn th e i ~s uanc ·~, 
ame ndment, and re vocation of a rule. At a ny ra ts, the r:a rro'.V inte rpretat ion is 
l ike\\·is·c ill at case with a literal reading of the st:1tu[e. T he court's ordet· to 
init ia te "the ac tion requested by the petitioner" is to be predic:ltt:d on a finding that 
the Co mmi ss ion's fa ilure "to initiate a rulemakin;c nrocecJim( under section 7 
or 8" (emphasis added) unreasonably exposes rZtiti cncr o r -o thers to danger. 
Surely tl1is narrow interpretation has p roduced an illogical sta tute if it r'"quirt:s, 
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and accordingly the Commission and the courts should adopt the 
interpret::ttion which best comports with the larger aims of the 
statute-that i~.>, the broad interpretation set forth above. 
2. Pmver of Court to Prevent Abortion of Product Standard 
c:: u.'. >; Li ·~u ·: ~-; Li.8.j z~ :·J.~-;:: conc:2rning tl~c clf~ ct of a Sect il··in .l 0 ur-
der m~cl the cL~gr': e to \Vhich it contro ls the Commission's discre-
T l·~ C:r>r·t-r· nn 1 nu r f':) ( 'l. 1 
.L .1_ '-..J""'"'-" L '-'-"- ._ \ --./ J / ' 
the i'>ct provides that " the d istrict court shall have no authority to 
,....~. ,-~ ~ ·--1 ., : •. c. ·0 ·"·, -~,...,-l; .·,·r ;C· '' to kr:l-n "'"'Y ""•Li 0'1 0+L1D'"" th"'Il +j,n i·1 ;f i·l -\_.>'Jld. _tJ'~ - l ;_.!..;'c-" '--'V~.lL;._l hJ.)l l .J. .,. l (,_J..,_I..,.. LlA.J. (..4\._, l. . J..'_..l. 1..~1d. l 1 .,_, .... ! ... ~~.-~ ..._ 
tion oE a n:le-rnaking proceeding in accordance \Vith section 7 or 
8." This means, at the very least, that the Commission m ay not 
be required to adopt a particular rule, or indeed any rule. It is 
less cl~~ar, hmvever, whether the Commission m ay be required to 
carry the. Sect ion 7 proc.:;cding to the point of proposing a rule, thus 
triggering the Section 9 procedure. One can argue that once a 
court has determined the product, and the Commission's inac-
t1 on, to be unreasonably hazardous, the Commission m ay not con~ 
elude othenvise without at least receiving comments and oral 
argument from the interested public-a result which is not as-
sured by the Section 7 proceeding alone. This interpretation can, 
with difficulty, be reconciled with Section IO( e) (3) by inter-
preting the pl11ase "rule-making proceeding" as referring to the 
Se.-~tion 9 ;Jrocedt:re pt"Oper, a1beit initiated in the special manner 
prescribed by Sections 7 and 8. The better view, however, and 
. 1 1 1 .. r. ~ 1 . 
c c.::rt(un~y tn_e mere 11a tu ra.~. reacung o:L ti1e statutory 1anguagc, 1s 
that nothing mm-e can be required of the Commission than that it 
commence a Section 7 proceeding and conduct it in good faith; and 
that if this rcqu~rement is satisfied, the court's order is not disre-
......... - ; er~ '···· · --.1,· --:~ , or ~t, p. n·~-""'r.GPJj. ]lO' \Vj .... t..,,""'l1t- Dl·onos.-,·1 of ~ . 1 
go.J. C.,~·-' '--'/ "-"'J~ '"S '"~ JJlU·. '~v' 'o · " Lllv,,, ~ .i:-' c, ~ ,, fUte . 
This interpretation is particularly compelling if one notes that 
the Section 7 prcce~ding may not produce any private offers to de-
• ' 1 1 1 • 1 • 1 1 (.' 1 velor: tne 2:·-e q iJ.GstcG sta11Carc1-111 \V111c11 event L1e court 1t tne 
upon a bare finding that some p roduct rule is call ed for, commenc·~m c nt o f 
proceedings to ::tclcp t the more drast ic rule-and this even though the cou r t its::lf 
n1i gb t p r~~fc r 1he rnore niod~rate. Furthern1 o re., if the Con1n1iss!on's prcf,~ rence 
for Section 7 o.,·e r Section 8 is subj ect to judicial review de nm·o in situ a tions 
\V hcr:~ the Con·,mission had been inactive unt il petitioner's requ est, why sh ould 
it r,ot ~li :~ o be snbjec t to such .rcv ie\V in cc. ses \vhe re a Sect!o n 7 proc~eding is 
~-~!r~~~:d _y y::::r~ :.l i ng c~r has recei::ly bc~2n aborted \vithout is sue? '{et the lit e r~d 
1ang~''' gc of s,:ction l 0 (e ) (2) , which presupposes "the failure of the Com-
m is::;;o:-, to init:at•o a rule m ::tking proceeding", see m s to foreclo se th at result; indeed, 
fe w '.\'l'Ui d ,;,:: :· ''J'-' :i :/ ;:;-gue for it. In sum, nei ther of the alternative interpretations 
of SectiGn 10 is a Hogethr:r compatible with th e most natural readi ng of the literal 
.l angt:a.;c; so nt::; ~t t-~1i n is i~1evit8bl e . 
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former reading of the language were adopted) would be forcing 
the Commission itself to spend public funds in its own develop-
ment a standard it believes unnecessary or, worse, infe;.:tsible. 
It is possible, however, that a Section 10 order obligates the 
Commission to turn square corners in the Section 7 proceeding-
that the Cummission's determinations under Section 7 will be subject 
to so :. ~ t c scrutiny \vhen the proceed ing is cou:t-m·dcrcd 
tl12.n \\-h :~ : l it is vc"~lu~t~1rily lnitjatecl. OrdiJ1J.rily, dct c rlr:in~~tiuns 
that one or all offcrors are unqualified or have failed to make 
satisbctory p:-ogr,:ss, or that the proceeding should be ::d:;ortcd 
without pmposztl of a rule, are judicially reviewable, if at ::211, only 
for arbitrariness or abuse of discretion. The Commission prob-
ably need not give reasons. With a Section 10 order outstanding, 
however, one can argue that the Commission must satisfy the 
court that it has proceeded in good faith and, to that end, must 
giv': reasoned justification for declining to propose a rule. Failure 
to do so might be deemed a violation of the spirit if not the letter 
of the court's order; or, more likely, it might simply be viewed 
as an abuse of discretion under a stricter-than-usual application 
of the traditional standard of review. To avoid these possible 
pitfalls, the Commission would be well advised to spell out its rea-
sons for those determinations which result in aborting a Section 
1 0-compelled Section 7 proceeding. 
3. Timing and Frequency of Petitions 
The timing and frequency of Section 10 petitions may also 
present a problem. Hmv soon after the actual adopt:cn cf a 
product safety rule may a party petition the Commission to initiate 
proceedings for its amendment or revocation and obtain de novo 
judicial review of the Commission's refusal? The Act does not 
in its terms c~stablish any limit. Clearly, however, Section 10 was 
not meant to provide stringent judicial review of the n1le which 
issues from Section 7, 8 and 9 proceedings, but rnerely to ciS-
sure that such proceedings, where appropriate, are conducted 
-that is, that the Commission duly deliberates and explores the 
need for a rule. An adopted rule is subjected to judicial review 
by a diffen~nt provision of the Act (Section I l) in zt different 
court (the court of auoeals) under a different standard (the "sub-
- ..L ..l \ 
stanti <tl evidence" test). 131 A party who proceeded to chal-
lenge "" rc(:ent rule by the Section 10 route should thei·cfort: 
to1cl by the district court either that his so le recourse \Vc..::; to 
the ccurt of app,::als under Section 11 or that the Commission's re-
1:n See text accompanying notes 133-44 infra. 
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fusal to start proceedings for the amendment of a newly minted 
ru}e docs no t, whatever the merits of that rule, "unreasonably" 
endanger the consuming public, at least ii1 the absence of ne\v evi-
dence not considered or available to the Commission at the time it 
acted. 
Sc1mcwh~1 t simil ar is the question of how soon a Section 10 
pn i 1 ~~ n1ay !-_~:.: brnu~~ht to ob t ~1in rc-con:-) ideratio:1 of ~ 1 rule 
co n ~; td c r ·~ J but rc.j r.; ct~:: cl at the Section 7 c~r Sect ion 9 s t ag:~ . T<. o ~. igh1y 
tlJ ,_; ~ ; ;il tL: an sw-:: r \\uuld be approp:·iate. Apart from Section 10, 
tlh~ Cuti li ui :;siuil deci sion not to propose , or at leas t not to promul-
gate. a product safety rule would , if reviewable at a11 , be Sclb-
ject to non-statutory revie\.v of minimal scope.1 :;:c The district 
court, having jurisdiction in either case, might treat the civil ac-
tion under Section 10 as a proceeding for such non-statutory judi-
cial review . Quite clearly, however , it should not be willing to 
review de novo the Commission's recent judgment that no prod-
uct safe ty rule is desirable-especially if, as suggested earlier, a 
court order under Section 10 cannot compel the Commission actu-
ally to propose a rule, but merely to initiate a Section 7 proceed-
mg. 
E. Judicial Oversight of the Rulemaking Process 
Both action and inaction of the Commission in the course 
of the rulemaking process are subject to judicial review of one 
kind or another. The major situations and problems are dis-
cussed below. 
1. Judicial Review of Consumer P roduct Safety Rules 
A consumer product safety rule promulgated by the Com-
mission under Section 9 is judicially reviewable in a court of ap-
peals under Section 11. The rule cannot be affinned "unless the 
Commission's findings under subsection 9(c) are supported by 
substantial evidence on the record taken as a whole."1 3 3 For the 
purposes of this provision, "record" is defined in a fashion which 
is to our knowledge unique in leg islati ve d raftsmanship, and pe r-
haps in human contemplation: 
For purposes of this section, the term "record" means such 
consum er p roduct safe ty rule; any no tice or propos c:l pu b--
lished pursuant to sec tion 7, 8, or 9; the transcript req uired 
by sect ion 9(a) (2) of any oral p~esentati o n ; any written sub-
miss ion of intereste d parties; ond any other information which 
the Commission comiders relevant to such rule .1 3 4 
1 "~ Se c te xt accomr :1n yin g notes 146 -57 infra . 
1:::1 Section 11 (c) . 
13·1 Section 11 (a) (emphasis added). 
ll 
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T he obvious purpose and effec t of the last clause is to make "ree-
d" . 1 l \ . . 1 • l 1 d or mclu c,e t11Z: t \Vhlcn 111 .a"Yvyer y an even common p arlance 
would more precisely be described by the term "non-record ." 
This verbal Ztbs urdity is more th~,n accidental; it reveals .a basic 
problem th :tt has developed in the judicial rc~v !ew of informal 
rulemaking . 
aside agenc y :!cttun, iindings, and conclusicms c:re (l) the de-
terminat ion that they ar;; "arbitrary, capric;c •.c:,, 0.11 ab use of di s-
cretion, or otherwise not in accordance with lavi';L~;; and (2) 
the determ ination tll::lt thev are "unsupoort:::cl b.)v substanti al evi-"' ~ ~ 
dence in a case . . . reviewed on the record of an agency hear-
ing provided by statute." 13 n While the former is applicable to 
review of all agency action, the latter is an additional rigor im-
posed upon on-the-record adjudication and rulemaking-that is, 
in those insL:.nces the action must not only be shown to be not 
arbitrary, capricious , abusive of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with law, but also must be shovvn to be a reasonable 
action on the b asis of the evidence adduced in the required pro-
ceedings and without r eference to extrinsic evidence that the par-
ties had no opportunity to refute. This scheme is entirely ra-
tional, and is indeed essential to the distinctive character and 
purpose of an on-the-record proceeding. 
What appears to have happened , hmvever, is that the "sub-
stantial evidence" test has acquired a vague reputation as the 
more demcmding of the tvvo withou t appreciation of the fact that 
it is only rationally applicable to an "on-the-record" proceeding. 
As a result , it has in recent legislation 2.p parently been included 
when Congress has desired particularly " tight" revi ew, without 
reference to whether the reviewed proceeding was "on the rec -
ord."137 This mistakes the nature of the standard . The essen-
tial constraint of the "sub5:. tantial evidencs" tes t is not th at it 
requires a higher degree of support for an agency determination 
(the arbitrary and capricious standard itself would probably be 
violated by a determination made on the basis of insubstan tial evi-
dence) but r2.thcr , that it requires this support to be contained 
within the confines of the public record made pursuant to the pro-
visions of sections 556 and 557 of the Aclmini::;trative Procedure 
1:;,; 5 U.SC. § 706( 2) (A) ( 1970). 
J3<; 5 US.C. § 706(2)(E) (1970) . 
B7 E.g. , section 655 (f) of the Occupation ::l l Safety and He2.lt h Act of 1970. 
29 U .S.C. ~ 6SI et seq . ( 1970) . p rovides tha t the find ir1gs of the S::: crctary of Labor 
shall be conclu s[ve if supp orted "by substa;:ti al cvidenc;,; in the record co:-,siclere cl 
as a whole," even though the proceeding is no t a n on-tl:e-r·cco rd proceeding . 
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Act. 1:;s If there are no such confines, there can be no such con-
straint.1 ~:!J To nvoid th is logical impasse, one commentator has 
suggested tlnt judicial re ·-;iew provisions which require "substan-
tial evidence on the rec·:xd" to support informal rulemaking jn 
effec t convert informz:l rulemaki ng to form al rulemaking on a 
closed record . !H> 
-~'. ',".•'.: . ~. ,_·.: •. : ,, ::-i :·,., ,-.. :' ",.,,,...,-,,.(·l" i11 '>c··,. ;,,,-~ ·11 (a' "1' ')Jren tlu _ . . 11 _r_, . _ _ , ,_ ._ ...._,,, _ , _, ._.._ ~ ,~,_~ _, · '- - ~ _ . '-) l.l !-' t- -) 
rcprcs:..;nt:; :._:n ~~tt> : ;.-:; t .l ck~1 1 '-'-·i th this p n> biem. The NCPS bill, 
as iilL:od uccJ in both the Sen::._-~c 1 · i. t ~1nd t11t~ }{uuse: l -f ~ IJrovicled for 
:,ld!. " l . . ll .. ,., , ;;"., i:·· . ,,... r-r-.··r]•;:cr,~. ,_ ,:t 1: ' 1::" L\(l,: it:i~trativ"' Procec11•re J - \._., (. 1 !_ ....., 'I' • -" ~' .. _l 1.. L-1. ·- ·- ~ ' i. .... . t. . • A .... . . ..., " . _... .I.. ll • ....., - .. -· • . - ~ . - ' -~· .... (. ~ I../ ~ - _ l 
Act, 5 U.S. C. § s 70 1--06-thJ.t is, in effect, on the basis of the "ar-
138 5 u.s.c. §§ 556, 55 7 ( 1970). 
To be sure, the concurring opinion in Charlton v. U nited States, 412 F .2d 
390 (3d Cir. 1969) asserts a clear distinction between the "arbitrmy, capricious 
or abuse of discretio n" test and the "substantia l evidence" test: 
While agency act ion which is arbitrary and capricious, or which con-
stitutes an abuse of ci iscretion, would no doub t be action which is "un-
suppo rted by substant ial evidence," the reverse is not true .... [E] ve n 
where the agency action is not arbitrary and capricious or an abuse of dis-
cretion, there may still not be substantial evidence in the accepted u se 
of that test to justify the agency action. The ve1y listing of the sub-
stantial evidence test as a separate and alterna tive ground for rev iewing 
agency action i!:'dicates a legisla tive intent that it be a different standard 
from that permitting the setting as ide of the findings or conclusions of an 
agency as arbitrary, capricious or an abuse of discretion. 
!d. a t 398. This language, howeve r, is entirely compatible with the view 
expressed in the text that the esse nce of the distinction, when eviden ti ary support is 
at issue, is simply the requ irement that the support appear on the record. 
This is not to say that the two concepts arc , in all contexts, coextensive, for 
often an assertion of arbit rariness o r abuse of discretion is not based upon an 
alleged lack of eviden tia ry suppo rt for the determination. A decision may be 
"arbitrary", for example, if it rests in part upon unlawful considerations, or 
devia tes unaccountably from previous age ncy decisions. But in the limited class 
of cases in which the ground for chall enging the agency action is the inadequacy 
of its evidenti ary basi s, it is diff icult to imag ine a decision having no substanti al 
ev idence to support it which is not "arbit:·ary", o r a decision struck down as 
arbitrary which is in fact supported by "subs tanti al ev idence." In short, in an 
evidentia1y context the level of required suppo rt seems about the same whether 
the "substan tial evidence" or the ·'arbi tra ry" te st is used. Beyond noting tha t 
rough equivalence, w.c share P rofessor Davi s' bel ief tha t "[ a]ny attempt to refine 
the formulas for re view is likely to be unprofi table ." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW T REATISE§ 29.02, at 126 ( 1958). 
l :l!) T he ve1y term "substant ia l evidence test" should perhaps be abandoned. 
It is, of course, useful as a means o£ describing the deg ree o£ evidentiary support 
required-distingu ishing the APA standa rd f rom the "preponderance of the 
evidence" test on the one hand aml th.e so-called "scint ill a rule" on the other. But 
this is no longe r the poin t of confusion it once was . To stress wh at now needs 
stress ing (the source of the ev idence rathe r than its deg ree), it might be better 
to refer to the i\PA standard as the " record evidence" test-or, if both source and 
deg ree must be reflected, the "substant ia l record evidence" test. 
HO See Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of General Ap-
plicabili ty : T h-.: Need for Procedu ral Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 
60 CALIF . L. R EV . 1276, 1321-23 (1 972) . 
Hl S. 983, 92J Cong., l st Sess . § 2S(c) (1971). 
H~ H .R. 8157, 92cl Cong., lst S·~ss. § 28 (c) ( 1971 ). 
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bitrary, capnc10us, ... abuse of discretion" standard. The Ad-
ministration bill, on the other hand, contained a straightforward 
"substantial evidence on the record" provision. u·; Both the Senate 
and the House chose the latter alternative, nwking it one of the fe w 
provisions of the Admi n istration bill to sur vive the legislative proc-
ess . It vvas the confe rence comm ittee which ::~cld ed the uniqu e, 2\l -
inclusive dcf: nition l ) f ' ·i cco rd .'' \Vhilc th e c ~..mfc r ::' ncc re port d ocs 
not ex pla in the tl C\V provision . it is ::1 reason a ble su rmise th~u it re-
sulted frcm :1 r :::~ tli z : t ti o n th::~t the jud ic ial rC \'iC'.v pr:w ision rni ght be 
construed to requ ire the use of trial--type procedures in ihe rul emak-
ing and would in any case force the Commission, through its 
staff, to establish p ublicly its evidentiary case in advance of deci-
sion. To avoid this, one suspects, the conferees chose the seem-
ingly less drastic and certainly less visible approach of water-
ing down the substantial evidence test by an expansive definition 
of "record" rather than flatly abandoning that test in favor of 
an "arbitrariness" standard. As the preceding discussion indi-
cates, however, the practical effect is substantially, if not en-
tirely, the same. In fact, in one respect the substantial evidence 
test, not limited to a genuine record, may be theoretically more 
lenient than an "arbitrariness" standard. In attempting to es-
tablish that an agency's action was arbitrary the petitioner can 
presumably not be defeated by the agency's development and pre-
sentation of entirely new data that was no t available and therefore 
not taken into account when the allegedly arbitrary decision was 
made. The present Act's novel definition of "record", however, 
so as to include "any other information which the Commission 
considers relevant," would appear not to impose such a limita-
tion.1H 
2. Judicial Review of Failure to Initiate Rulemaking 
The Commission, thus answerable to the courts of appeals 
for the concrete product of its rulemaking process, appears to be 
much more strictl y accountable to the district courts for failing to 
invoke that process in the first instance . Under Sec tion 10, as we 
have seen, a civil action may be brought in an appropriate district 
cm1rt to challenge the Commission's denial of a petition to initi-
ate rulemaking proceedings. The court must order the initiation 
·--·------- ·--- ---
14:3 S. 1797, 92d Co ng. , 1st Sess. § l l( b ) ( 1971 ); H.R. 8110, 92d Cong., 
l stSess. § ll (b) (19 71 ) . 
lH Of co urse if the Co mmission does p re sent such c~,l i re l y ne w data in 
th e appeal , the petiti oner would have a good case fo r rc mar.d to enable him to 
present writte n and ora l rebu ttal , which is ex plicitly provided fur by Sectio n 
11 (b). 
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of such a proceeding if satisfied merely "by a preponderance of 
the evidence in a de novo proceeding" that the produ ct is unreason-
ably dangerous and that the Commission's failure to act "unrea-
sonably" exposes consumers to risk of injury. 1 u; It is surpris-
ing that inaction by the Commission-failure to alter the status 
quo- - should b~ subject to a greater degree of _judicial control 
th ~: n a r f irm~tt iv c Comm iss ion ~ lc ti o n restr ic ti11 _<; (1 1 ~.:' .. e:l banning the 
~; ~t k o f products (which , as we have seen, 111::.:rcly requires "sub-
stanti ?cl evidence'' , r ather tl1:m "a prcponder:mc c of c':iclence", in 
order to <~ void judic ial intervention). In practice, ho wever, the 
Section J 0 standard may not be quite as rigorous as it looks . The 
question for the cc1urt to decide , albeit by a "preponderance of 
the evidence", is whether the Commission has "unreasonably" 
endangered consumers. The reasonableness, not th e wisdom or 
correctness, of the Commission's judgment is in issue; the court is 
not invited to substitute its judgment for the Commission's or to 
reverse the Commission's decision merely because the court it-
self wo1Jld have decided differently on the same evidence. So 
viewed, the standard of review does not seem significantly stL-icter 
than the traditional one which condemns agency action only 
when "arbitrary" or "capricious." 
3. Judicial Review of Decisions Aborting the Rulemaking Process 
Both the availability and scope of judicial revievv are clear 
when the Commission either refuses to initiate rulemaking in the 
first instance or concludes the rulemaking process by adopting a 
rule . The major area of uncertainty is the situation in which the 
Commission initiates a rulemaking proceeding but later termi-
nates it without adopting, or perhaps without even proposing, a 
rule. There are two stages at which this can be clone: (a ) a£-
ter commencing a Section 9 proceeding, the Commission may, 
upon finding that the product safety rule it has proposed is un-
necessary or not in the public interest, "withdraw by rule the ap-
plicable notice of procecding" ; 1 ~< ; (b) even earlier, 2t the end of 
the Section 7 proceeding the Commission may, instead of pro-
posing a ru le, publish in the Federal R egister a notice withdraw-
ing the notice of the proceeding.H 7 No specific findings are re-
quired . 
Neither of these actions is subj ect to judicial review under 
Section 11 or any other provision of the Act. Both, however, 
may be subject to "non-statutory" judicial review in accordance 
t4G Section lO(e) (2). 
l ·l G Section 9 (a) (l) (B). 
1-17 Section 7(f). 
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with the Administrative Procedure 1-\.ct. The AP A. provides that 
any person adversely affected by "agency action" is entitled to 
judicial revie\v/ 18 that in the absence of a special statutory re-
view procedure, review may be had in "any appEcable form of le-
gal action," including an action for injunction cr cl>:: cbratory judg-
'11 " '1. ;11 co COll"'t of CO'~lO"''~•l" ]. 1 lric·(;: ,.tin:•·H 9 .•·_,;_ c_.nr-}, 0ct1l .1 ~\,..,l l 1 _ "-'~ l . ,1 _ _..__t vlCl-L . -._~..._ · ~) - .... ~..- .~ - - ~l; - ~.....,_ - - -
action, the revicv:in ,g court s h~- -:.U S·~~ t ~ ! -~ \'-i h~ch i :-~ 
viev;ecl on the record of ctn •.•; i,;(· h :s ll-
supportcd by substantizll cviclence. " 1 "" Tl 'f'SC do not 
app1y, however, to "agency action ... comn1i :: tccl 'to 2\gcncy 
discretion by law'";1 :; 1 such action is unL·eviewabL:. Thus, "with-
drawal of notice" under either Section 7 (f) or Section 9 ( ct ) ( 1) (B) 
is subject to non-statutory judicial review in a ddrict court, 
through an action for mandatory injunction or declaratu;_·y judg-
ment, if and only if it is deemed to be " agency action" not 
"committed to agency discretion by law." 
a. Withdrawal of Notice at the Section 9 Stage. The case for 
judicial review is probably stronger in respect to withdrawals un-
der Section 9(a)(l)(B). The fact that termination of the pro-
ceeding must be accomplished by rule, and on the basis of find-
ings (albeit general ones), not only makes it easier to character-
148 5 u.s. c. § 702 (1970). 
148 5 U.S.C. § 703 (1970). 
1::>0 5 u.s.c. § 706 (1970). 
l:il 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1970). 
Professor Raoul Berger, in a lively, long-running controversy with Professor 
Kenneth Davis, has taken the position that all a!',ency ac~ion is reviewable for 
abuse of discretion; that the apparer.t exception in 5 U.S. C. § 701 (a) (2) for 
"agency action ... comn1itted to agency discretion by lz:.v/' dces not lin1it the 
broad injunction in 5 U.S.C. § 706 to set aside Rgency action which is "arbitrar;", 
"capricious", or an "abuse of discretion'' but merely means tlnt a coert may not 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency when the latt·~r is properly •exercising 
its discretion. Professor Davis, on the other band, maintZti;:s that the section 
701 (a) (2) exception does make some discretionary Ret ion l.Eirevicwc:b!e and 
argues, with deliberate circularity, that agency action ohould b e deemed "com-
mitted to agency discretion by law", hence unreviewable, when and only wher. 
it appears from all the circumstances, inclncling the !~:ngu~1gc , history, and pur-
pose of the statute, and the nature of the action itself, that Congre ';s intended it 
(or, upon reflection, would have intended it) to be 1.1nrcvicwablc. S ee Berge;·, 
Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Rel'iew, 65 COL1J 1\L L. RE'/. 55 (1965); 
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 28.16 (Supp. 1965); Bcrg,;r, Ad-
ministrative Arbitrariness-A Reply to Professor Dul'is, 11-f U. P .\. L. REv. 
783 (1966); Davis, Administrati1·e ..-1rbitrariness-A Final W o•d, 1 H U. p,\. 
L. REV. 814 (1966); Berger, Administm!i:·c Ar!Jitrarincss-/i to Pro-
fessor Davis' "Final Word", 114 U. P.\. L. l<.C:\'. 016 (1966): D~1vi:,, A,iministro-
til·e Arbitrariness-A Postscript, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 823 (l%6): , Ad-
ministrative Arbitrariness: A Sequel, 51 l\-JrNN. L. REv. 601 ( 1967); Berge;-, 
Administrati1·e Arbitrariness: A Synr!zcsis, 78 YALE L.J. 965 ( 1969). Sec a/.co 
Saferstein, Nonrcviewabi/ity: A Functional /l of "C oilliiii!ied :o 
Discretion", 82 HARV. L REV. 367 (1968). 
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ize the decision as "agency action" rather than inact ion, but also 
suggests that Congress consc iously intended it to be reviewable 
nithcr than "committed to agency discre tion." 
This conclusion, however, is not ·without difficulties . It is 
' '. - . l ' - J ,- l .-l extren1e1y unlJ !:(cty t.aat a co urt, nG\V~V·~i- C G~l 'v'lcc :: c L 01 t 1e 11~eu , 
C ~· Jl cl 1),... ,-..., po!·! u ,-,.l-' 1""'1p"l t110 f'n ·· ·l i"'" "• ;.,;.(' ; "-,1 -(- -... n--!, . 1 .... ~ , -- .... 1 1e E vPn Sec U~.- ._ .t J.'-' ...._.Ll.,r \.... .1 .!.1 "L.. i~v '-- v lL . .:._i.i L.), .\i 1 ... ..J 1 ;_U ~..~U'-i_i;L d 1 L.... . ....,.~.L -
t i l)L., ·1 n_;\:llJ:cl-1 Gi'J;::..:::: J..L O Jt n···,r: .. ~ r ~.....,r 1 ~'""\ " -~0-- l ·;, :.7: .,_ , L .l v ~ ~ , :=:: '" V v ,_ -•l-' t ._. -._..._ ... ~ ..... .t>. .~-·- _.. 1-_. ,, in creat ing Il1Cl.l1-
darnus-like rcvi~_:\v ()f agenc y in~ ct ion--~;tcp>; i'~~~- s !·i:Jrl of th~l t. 1 :. :.: 
• • 1 " • 9 .. ' . 1 - kf mmatmg tne .. ::,..:c t ,on proceeci rn g a. no s•.?ii ·- ~ tnt; ci 1~itter bac., _,_or a 
new round of proceedings and bet ter aniCLi latecl reasons. Thrs 
m ay well seem a pointless cxercist: , wz;si:dul uf both judicial and 
administrative resources and unlikely to have been intended by 
Congress . Nonetheless, the strong presump tion of reviewability 
that normally attaches to a "rule", and the powerful current 
trend toward ever more liberalized judicial revievv, would prob-
ably lead to this result. 
The standard of review is not specified. Certainly the Com-
mission's withdrawal of notice would be set aside if found to 
be arbitrary or capricious. The "substantial evidence on the 
record" test, properly speaking, should not be applicable since 
there is no "on th e record" proceeding involved. 15 :3 I t is, more-
over, possible for the withdrawal to occur shortly after com-
mencement of the Section 9 proceeding and before anything that 
could even inappropriately be called "the record" has been made. 
The fanciful Section 11 definition of "record" is not app licable.13-1 
b . Withdrawal of Notice at the Section 7 Stage . T he avail-
ability of judicial review is more doubtful where the Commission 
aborts the rulemaking proceeding m1e!er Sect ion 7 (f) without 
even proposing a product safety rule. H ere the withdrawal of 
notice is not done "by rule" , and no find ings, not even general 
ones, are expressly required ; notice in the Federal Register 
alone suffices. Because of this informality, and the relatively 
early stage at which the decision is made, the Section 7 withdrawal 
looks rather less l ike "agency action" or, alternatively, r ather 
more like action "committed to agency d iscretion" than the corre-
sponding withdrawal of notice under Section 9 (a) ( 1) (B) . A 
tenable case can never theless be made for the position that non-
statutory review of a withdrawal of notice should be available at 
the Section 7 stage even if not at the Section 9 stage. T he ar-
1 5 ~ See Part Ili (D) (2 ) supra. 
1~:~ See text accompanying no tes 135-39 supra. 
1=>~ Sec tion ] 1 (a ) rec ites th at th at ddin ition only appiics "[f]or pu rpos<:~ s o£ 
this sec tion. " 
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gument would be that a decision to terminate a rulemaking pro-
ceeding before the public has had a real opportunity to contribute 
its views is more in need of judicial scrutiny than one which has 
benefited from those views and has thus acquired a stronger 
presun1ption of validity. The Ac t, after all, reserves the most 
stringent judicial review for the Commiss ic)n's fai lure to take even 
th !~ first :; t·.:p in the rukm akin g prcK·c~;s; 1 ,-, -, :lrguably the necessity 
for judici <d oversight di minishes, rath er than increases, cts the 
process unfolc!sY•G On babnce, however, it is prob able th at a 
Sect ion 7 withdrawal would not be reviewable. If it were review-
able, it seems clear th at the "arbitrary or capricious" stand ard 
rather than the "s ubstantial ev idence" standard should apply, 
since the latter is only proper when there exists a record that is 
intended to be the exclusive bas is of the agency decision, which 
is not the case here.r"' In fact , even if a court were willing to 
apply the "substantial evidence" tes t to a non-exclusive "record", 
it would rarely be able to find a record of any sort at the Section 
7 stage, unless it be the "records" maintained by the developer 
pursuant to Section 7 (d) (3) (C). 
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURES FOR REQUIRING NOTICE 
AND REPAIR, REPLACEMENT, OR RE FUND 
Section 15 of the Act provides formal administrative pro-
cedures and remedies designed to protect the public from defec-
ti ve or substandard products already on the dealer's shelves or in 
the consumer's hands. U pon determining that a product pre-
sents a "substantial product hazard"-that is, contains a product 
defect or fa ils to comply with an applicable product safety stand-
ard-the Commiss ion may order the manufacturer, distributor, 
or retailer to give notice of the hazard. 108 Upon the same deter-
l~D See Section 10 & text accompanying note 145 supra. 
lGG The stren gth of the arg ument fo r non-statutory rev iew of Section 7 (f) 
withdrawals depends to some exte nt on one 's ass umption as to the powe r of the 
court i;1 such an act ion to order the Comm ission to propose (as dis tinct from 
promulgate) a p rodu ct safety ru le, and thus force the rul cmak ing process forwa rd 
to the Sect ion 9 stage. Abse nt such powe r, non -statutory rev iew of Section 7 
withdrawals might we ll be considered futile . If one assumes that a court order 
u nd::: r Section 10 can force the Com mission into Section 9, no n-sta tutory rev iew 
of a Section 7 wi thdrawa l co uld be described as an alternat ive m eans to the same 
end . The cont r:uy assumpti on- that a Section 10 o rder canno t require the pro-
posal of a ru le-weake ns but does not des troy the case for the exi stence of such 
:~ remedy in connection wi th rev iew of Sec tion 7 withd rawals. One can still 
argue that Congress, though ruling o ut so drastic a usc o f jud ic ial powe r in the 
contex t of a de novo procec:cli ng under Sec tion 10, was w ill ing to see it exercised 
upo n a determination that th e Commiss ion 's failure to propose a rul e was "arbi-
tra1·y, capricious [o r·] a n abuse of discret ion", the Section 7 standard. 
1,:,7 See text accompan ying notes 135--10 supra. 
t:>s Section 15( c) . 
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mination , the Commission may also, or alternatively, order the 
manufacturer, distributor, or retailer "to take whichever of the 
follmving actions the person to whom the order is d irec ted elects" : 
(a) b:·ing the product into conformity with the standard or re-
pair tbe defect; (b) replace the product; or (c) refund the pur-
c h zt :; ,~ pri cc. 1 ~. : · 1t may a1so require the submi s::: ic n t1f a sa t isfac-
tc:ry plan i'or t :.t k i ng the action elec ted. 1 ';') 
A. .)'epowtion of F!mctions 
T i;<:.: dc t :~~~·m i n ~t tion of "substanti ~,l proclt:ct h ~7: ard " m::1y be 
made unl y afk r gi ving all interested persons an opportunity for 
a fon n2l tr ~a l - typ e hearing in accordance with section 554 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act. 1 c1 In such a proceeding, unlike 
the m lemaking proceedings provided for in Section 9 of the Con-
sumer Product Safety Act, the Commission is required to comply 
with separation of functions requirements. 1 n~ That is to say, no 
employee who engaged in investigation or advocacy at the hearing 
stage of the proceeding may participate in the decision-for ex-
ample, by giving the Commission advice off-the-record. In all 
likelihood, this disqualification applies to high-level staff mem-
bers-such as the General Counsel, the Director of Engineering 
Sciences, or the Director of Epidemiology- who may have super-
vised the attorneys and technicians presenting the staff's case at 
the hearing. This means, in effect, that the Commission must ei-
ther crea te a separate staff of attorneys and technicians to try Sec-
tion 15 cases, create a separate staff of advisers to help it decide 
those:: cases, or limit its off-the-record consultation to the commis-
sioners' personal assistants or opinion writers. 
B. Requirement that Administrative Law Judge Preside 
The Administrative Procedure Act requires that section 554 
proceedings be presided over by either the agency itself (in this 
case the Commission) , one or more members of the agency (in 
this case one or more of the comrn issioncrs) . or- '.v hat is usu-
ally the pract ice--an administrative law judge. H;:~ I t is possible 
to argue that this provision does not apply to Section 15 proceed-
ings under the present Act. As noted above, all the statute says 
is tint the hearing shall be condu cted " in :J.ccord;:"J1ce with sec-
tion 554" of the APA;16'1 and it is not section 554 itself which 
LiD Section 15 (d)(3). 
1 GO I d. 
lGt 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1970). 
1t~~ 5 U.S.C. * 554(d) ( 1970) . 
1G0 5 U.S.C. § 55 6(b) (1970). 
H ; ! Section !5 (f) . 
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requires o.dministrative law judges, but rather section 556, which 
describes the personnel that must be used i..'1 section 554 proceed-
ings. In addition, the present Act states e lsewhere that the Com-
miss ion "may, by one or more of its mem.bc:·s or by q: ch 2.gen ts 
or agency as it may designate, conduct any hearing or other 
inqc:iry w~c~ss ary or ~:ppropriate to its hn:ctions a ;1 ywhere in the 
of its funct ions cr po\V<;>L:i, othe;.- than the: pcr.'.Tr tc• iss ue sub-
l) '0'l '"' S tO r'l'"•1 o71''l·C ·'t" Ol" •"Ll'!'lOVC 0 r.J·, F the 1n'~' "1; S~ ; r1Jl ' " lf;(; ..I.. \.~ .J. L l • o • U,. l) _l_ \....- ..._, J l_J .L .) ....... l . l- • • '-- - i • • 1 l l .. _ l \_ • 
~· . . ' ' ' , 1 1 . . h l11c cluestt011 1s \VlJ etnc:r tnese oroaG. auL.10rlZJ.tions c2.n Le con-
strued to alter what wo uld be the normal effect of a reference to 
APA section 554-particularly in 1ight of another provision of 
the APA which states that no statute may be held to supersede or 
modify its provisions "except to the extent that it does so ex-
pressly."1 u' 
The delegation language in the Consumer Product Safety 
Act is, to say the least, unusual. Statutes and reorganization plans 
that authorize the subdelegation of functi ons by m os t indepen-
dent regulatory agencies expressly provide that section 556 of the 
APA shall not be superseded. 168 It can certainly be argued that 
the omission of comparable language here reflects a deliberate 
policy choice. I t is also arguable th at Section 27 (a) of the 
Act, in specifically authorizing the delegation of power to con-
duct hearings, does "expressly" supersede APA section 556. 
The better view, however, is to the contrary. Since Section 
27 makes no reference to the AP A, it should not be deemed to 
1r; ,-; Sect ion 27(a) . 
lGG Section 27(b)(8). Whatever its effect upon the poin t here unde r dis-
cussion, this delegation provision has another impo rtant impact upon the hear ing 
process: It re lieves the Commission of the obligation to review every hearing 
office r' s determination, and enables instead a system of "discretionary" review 
in which the decision of the hearing officer (as in Civil Aero nau tics Board 
hearings, sec R EORG. PLAN N o.3 of 196 1, 49 U.S. C. § 1324 no 1e (1970)) or 
of an intermediate re view board (as in the Federal Com mun icat ion s Comm is-
sion, see 47 U.S.C. § 155(d) ( 1970)) is final absenL the ::tge nc::/s ck:ci sion to 
review. Tb e aclv::tntage of such delegation, of course, is to free age ncy members 
from rout ine adjudicato:·y du ties in order that they I>l ay d ·~ \'O te th ei r a ttention to 
bro::tdcr issues of programs and policies. In view of the wide scope of its ac-
tivi ties, the Commission caa be expected to make usc: o f this provisio n if a 
considerable volume of contested Section 15 proceedings a:i sc s. 
1 G7 5 U.S.C. § 559 (1970). 
lGS Sec 15 U .S.C. § ?Rd -1 (a) (1970) (Securiti es and Exch::tnge Commis-
sion); 47 U.S.C. § 155 (cl) (l) (1970) (Federal Comm uni c::~tion s Co mmission); 
REOl~G . PLI N No. 3 of 1961 , 49 U.S .C. § 1324 nolc (1 97 0) ( Ci\ il Aero nautics 
Board); Rr:ORG. PLAN No.4 of 1961, 15 U.S.C. § 41 no le ( 1970 ) (Federa l Trade 
Commission); R EORG. PL\~-T No. 7 of 1961, 46 U.S.C. § 1ll1 nu1e (1970) (Fed-
eral ;vraritime Commission). A not~1ble excepti on is the Interst:ltc Commerce 
/ ,ct, which, in :1 prov ision long antedating the APA, broadiy a ut hor izes the ICC 
to d:; k ga rc "::tny of its wo rk, business , or function s" to employee bo ::trds composed 
of three or more members. 49 U.S .C. § 17(a) (19 70). 
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have "expressly" superseded jt. 16!) 1v1oreover, jn vjew of the reg-
ularity with which Congress has declh'1ed to authorize delegation of 
trial-tviJe hcarim2: functions, it js most unlikelv that it '.VOu1d ' ~ . 
1 J 1.' l . . . 1 1 . J • •• " 1avc Ctem;erate.y brol-:cn tne pattern 1ere w1tnout sp:;cittco.uy say-
mg so. This conclusion is reinforced by the Congressional re-
fu s:.t l tc permit delegation to employees of the much les'; i;·,1portGnt 
:--:ubpn ~ ~~1~l. p(Y-.\- c L· .j·,- ~~ -~ - l 1e L.;r;g uagc of Scct!on :27 (c:) i :-~ .. (:~-~ -
' • l 1' l I . ] · ' . '1 l ' ' ' ' -. p1atnec as appiiCaL1iC l1 L?L to tne tr1at-typc ne~11.-1ng~ r L>-.}Lii:_·,_: rJ ~--;y :_'<: c --
tjnn l5 ~)Ut on1y· ~o 1cg i~:_do.tive-type hear1ng~ ) such ct:) U~ u:; -=· 
contemplated by Sections 9 and 10, and to proceedings of a more 
Qeneral nature designed to inform the Commission and the nub-
~ ~ L 
lie on matters of consumer product safety. This interpre tat ion 
is supported by the subsec tion's last sentence (" [ t Jh ~~ C.xnmission 
shall publish notice of any proposed hearing in the Federal Reg-
ister and shall afford a reasonable opportunity for interested per-
' . d 1 ") rl 1 l 1 •• sons to present retevant tes ttmony an aata an,t oy Uc ne;:cclmg 
of the Section-"Adclitional Functions of Commi~;sicn"-·which 
jmplies that the "hearings" contemplated in subsection (a) are 
above and beyond those required or even mentioned in the pre-
ceding provisions of the Act. 
C. Relationship to other Enforcement Provisions 
There is obviously considerable overlap between Section 15 
and the other, judicial, enforcement provisions of the Act (to be 
discussed in Part V below). A product which does not conform to 
an applicable consumer product safety standard and thus presents 
a "substantial product hazard" under Section 15 may also consti-
tute an "imminently hazardous product" under Section 12. Its 
manufacture or distribution would likewise be a violation of Sec-
tion 19 subjec t to injunction under Section 22, and, if kncwing!y 
done, might give rise to civil or criminal penalties under Sections 
20 or 21. Judicial proceedings under any or all of these provi-
sions might, in theory at least, unfold simultaneously with the 
adm inistrative proceeding under Section 15. 
A problem of appar(;nt fairness is clearly involved when the 
Commission asserts in court a violation requiring civil, crirninal, 
or injunctive relief, ·,vhile at the same time purporting to sit in 
impartial judgment of the same issue at the adn1.inistrative level. 
With respect to the civil <mel criminal penalty provisions (Sec-
ti or: s 20 and 21) , it does not seem th at the Commission wm.1ld of-
ten be forced into such a position; it is difficult to conceive of any 
JI;:J See OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, :MANU AL ON THE r'\D:VI!N ISTRA-
T ! VE PROCEDUR E i\Cr 72 (19-f?). 
El) Sect ion 27(b)(S). 
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practical compuls ion to impose such penalties before completion 
of the Section 15 proceeding. With respect to injunctive relief 
(Sect ion 22), however, the dilemma may be more difficult to 
avoid-though even here, it seems likely that, once a Section 15 
proceeding is commenced, the businessman will ordi nar il y post-
pone furth er di stribution o[ the product voluntarily rath er th ::m 
ri sk ::1dd i tit:~1~d li :tbi lity h' r refund, rep lacement, o t· rep::tir. tn s::ly 
nuth icg of civil and criminal penalties. This p1·obl em C't ap-
parent prcjuclgrncnt can of course be eliminated by the Co mmis-
sion's delegating to its staff the decision whethe:-- to seek j1Jclicial 
relief in cases where administrative action is pending or contem-
plated; but this may be neither desirable nor reasonable with re-
spect to criminal proceedings. Such abstention by the C ommission 
from the dual role of prosecutor and judge is not, in any case, 
strictly required by the Adminis trative Procedure Act. 17 1 
The Commission may on occasion deem it desirable to pro-
ceed simultaneously under Section 12 (providing judicial relief 
against "imminently hazardous products") and Section 15. Where 
Section 12 is invoked, the administrative proceeding might be 
thought supcrf1uous, in that all of the sanctions avo.ilable to the 
Commission under Section 15 are likewise available to the court 
under Section 12; a..'1d the judicial route will inevitably be more 
expeditious, if only because a Section 15 order, once issued, is sub-
ject to non-statu tory review in a district courtY~ N evcrthe-
less, in view of the possibility that the court may find the product 
not "imminently hazardous", and may thus grant nc relief Clt all, 
concurrent pursuit of the administrative remedies rnz.y sometimes 
be thought desirable. 17 :3 In any event, although the determina-
1 7 1 The s•::par::1tion-of- fu nctions provisions of th e APA uo no t apply to the 
agency heads themselves. Sec Part (C) of the last senten"" c f 5 U.S. C. § 55-H cl) 
( 1970) . Moreove r, it is by no means clear that the decisio n to i1: :t ia ' . ..:: :t jctd::::~ll 
proceed ing or to refer a matter to the Atto!·ney Genera l co nstitutes, wi thout 
m o re, " a n investigative or prcsecuting function" within the meani ng o f 5 U .S.C . 
§ 554(cl ) , j:"•erformanee o f which would di squali fy e ven a sta ff me mbe r fro m 
pa;ticipating in tb c aci min is tra ti \·e decisi on of the me rit s u nder Scc ~io n 15. 
1 7., See tex t accompany ing n o tes 174-76 infra. 
1 ;:~ In bringing a n actio n under either Section 12 or Section 22. the C om-
missio n runs the ris k that the co u rt's decision , or some la ng u ag~ in its opin ion , 
if adverse , may embarra ss o r even fo reclose any subsequent ;\dmi:1i strative pro-
ceeding under S::ction 15. A judicial rulin g unde r Section 2 ~ th a t t.he p .-odu ct 
d o~ s not viol ate a n a pplicab le product safr:ty rule '.vould be bi :•d ing upo:m the 
Co1nrnission Jnd preclu de: n co r. t r~ ry adn1inistrative dete rn~ in2 !io:~ un :.:~t~r Sec tion 
15 . . And '.vhile a judici al dtt-::rrn inaticn under Secti on 12 that tr~ c prod uct clo:: s 
no t "immine;1tly" th ;·c atcn "death , se rious illness, or seve re person::1l i;1]ury", 
\VOuld not necessaril y fo rc clos·2 a subsequent ad rnirJ.! st r~Hi \'c: fi~ ·~ di n v t ;: ;.r~ it DDs~s 
a "substancia l risk of in ju ry to the public"--the two issues not b2i rw id enti~al­
broad } Q;lg~lage in the opi nion r11 ight \Vel! dis incline thl~; Corn ~1i~, ;l·: .: t·1 to tz~ k c 
furth er ~; drn ini s t!· a'l ive ;:v.: tion. 'fh!s cor: side:·ation s u gg~ st.s that, \\':;e re inju r:c tive 
rel ie f un det· Section 22 is not urgently re qu ired (presumabl y the need fo r rel ief 
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tions to be made in the two proceedings are somewhat different, 
the element of unreasonable risk is common to both and, there-
fore , the problem of apparent prejudgment discussed o.bove in 
connection with Sections 20-22 is, to some degree, present also 
in Section 12. 
D. Judic ia! R eview 
The A ct makes no explicit prov1s10n for judicia! rev iew of 
Section 15 determino.ti ons, but presumably they are subj ec t to "non-
statutory review" in a di strict court11 ·1-either in an action for 
injunctive or declaratory relief brought by the aggrieved p~1rty or 
in a civil or crirninal proceeding under Section 20, 2!, or 22 
brought by the Commission to enforce compliance with the Sec-
tion 15 order. 17 '3 Whether challenged in an offensive or defen-
sive p osture, the Commission's deterniination will be upheld 
unless found to be arbitrary or capricious, unsupported by substan-
tial evidence on the record, or otherwise not in accordance with 
law. 1 >B 
The weight to be accorded the Commission's determination 
under Section 15 may also become an issue in a suit under Section 
22 to restrain fur ther distribution of a product alleged to be not 
in co mpliance with an applicable product safety rule. This type 
of offensive Commission action (unlike the actions referred to in 
the preceding paragraph ) does not seek enfo rcement of a 
Section 15 order as such; but it places in issue the very same ques-
ti on of rule-compli ance which will have been adjudicated in an 
earlier Sec tion 15 proceeding. In such a situation, is the court to 
m ake an independent judgment, or is it to accord the Commission's 
prior determin ation the same presumption of validity it would re-
ceive in a proceeding to reviev1 or enforce the Section 15 order it-
self, upholding it if supported by "substantial evidence"? E ither 
posi tion is defensibie. F or the former view, one can argue that 
if Congress had intended th e same degree of judic ial deference as 
that accmdccl to other appl ications of Section 15, it would simply 
have included a ceilse-and-clesist order against future d is tribution 
as one of the judicially enforceable sanctions which th e Commis-
un de r Sect ion 12 wi ll a lways be urgent), the Commission may general ly be e:; -
pected to concluck the admini stm tivc proceedin g befo re invok ing th e a id of th:: 
cou;·t s. Bv da in cr so. it mav be abl e no t only to secure e nfo;·cc m-~ n t of its orc:!.:; r 
before ri :; l;i ng a~ acivc rse jud ic ia l dec ision in an acti on unde r Section :::>2, but 
al so to im p;·ove its e·;entll a l ch ances in such an action , to ti L~ C\km the: court 
gi ves clc f.:r~ncc to the prior ~~ drni :l i s tr ~!ti ·v·c ch:tcrrn ination. 
JH Sec text accompanying no tes 148-51 supra. 
1 7"• See tnt accompa nying notes 177-82 infra. 
l /l] 5 u.s.c. § 706 (1970) . 
' .l 
l 
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sion itself co uld unpose . B y r·equ iring the Com mission to initiate 
tl1is part icular sanctic11 before the courts, it presun1t1bly i_ntcr:dcct 
the judici2.l functir:;n to be som eth ing more. This view is support-
bl 1 . c . . ,-1 • '1. , ' ,.., t" ') 0 1 . a c on y tl 1t JS conce.Jecl cnat tne court s ,:,ec ron - "- c etermma-
t ion will not undo t he effect ot the Commission's Section 15 de ter-
n:ination ·[or other p urposc~s ,-. j, ')S r·"'qll ·J"rincr r "' l"lir l) l" ·· ~" 1 ' ' ...... .. 1 (.. . ._, ._ ... . o "" _t.J ~.. _l_ t_,. t) .. .. ce -
;; , . !t-, -. rf~ · for ~ .--:--r t .!O ll 'JJ ;~ , r ~ ~ -.... ·i··l ·' 11 __ _ • .''....: .._ .. ·---}' , __ .n_ ..._. -~- L.J ._. ! "._.. ,_, l _ ) L 1 \ 1 L 
:l""b..._.r .. ·~rL:: .... r-! -;"~ ~ ~ c:: p ~-: t lc ~ 11d ;, f!it- r' r't ~: l~~~ ns oF 1p1r)o sipa cl ~-~ :lo,·o :, 1 I L ! ;. ,_, ;. ! •. '- · •• ..,.·. '· '-) ~ o , • .~ '--'- I -' . •! ·-~ • .{ ~ ~~- . "-' -' - _I-~ ._.. \.. • '- ~ - 1__.. _1 - - _.. :::::J •-' J.. .,' J \,.. -
dici~-~1_ i ·2vic~\V C·rl S~':t icn 1.5 itscif . T"his '/eJ.·y lin1it~t ion, h o\Ycv~r , 
renders t"h e ClJposite ·vic\v rnor~ lJ.iansiblc, for only' 011 the basis 
nf ·t1"' = ,.... l ,_, ., ... ,-:-o S"' r~-,"'"· 1 L 0 1 ... """ ' ;,...,r-J j,.... 0Li o· .... " 1 .... 0 ll 1 d 1"'" bpo "SSll'l,Cd {'0. ' ,J>. ll·~ · '-·1•:.: •.•.!'-- ' .oLtL L.l u . y ""u,·v-.L u -' l• 1 l ~ u , , - "" tl gress 
intended to create a systern under which an agency determinat ion 
cou ld be fou nd erroneous in one judicial proceeding a nd correct 
in another. T here is no su ch clear indication here, since the 
""J1frj'P<:~ :ona1 re f' l ~'~ ·l to crr"llt t hp. Com mi c<:: ion CPace "'nc1 r!as :rt ..__.- v •c _ . ._,._) 1 :_.:_[. .L .1.~ .... )(,..,, ~ ~ (.i. '- LL.!'-' ..1.....&. 0....-..o. " ~,../( .._) ---~ ... 1 !. _ _ \,..- l,-::-> 
powers could conceivably have been intended to provide de novo 
judicial judgment not on the issues already adjudicated under 
Section 15, but only on the ultimate question whether an injunc-
tion should issue. 
V . JUDICIAL REMEDIES FOR THE C OMMISSION 
The Commission has a varie ty of tools for enforcing the Act 
in th e courts. These remedies may overlap to a certain extent or 
give the Commission a choice as to how to deal with particular 
situat ions . 
A. Judicial E nforccrnent of Section 19 Proh ibitions 
Probclbly the Commission's basic and m ost imp ortant litigat-
il:g authority is its power to sue for enforcement of the prohi-
bition:; conta~ned in Sectt011 19 of the Act. Section 19 m akes it 
:.m la\'.'f~d to Immufacture or distribute products which do not 
conforn:. to c\11 applicable product safety standard or which have 
been bann.ecl <~s h c.zc:. rclo~ts products. It also prohibits v iol::ttion 
of altci1J~L·y j~i"rov i ~i Oii.S of th e J\ct 7 such as the requirelllcn ts for 
furni shin~ cc~' t ific ::t t c :;, mD.k ing reports, and permit ting access 
to records. Finc,_lly, Sectioi1 19 makes it unlawful to fail to ccm-
1
')1 <; \}./J· ,:.:··, .,. , n :·/·1e;· ; .~ '; ' ~ cr·1 , ,,_,.-1,,, 0)e~ r; "ll ] .:; (c) or· 1.L.::; ( ' t1 ) 
... .., ' .. ~.t : ~ '• . '- '- ·J. -' .~ .. • ~ -- l-- ·- · -.. · t · ... ~ ---- \... _.l._..~ t'-/ . - ~ J \\... ' 
hlting to ;1c tification of defects and repair, replacem ent, a nd 
fund. 
re-
rc-
'1~0 enforce the 11~-oh ~ L, itions of Section 19 , tl1e Con1n1i~:sio n 
with t !; c concun-ence of the ;\ttorney Ge!1eral (or the Attorney 
General ,:-,1or:.c) 1 .,, m<~.y sue in the United Sta tes District Courts for 
--- -~-·· - ---- - -- ------ ·- - ·------ ~-~---
l ' ' For a di ~ cu ss i u n of the reiationship be tween the Commi ssion a nd the 
D;2partn1cnt of Justi ce, ~cc text acccH11panying notes 187 -90 in f ra. 
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. 1' f d c • c ' " , , , 1 1 - ~ T lllJUncttve re 1e an ror se1z ure or tee o1temtmg prcoucts . ' '· ~n 
the case of knowing violations the Commission may assess, and 
sue to collect, civil penalties.1 •n Although the statute is not en-
tirely clear on the poin t, it JDDem·s that ?, suit to imoose and col-. ' ~ 
l ' 'l 1 l ' . ' 1 1 • 1 rl' . 1ect a c1v1 pena ty '.VOUJl De tnc0 Cte 11ovo m tne -.J JStnct court 
rather than be reviewed on the record of an achninistr::ttive de-
tt:;rn1ination . 1 ~ 0 ConsL\C:tt :r:·::Liy. t1·:e Cnrnlllis:; icnl is 110t obiigecl to 
se t up any for111al triai- typ-.:: pL\·,.:2cdul·;.; Cu i· ~t~se: s ~i11g ClVL. l->.: n:.llt ics 
in the first instance . 
Finally, the Act prnvide:; criminal penalties for a person 
who knowingly and willfully violates Section 19 "after having re-
ceived notice of noncompli~i!H: c from \. he Con!1r1ission. " 1B ' Crim-
inal prosecutions could not, of course, be initiated by the Com-
mission itself but would have to be referred to the Department of 
Justice. The criminal penalty provisions do, however, raise a pro-
cedural problem for the Commission--the notice of noncompli-
ance. The Act does not describe the nature of the notice or the 
procedures , if any, which must precede it. Several of the acts 
which constitute violations of Section 19 are, by their very nature, 
failures to comply with orders d irected to the person in ques-
tion.1 82 Probably the notice of noncompliance cannot be merged 
with the initial command in order to precipitate an immediate 
violation of Section 2 1, but a vari ety of intern1ediate forms of "no-
tice" can easily be imagined. The Commission can be expected 
to specify by regulation the precise form a notice of noncom-
pliance is to take and who may issue it. 
B. Judicial Relief Against Imminent Hazards 
In addition to its au tlvxity to seek judicial enforcement of 
the prohibitions in Section 19, the Commission has another litigat-
. 1 1 ~ · .1; ,, . "' · ., . 1 r . mg too unc1er ...,ectwn -· lt1ac ;:,ectwn au u1onzes tr.e ~omnus-
sion to sue in federal di strict court to prevent the distribution of 
----··---
178 Section 22. 
11n Sections 20, 27(b) (7). 
1 S O The civil penalty pwvisions ad ministered bv some age ncies, e.g ., FGclcral 
C o mmunications Commissio n , 47 U.S.C. §~ 503, 504 (1970 ); C ivil Ae ro nautics 
Board and Federal Aviation Admi nis tr:1tion , 49 U.S.C. s ~ J.;/l, 1473(b) 
( 1970) arc specific on thi s point. The un s ixcific prov isio n uf Scct;o n 20 ( b) 
ot th e Consume r Prod uct s ~~fc:t y ,\c t is ve ry similar to the civi l pct!a lty pmvi sion 
of the National Tra ff ic an d i'·.lotcH Veh icle Safety J\ct, 15 1J .S.C . 'i 139S( b) 
(Supp. 1973 ). In i n1 ;1lcnh:ntin£~ th ·_: lat t t.~r~ the I .. ~ ~H i c n a l :H;gh\·;·ay and 'Traf fic 
Safety Adm inistrat io n do:::s nu t u sc~ an adjudicative pruccss to im pose the pena l-
ti cs. Penalty a ssessments a r•.: either :;cttl ed at the administrat ive lev·.: ! o•· referred 
tt l the Department of Ju st ice fur coi k ctio;! t!Hcugh civil acti o n. O f cou rse the 
Commi ssion can bring such a c ivil s uit in its own :1 a me . Sect ion 27(b)(7). 
181 Section 21. 
J ;, ~ E.:;., Sectio ns 19(a)(3 ) , 19(a)(5), 
l 
I 
l 
j 
1 
1 
' 
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"imminently hazardous" consumer products. Such a product is 
defined as one which "presents imminent and unreasonable risk 
of death, serious illness, or severe person al injury . " 1 " ~ Sec-
tion 12(a) provides specifically tlnt such an :1ction m:1y be fil ed 
whether or not there is an outst:1nding safety rule banning or set-
ting a standard for the product , an d wheth er or not other admin-
i ' ;( r ~t t i vc or judicial proceedings ~ ti· c pe nd ing un der t he A,ct. Since 
\Vi(h respect to products viola tin g <t il ~t p p li c a b!c rule th t~ remed y 
unde r Section 12 essentially du plicaks that under Section 22, th e 
b ~! s ic thrust of Section 12 appears dir,;cted against those products 
not covered by any applicable rule and those products which , 
:.dthuugh they are in compliance or ~u·guably in compliance with 
an applicable rule, nevertheless appear to pose imminent haz-
ards. 
One potential dilficulty with respect to Section 12 is that it ap-
pears to call upon the courts for what is primarily an administra-
tive or legislative decision, that is, the initial determination as to 
whether a product, which does not violate any outstanding order 
or regulation, presents an imminent and unreasonable risk. For 
this reason, and also because the Commission's pressing of suit 
under Section 12 enables it to evade the more elaborate procedures 
required under Section 9 and Section 15, it seems likely thnt the 
courts will demand an extraordinary showing on the part of the 
Commission to justify a grant of relief. 
C. Judicial Relief for Private Parties 
Sections 23 and 24 create private rights of action to supple-
ment official enforcement of the Act. Section 23 permits dam-
age suits in the federal district courts for injuries sustained by 
reason of any knowing or willful violation of a safety rule or other 
rule or order issued under the Act. T he 2mo unt in cont rovcr:;y 
must exceed $10,000. 1 8 1 This damage remedy is in addition to 
and not in lieu of other remedies ex i s ~ ing under statute or com-
mon law. 1 8 ~ Section 24 empowers any " inte re~' ted perscn" to ~:::d.:: 
injunctive relief for violation of safety rules o r orders issued un-
der Section 15. No injury to the pla intiff need be shown; his in-
tended role is that of a "private attorney general." However, be-
fore bringing a suit under Section :24 the prospective plaintiff 
must give thirty days notice to the 1-\t to rn ey General, th,:: Commis-
sion, and the prospective dcfenclant. No suit \vill lie if th e same 
alleged violation is the subject of a pe nding civil or criminal ac-
1s:; Section 12(a). 
IS ! 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970). 
1 8 5 Section 23( b ). 
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tio n by the government (though it may be brought wh ile an acl-
mi ll istrat ivc proceedin g is pending under Section 15) . The no-
tice p rovis i.on th::;refore provides opportunity for th e private suit 
to be foreclosed by both the prospective defendant (thro ugh 
co mpli ~mce:) ctncl the government (through commen cement of a 
civil or crim irn l action of its own). 
·~ 
s~ ~~t u:u r; : :: J ,: cd !c ·~ (tlrlt 0 1· b r'~~1ch of warranty) and requires an 
ford o.cccss to the federal courts which otherwise mi ght not ex ist , 
a nd m:l~: !bus offe r tac tic al advantages. 
Section 24 is far m ore significant. It is evidently intended 
to deal '.vith th e failure of enforcement author ities to ac t w ith suf-
fi c ient zeaL C onceivably, Sect ion 24 suits might prove of value to 
the Cornmissic.n in circumstances wh ere its own failLEe to D.ct was 
att:"ibu tel b} e to lac \ o f resources; in many cases, however, the 
failur e to act will be based o n a disagreement with the prospec-
ti ve pl a int iff as to th e merits of th e case or the importance of th e 
v~ol<:. t i ;J n. In o.cl drtion to the possibility that Section 24 might be 
rni susc:d hy \vei! -Tol t an ing consumers and consumer groups, there 
is c-,.~ risk of its be ing abused by competing manufacturers or dis-
tr ibutor~. 
V/ htle suits under Sections 23 and 24 are between private 
patt i~ :-; , th ::: C o111mission is not necessarily relegated to the role of 
an observer. R ule 24(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
pt() \' idc.~~: 
\Vhen a pmty to an act ion relies for ground of claim or 
defense uoon any statute or executive order admini stered bv ~t 
feckr'tl 01~ stcttc h:overnmcntJ l officer or aQencv or upcn /tm 
rc!.';u l<tti on . ordet rcouirem ent. or agreement i~suc d or mz;c!:.: 
p~~·suant 'to the , stat~1 tc ur executive order, t!ie officer or 
agc i<cy upon time ly application may be permit ted to i;;tt:r'/Cne 
in the ''c tion. Jn cxcrcisinf:': its discret ion th ·.: CC L!r· t ::; lu ll 
consider whether the in tcrveiltion will unduly d elay or prej-
udice the adjuuication o f the rights of the origin al p~li·ti es . 1 "' ; 
Thus th\:; Comm;ss io n may, in th e discretion of the cou rt, inter-
ve ne to prc''ent its own pos iti o n wi th respect to the asserted vio -
lation. 
D. Relationship Bct\l'een th e Commission oml the DeJwrtmen t 
of Just ice 
M·.!St kdei.·al departments ~mel agencies eit he r rely entirely 
e n th~ De i,~1rtmen t of J us ti ce for representation in li tigat ion or 
- -- ·-- ·-- - - - -- - - --
l s •; FED. R. Civ . P. 24(b). 
, I 
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have authority to be represented by their own attorneys and to 
ccntrol their own litigation (subject to the Solicitor General's con-
trol of all Supreme Court litigation involving the government). 
The independent regulatory commissions are generally in the lat-
ter category. 
The Cm~:;u rn:::r Product Safety Act puts the Cummission in 
.,, l·-.~ 
CO i1trol by the _[)cpartntcnt of J usticc. rfhc Cor11ll1i~;s iol1~ S au-
tllCYL"ity U1ldc1· ~:>_·ctiorL 27 (b) ( 7) to litigate tl11.-ougl1 its O\\·n at-
torneys is qualified by the ·words '\vith the concurrence of the At-
torney General"-who is apparently to exercise whatever degree 
oE control he chooses, including insistence upon the Depart-
ment's own attorneys. There are similar provisions in several 
other sections of the Act: I njunction suits by the Commission 
under Section 22 (a) must be brought "with the concurrence 
of the Attorney General"/~ 8 judicial enforcement, under Section 
27 (c), of Commission subpoenas or similar orders may be 
sought "with the concurrence of the Attorney General." On the 
other hand, in actions brought under Section 12 the Commission is 
authorized to direct attomeys employed by it to appear and repre-
sent it "[n]otwithstanding any other provision of law."18 D In 
those sections providing for suits against the Commission (Sec-
tions 10 and 11), there is no special provision regarding control 
of litigation, and Section 27 (b) (7) would presumably gov-
ern, Js it would in situations involving non-statutory review of 
C01mnissioa actions (e.g., a suit to review a Commission rule 
othcc than a product safety rule, or a suit to review a Commission 
order issued under Section 15). 
Thc relationship of Sec tion 27(b) (7) to the other spe-
cific provisions regarding control of litigation is somewhat puz-
zling. Section 12 (f) appears to have been intended ;:rs an ex-
ception to Section 27 (b) (7) , and there is lcgisbtivc history 
to this effect. 1 0 'J The provisions regarding Attorney General con-
currence contc\inecl in Sections 22 (a) and 27 (c) appear to 
duplicate Section 27 (b) (7) and probably should be regarded 
as surplusage. It might be argued, hmvever, th(lt while Sec-
1 8 < Section 27(b)(7). 
JS S Such concurrence is n ot specifically required, however, [,1r libels under 
Section 22(b). This is probably an oversight. 
1"~ Section 12\f). 
1:!0 Congressman Broyhill stated in the floor debate: ""E.\ccrt as tel in-
juncti on proceedings for imminent hazards ... , the basic comrol of litic>atio 11 
was ldt with the Department of Justice." JJS CONG. REc. 1-l. ')909 (dailv eel. 
Oct. 13, i 972). · 
• 4 
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tion 27(b)(7) would be satisfied by some sort of gener2J and 
prospective concurrence by the Atto rney General in Commission 
control of its U\Vtl litigation, the forn::.er provisions can be satisfied 
only by concurrence in the particular suit or proceeding. 
CO!\"C LUS!ON 
-r:1~ C.' u:L~i.~::: ._ r · i';I\)duct ~ry ~-\ .. ct \\-'as n ut, uf c-_;L:rsc~ in tr.:.~ 1 1 
as a textbook sL uLiy t~t :.tdn1i n i:.;tr~t civ~.: _proce Liure_. ;.t l1d ~i n:.1 lys\s ot it 
irom th at sun,_: point aione is as in adequate as a geometrical de-
scription of a rose . Nevertheless, it is fair to say that the frarners 
of this legislatit'll '-'-er~ more th an usually atten tive to matters o£ 
procedur:.tl detail. and displayed rare inventiveness in a con-
scious effort to fashion 
a process which makes maximum usc of the expe rti se available 
in the private sector and permits maximum participation by 
industry a nd consu mer interests in the standard-se tting proc-
ess, while at the same time rcscrv i.ng to the commission that 
measure of discretion and authori ty necessary to pe n11it it to 
efficiently and effec tive ly carry out its responsibilitiesY11 
The success of the Jegis1ation will depend upon whether the bal-
ance between these competing procedural objectives was wisely 
struck and can be effectively maintained. 
It is never possible to predict with assurance the operation 
and effect of nev; legislation-especially vvhen it is to be imple-
mented by a newly created agency not yet fully staffed. }.1uch 
depends upon thr::; vigor 2nd strictness of implementation. Here, 
that norm al uncertainty is compounded by the extraordinary 
degree to whi ch pri v~.te parties have been empowered to initiate 
standard-deve lopment and enforcement activiti es . 
The key question, which time alone can answer, is whether 
these vague procedural opportuniti es will prove to be of greater 
benefit to co :I S U i1 1 •~rs or to the :~ ffec tecl commerc ial interests. It 
seems likely that th e Section 7 provision for private standard-de-
ve lopment wi ll tx~ used chiefly by industry groups; that, at least, 
was the expect~t[on whi ch led Ralph Nader and other consumer 
spokesmen to oppose this teaturc of the Act. Ex perience sug-
gests, iron ic1 lly. th~tt indust i·y may ~!lso be th e p ~·inci pal benefi-
ciarv of the Sectic1n l 0 orovision enabl ing Drivate individu als. with 
.; I . ..._ ~ ~ 
judicial ass isLmce, tu co mpel ini t i ~tt ion of th,.:; rulemakin g proc-
ess .1"" In th i'; ccmnectiun , the e!!rnination of the consum er-ad-
' · 1 · · • - T"DS · "1] · 1 • 1 1 · · c· voca te propl·,:-;~: ; ot L1t~ o'·;gina. l 1\•~.~.- DL 1s mgtLY Slgl1lL1Cant, 
since it \Vas spec ific all y dssignecl to insure that these "extra-
--- ---- - --· - - - ··- ·- ···· - -----·· - - - ---- - -
1(,1 1-!. R . J-(El 1 • ~<u. 11 .53, 92 J C~on g . 2d Scss . 1·4 (1 972). 
1 ~ :.! Sec no te 1:25 supm. 
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agency" initiatives would be taken for the benefit of the consumer. 
Without that provision, one suspects that the procedural oppor-
tunities afforded by thi:' legislation \vill (like most procedural op-
portunities) be grasped princip<11ly by those groups that are suffi-
ciently cohesive ami ktv '~ enough at stake to \Varrant the legal 
costs-in a \Vord, by C'.'i1lll1crcial rather than consumer intr:re:;ts. 
. Sl !1C C -
cst1hlishing a fcd cr~d c(_-·n:~.ur:1·:~·r \ ' !_1C:.ttc tel ~:1_Jp'2::::r bcl'or~.:? ctJ-:, ___ ·;· 
federal agenci:.::s !s n ~:\/'/ p~..~ncl!ng in b()Lh htYU~t~ S o[ Con 1 ~~:: 
Finall~l, one rnust net\~ the IJ~·cbability---and the dcsii-c-
ability--that this legisbtion will be revised during the first few 
years of its operation. It obviously contains some loose end:;-
such as the requirement that the Commission exercise those prod-
uct safety functions transferred from existing agencies only in ac-
cordance with the procedures established by prior legisiation. 
'vVith th~ adoption of ornnibus product safety regulation, it makes 
little sense to continue without modification the special provisions 
of earlier piecemeal legislation-provisions that will rep:atecll:y 
confront the Commission with unnecessary questions of product 
classification and force it to shift from one procedural scheme to 
another. It is understandable that this arrangement was left un-
touched in the closing vveeks of the session in order to secure 
enactmen.t of this controversial legislation; but it seems un-
likely to surviv,:;, c~;p:;ciall:; since the Commission itself c:.;n t:c 
expected to press for its elimination. 
It is desirable for other reasons, too, that Congress keep a 
watchful eye on the Act during the ee1rly years of its operation 
and remain receptive to proposals for modification. 1'/Iany of the 
provisions, partic:.ll;;rly in the area of administrative procedures, 
are admittedly exper ir:1ental; Like all experiments, they should 
be closely and c:1refully evaluated. Cong;-ess apparently recog-
nized this when it 1irnited the appropriations authorizatio!l for 
the ne\r/ (:1g.-~ncy to th i ·~~c ::r:;~ 2n:_i :-~~_;:::; :_] __ _ 
Congressional louk. at the Con1n1ission in 197 5. Eve11 that date 
rience under the bw. especially since some of its most innovative 
provisions do not b(:come O!'erative until 197 5. One can hope, 
hov/ever , that the necc:~s zlry funding revi:~icn v/ ill lJrornpt the Con-
gress to take 2t least the first step in the continuing refinement of 
what may prove to be pio;1eering legisLHion. 
1 83 Sec S. 707, S. 1160, !-I.R. 14. H.R. 21. H.R. 564. 93cl C)!lg. 1st Scss. 
(1973). 
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APPENDIX 
CoNSUl'v!ER PRoDUCT SAFETY AcT 
Public Law 92-573 
92nd Congress, S. 3419-2 
Oc tobe r 2S, 197~; 
An Act 
To p rotec t co ns um e rs against unreasona b le ri sk o f injury [ro m ilaz:1rdous 
produ cts , and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of R epresentatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, 
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FINDi NGS Al'D PURPOSES 
SEc . :2 . ( ::t ) The Congress find s that-
( 1) an unacceptable number of consumer products 1vhich 
p resent umeasonable risks of injury are distribu te d in co m;ncrce; 
( 2 ) complexities of consumer products and the di verse na-
ture ~1 nd a bilities of consumers using th em frequ ently rc:~ul t in 
an i n ~l b il it y c f us·.:rs to ~t nticipette risks and to s a tegu ~t rd thl.:n_l-
~~ ~ -~;·.: ~~: :. ~t d~~q~ :.: tU~ 1 y; 
(:-~ ) th e Dnbl1c 5hnuld be Dro tectc c! ~1~~i ns t lli1rC. :1~Cl n~ t bk'. 
!·i -:.:.:_s z.1t ,ifl iurv ~s~oc i a tcd \~.: ~ th co n ~; Lln1 c r products: 
( 4) co:1twl by St<1te and loca l go vernments of unrc :t son-
ablc r isks o t injury associated \Vith consumer product::; is inaJc-
q~:~llC o.nd may be burdenso me to manufacturers ; 
() ) ex d ing F cdcra 1 etuthority to protect consum c: ;-s fro m 
exposure to consumer products presenting unreasonable risks o[ 
injury is inadequate; and 
( 6) regulation of consumer products the distribution or use 
of which affects interstate or foreign commerce is necessary to 
carrv out this Act. 
(b)- The purposes of this Act are-
( 1) to protect the public against unreasonable risks of in-
jury associated with consumer products; 
(2) to assist consumers in evaluating the comparative safety 
of consumer products; 
3) to develop uniform safety standards for consumer 
products and to minimize conflicting State and local regulo.tions; 
and 
( 4) to promote research and investigation into the causes 
and prevention of product-related deaths , illnesses, and lllJuries . 
DEFINITIONS 
Sr:c. 3. (a ) For p urposes of this Act: 
( 1) The term "consumer product" means any article, or 
component part thereo f, p roduced or distribu ted (i) for sale to a 
consumer for usc in or around a uermancnt or tc moorary house-
hold o r rcsickncc, a school, in rec:eation, or otherwi~e , . o r ( ii) for 
the per5onal use, consumption or enjoyment of a co nsumer in or 
around a permanent or temporary houselwld o r res idence, a 
school, in recrea tion, or otherwise; but such term docs not in-
clude--
( A ) anv article which is not customarilv mocluccd or 
di stributed fo( sale to, or usc or consumotio n' bv, nr en jov-
• • , n - c ,. o ~' " c o,~ '' l 11" " er- ~ - - -i !~ \- !!.L L' '-!.. .!l.::, ..,.tl 
( 13 ) tobeccco ~ t nd tobacco products, 
( 1') • - . 1 ' • • • ' , '--" l1lOLOr vctuc1es or n1otor vcn:c tG c.qtu prncnt t._as 
defined t y ~~ ~~ c ticn s 102(3) and (4) oL th e I'Tational Tr ~tf fic 
:ttvJ. I·vfotor Vc:1icie S;_t fety Act of 1966), 
(D ) cconc mic poisons ( as ddi ncd by the .F\::d ~_:r ~ tl I n-
::-cctl cidc , 1:;-u n.~: icid c ~ ~1nd P ...odcnticide ;-\ct ). 
(E ) any·- artic le which, if solei by · the manufacturer, 
p :· ~~ du cc:-; or irnpor tc r, \vould be subjec t t ~..) th e~ t~1x in1-
!K,sed b v ::. ec tio r:. 41S t of the Internal Reven ue Cod C" ot 1954 
·( de tc r.t~1pincd \Vithout ri:g[:rc.l to any cxen1ptions fron1 such t~J_ X 
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provided by scct(;,_,n 41 82 or 4221 , or any other prov ision 
of such Code), c t· any component of any such artick, 
(F') ~tir:_·: rLl ~:t , a ircr~ f t engines, propellers, o r apiJii-
ances (as d::fir~cd in section 101 of the Federai Aviation Ac t 
of 1958), 
(G) bo <lt~. '.'.h ich could be subjected to s~fc tv r-.,,,i-J _ 
tion 1Jncicr th ·~ :;=-·<·d::: ral Boa t SaEety Act of 197 t ( 46 lfs'.·c. 
! 4:~ i ' -~~ :::, -.; q ) ;. · · . , .· ,.:. ~-; r: ·1:--·d (} fJ 'J'I r~c n rlqce~ to vc:~>_:c l :: ( c tb·,: r 
~ :-, _, · . . ·', :- '' . . · ~;_.~~ ,: ··l ·l~-ld :\~. ~~ :'t,_i c~t<:~d-to ~z:k l > L ''"· ! ·! il>'1 
~L-; ·:~l-.:r ~;1- '- " ·~--) , : ::, ·· 2<; ~'"-·j~:cd St ;tttrtcs or oth\~r nL~:· i: ·i!_ :-;~ L L . .::. ·-: 
< ; tc;tul :: ~; c:~k;ir: : ~: . :: · :: d LJ '.' thr~ depanme nt in which til ·: cu ~t;[ 
Gua[d i :~ Uf~·\:r~~I i~;g; ~1nd equipn1ent (including ~ t :)su~~ il-ti.t..~ J 
equipmen t, ~ \ S d·.:ii n•.:: c[ in sec tion 3 ( 8) of th;:; Fcdcl- ~il Du::~ 
Setfcty As t c:t l 9 7 L) t<J the extent that a risk of injury ~lssoc i­
a ted vrith the u:o.c of such equipment on boats or vessel s coulJ 
b e elinlinz, ~·::d or reduced by actions taken under a ny statute 
referred to in this subparagraph, 
(H) drugs, ck~viccs , or cosmetics (as such terms are de-
fined in sections 201 (g), (h), and (i) of the Federal Food, 
Dru '!: , ;-mel Cosmetic Act), or 
- (T) food . The term "food", as u sed in this subpan:.-
graph mean::; ali "food" , as defined in section 201 (f) o-f the 
Federal F ood, Dn1g, and Cosmetic Act, including poultry and 
poultry products ( o.s defined in sections 4 (c) and (f) of the 
Poult ry Frcducts Inspection Act) , meat meat food product:; 
(as defined in section 1 (j) of the Federal Meat Inspection 
Act), and eggs zmd egg products (as defined in section 4 of 
the Egg Proclc1C ts Inspection 1-\ct). 
Sec sectior:s 30(d) and 31 of this Act, for limitations on Commis-
sion's au tbor ity to rcguht,_; certain consumer products. 
(2) "The tcnn "ccn:;umcr product safety rule" means a con-
sumer products ::,,:·ety s t~1ndarci described in section 7 (a), or ~l 
rulG under t!1 is Act dcc]~lc·ing a co nsumer product a b anned h;v-
ardous !Jrod u :-~t . 
(3) The: terE1 "risk of injury" means a risk of death, pcr-
son~'tl jnjury, C·t ~~c ric:l~S or frequent illness . 
( .~l) ~The t~.~ -~·nl ~ 'rnanuf~tcturer" n1eans any person \vh o n1an-
ulactu res o r in1ports a cnnst1n1er product. 
( 5 ) "Tl:.c tc.r111 ~ \li s t~· ibutor" n1cans :1 person to \Vborn :1. 
consumer Droduct is ck Evered or sold for purposes of cii~; tri-
1'll·j·l··ot' : ., ;. ,., .. 1" ' ' " '''' ' c'YC "'' L '' " .L sn r11 !r•l' l11 does. not J'ncl.l; <',·e c'l, U .._ 1. 1 ! ~ ._. ._. ! ~~ ... ! ·..- :._·...- !_.: ..... , ~ ,... l_,}-' ,_ J .. c t .__ .. _._ __ _ _ ~ -
fi l2l1UfD.Ctt~ rC~." or rctzlih~ r uf such IJroduct. 
(6) The >:,;rm "r,::t ailcr" means a person to \Nhom :t con-
sumer prod:.,ct i'; clcE'. -: reel or sold for purposes of sa le or dis tri-
bll t ;nn 'to' v o;.,: :i (' ~) n:"); · ·::. r---J:~· h) ' l ron, s~ l li"'! 1' 1 • l ! V•J. . i ._, 1.. • ..- l L ~ -· ··-~- · - 1 • ......, ( - _. -L~- - ·-'-l• 
( 7) ( i-\. ) ~-~-be tern! '~ priva t~~ l~tb e le 1.·" n1cans a.n O\vnc~· c[ ~l 
brand :J:· tr ~:ckn ' '' ~-;.:: on the htbcl of a consumer produc t which 
bc?rs (l ~:; ri v~1 tC Ltbel. 
(B) /~.,_ -:u n <: ~: mcr product bGars a private label if (i) 
the p~·cduc t (c~· its ccntainer) is labeled with the b rand or 
t r c-~dc:-na:~-~ c.f G. p:.: rson other than a 1nanufacturer of the 
product, ( ii) the- uerson \Vith \vho se brnnd or trade :n ar l= 
the procl>.iCt ( '.:';_- contJincr is l ~tbelecl has author ized o r 
c :_ ii_ : :: r~d th·.: :_tct to bs so l0.bcled, and (ii i) the br~:nd or 
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trademark of a manufacturer of such product docs not ap-
pear on such label. 
( 8) The term "manufactured" means to manufacture, pro-
duce, or assemble. 
(9) The term "Cormnission" m eans th e Consumer Product 
Safety Commiss ion, esta blished by section 4. 
( l 0) T he te rm "SL:tc" means a State, the District of Ccluin-
bia. the Common"-c:dth n :· 0 uc rw R ico, the V irgin Island <;. Cuarn. 
\\l ~lkG IsL1nJ, ~\ ·lili \\.~tY _L L:Ecl : l{ingrn:tn l<.ccf, Johnstvn .Ls;~li ·~ ·J , 
tbL- c~t na i Zun~ , t\.nh..:rit..:dll s~ti t J. O a, or Lh~_; -r ru::;L -r crritory ur L><t.: ~ --·~:_.~ 
cific Islands . 
( 11) The terms "to distri bute in commerce" and "distribu-
tion in comme rce" mea n to ~;ell in co mmerce, to introduce or Jt:-
livcr ior introduction into commerce, o r to hold for sale or distri-
bution after introd uctiun into commerce . 
( 12) The ter m "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, 
or transportotion-
(A) between a place in a State and any place outs ide 
thereof, or 
(B) which affects trade, traffic, com merce, o r trans-
portation described in subparagraph (A). 
( 13) The tenm " import" and " impor tation" include reim-
porting a consumer product manufactured or processed, in whole 
or in part, in th e United States . 
( 14) The term "United States", when used in the geographic 
sense, m eans a il of the States (as defined in paragraph 10)). 
(b) A common carrier, contract carrier, or freight forwarder 
shall not, for purposes of th is Act, be deemed to be a m::mufacturer, 
distributor, or retai ler o[ a consumer product solely by reason of re-
ceiving or trcmsporti ng a co nsum.er prod uc t in the ordinary course of 
i ts business as such a carrier o r forwa rder. 
CONSU;-_JER PRODUCT S,\FETY COll fMI SS !ON 
SEc. 4. (a) A n independent regulatory commission IS hereby 
es tablished, to be known as the Consumer Product Safety Commission, 
consisting of f ive Commissioners who shall be appoi.11ted by th e Presi-
dent, by and with th e advice and consent of the Senate, one of whom 
shall be designated by the President as Chairman. The Chairman, 
when so dcsign::-tted, shall act as Chairman until the expiration of hi:; 
term of office as Com mi ssione r. Any member of the Commission may 
be removed b y the P resident for neglect of duty or malfeasance in of-
fice but for no other cause. 
(b) (1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), (A) the Com-
missioners fi rst oppointcci under this section shall be appointed for 
terms ending three , four, five, six, and seven years , respectively, af ter 
the date of the enactment of thi ~; Act, the term of each to be clc ~; ig ­
nated by the President at the time of nomination; and (B) each of 
their successors sha11 11,; ~1 p pointed fo r a te rm of seve re ye ar~. frc,:1: 
the date of t!J e expira ti o n o [ the term for which his prcdeces ~~o r WJS 
appointed. - -
( 2) Any Corn n~ iss ioner appointed to fill a vacancy occurring 
prior to th e c:ip iration of the term fo r wh ich his predecessor w~.s :lp-
pointecl sh:lll be appo intee! on ly for the rema inder of such term. A 
Commissioner may continue to serve after the expiration of his term un-
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til his successor has taken office , except th a t he may no t so continue 
to se rve more than one year a fter the d a te o n which his te rm wo uld 
otherwise expire under this subsection. 
(c ) Nor m o re than three of the Commiss ioners sh all be affiliated 
with the same political party. N o individu al ( 1) in the emp loy o f, or 
holding any oflicial rela tion to, any pe rson engaged in sellin g o r m anu-
bc turin g consumer produc t ~;, o r ( 2) ownin g stock o r bonds of sub-
sL<nt ia l va lue in a perso n so eng aged , l l f ( 3 ) \Vho i ~. in an y ,,rhcr man-
lli.:;_· p,_·cun i tl r ily in tL· r c :~ t \.' (:_ !n ~: uc h ~ t ~~ -. : r·_~_cq r. ;_ ;1· in ~ t :~~~ ~h:~t: · p; __ i~ : 1 :..:ll jtp l ic.r 
~._Jf .:J l h.: ll a pc r::;o l1 , sh :·l l l h(~' l d th C. () f fi ~: (' ;_ l ~ : C.~ U 111 n~ i ~' S in n cr. i '·. \. ~ \ J ll d ll i ~ ­
sio nc r may not en g:tgc~ in <lilY othe r bus iness, vcc::tti o n. or e m p loy-
me n t. 
(d) No vacancy in the C ommissio n shall impair the r ight of the 
remaining C o mmiss ioners to exercise ~dl the powe rs of Lhc Co mmi ss ion, 
but three m embers of the Commissio n shal l constitu te a quorum fo r 
the transaction of business . The Commission shall have an o ffi c ial seal 
of which judicial notice sh all be take n. The C o mmission shall annu-
ally elect a Vice Chairman to act in the ab sence or disability of the 
Chairman or in case of a vacancy in the office of the Chairman. 
(e ) The C o mmission sh a ll maint~1 in a principal o ffice and such field 
offices as it deems necessary and may m eet and exercise any o f its pow-
ers at any other place. 
(f) ( 1) The Chairman of the C o mmission shall be the principal 
executive officer of the Commission, and he sh all exercise all of the ex-
ecutive and administrative functions of th e C ommissio n, including func-
tions of the Commission with respect to (A) the appointment and super-
vision of personnel employed under the Commi~sion (other than per-
sonnel employed regularly and full t ime in the immedi <1 te offices of 
commissioners other than the Chairman) , (B) the distribution of busi-
ness among personnel appointed and supervised b y the Chairman and 
among administrative units of the C ommission, and (C) the use and 
expenditure of funds. 
- (2) In carrying out any of his functions under the provisions of 
this subsection the Chairman sh all be gove rned by general polides of 
the Commission and by such regula tory decisio ns, findin gs, ::wd de te r-
mi n a tions as the Co mmission may by law be au thorized to ma ke . 
(g) ( 1) The C hairman, subject to Ihe clpp rova l o f t~: e Commis-
s io n, sh all appoint a n Executive Directo r, a G eneral Ccumci, a D irector 
of E n£ineering Sciences , a Director of EDi clemic1e> ;:: v. and a D irec to r of 
In fo ri;ation. ~ No indi ~iclu ~tl so a ppoin ted may rece ive p ay in excess 
of the annual rate of b asic pay in effec t fo r grade GS-1 8 of the G cn-
cr:·d Sch~clu1e . 
(2/ Th~ _ Chai rm~~n , su b ject tn_ s ~ bs ~ c tion ( f)(2~, may e mploy 
5t:ch t' tncr o tf1ce rs ancl. emolovccs ( mc ! ud tn ~ atto rnc vc;) as il r c ne ce~ ­
sar v in th e execution of th e' C~mmis s i o n 's fu~ctio n s . -No fnil-timc o ffi-
ce r- or emolovce of the Commissio n who w2 s at <1nv tii11 e durin!: the 12 . ~ ... .__, 
J r1 " t • • ,. L. · 1 • 1 • ~ m?n~ 1s p rece .dng tne termm~l t : ·~ n m 11:s c mp,oynF'nt wlt:·; tn c Lon:-
Ill iss;o n cornpcn ~; ~1ted at :1 r ~~tc F1 cxcc :..: s o t t}1e J n n u~1 rate of basic 
pay in effec t for grade GS-14 of the Gcncr <li Sc hed ule , sh <l ll <lCce pt em-
ployment o r compensa tion from any ;m: rw fact urcr subjec t to thi5 Act, fo r 
a _pe_riod of 12 mor,ths afte,· h: rrni nating e mplo yment with the Co m-
miSS IO n. 
(h ) ( I) Section 53 J 4 of tiLlc 5 , Uni ::~ J St:• tc' Code, i>; a m ench~d b y 
acld in rr at th e end thereof the fol l owim~ new )J ::l !" ;!i:; r :m h: 
Q "'--' ~ ·- I . 
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" ( 59) Chairman, Consumer Produc t S ~1fc ty C o mmission. " 
(2) Sect ion 5315 of such titk is ame nded \)y :1dd ing at the end 
th ereof the fo!lo\ving nev; p~1rngraph: 
"( 97) Members, Cons umer P roduct Safety Commission ( 4) ." 
( l) nl~t ii l ~ ~ li n ~1\~ Tni:.t!· 
ti;: :1_·_:: :.l~~~-dy ~:~ : , ~:r: d ~ ~ -~- · ·-": ~--- · : · d:_::_:_ t: : :~~~ c1 i r: \' c: -~·:r:l-
ti~ 1 1. 1 ~: ' ·t_ .nc: tu the c~lu s·:::-~ ~ ti!d ni · ,:~- -' ·--·!~ :_i ,·:i; = ~ r d·-::_· t~· h_ ini u ry_ ~ tnd 
li i lli.: :.;s a::;scc~ t tcd \Vi lh cons :._:.r:1~~ r p1~od ~: ~~L< ~-:n~l 
(2) COl}duct such continuing s tudie'' and investiga tions oi 
dc~.t th :;, injti.ric :~ , di serrscs, o ther hc~li t h irn_p:_-:_ irn:cnts , and econon1ic 
losses resulting frorn accident) iavclving c ~ ~j c. :=~ urn<:r products as it 
dccn1s necessary. 
( b) The Commission may-
( ') conr'··et .. p~~'lt·rh Stll,.1l.P" rp v· )'' '! ". ,. ; ,.r .. • ; •• - ~ r.lil th·~ .l ULlv l .. ~ ;:,t._: . ~,. ...- .il, U .,_.,.'), '-.d. .._.._l ~ l.i \o 1,.....)L .i 6.:.~u U.>.. l..) ... . v 
safety of consumer products and on impw·;ing th e safety of such 
products; 
(2) test consumer products and dcve1op product safety tes t 
methods, and assist public and private organizations, administra-
tively and technically, in the developme nt of stlfe ty standa rds a nd 
tes t methods . 
( 3) offer training in product safety investigation and tes t 
n1cthods, and assist public and pri•v' o. tc crga _; 1i. z~tt i 'J ns , ~!drn i ni s trJ­
tivcly and technically, in the development of safety standards and 
test n1cthods. 
( c) In carrying out its functions under this section, the C ommis-
ston m ay make gra nts or enter into contracts fo r t!1e conduct of such 
functions with any person (includin g a gove rnment:ll en tity ) . 
( cl) "'vVhcnever the Federal contr ibut ion fcJ r ~~ny information, rc -
sc:J.rch, or ch.:velop n1ent activity authoriz·:d by this P~c t ls rnor:~ than nlin-
im ~d, the Commiss ion shaH include in any contr ::tc t, grant, or other ar-
rangcrncnt f()f such sct i·vity, provisions effectiv l.; to insure that the 
rights to all i nforrnati or~. , uses , prcce:;~:es , pJt:: ~~ts_. ~tnd oth ~2r develop-
nJ: ~l t::J r ~: :~u l ting fro n1 that ~ct i _vity \Vi.ll b~ n1?~lc :.~ V~l_i~~bl e ~to th_c public 
V/1t!1out cn~1 rgc 0~1 a non exclusr\tc bas1s. 1·~otn1ng Li1 u·u :.~ :;·uosection shall 
be construed to deprive ~E1Y person of c:ny right -.vh ich h e n1 ~i.Y have 
h~td , prior to cntc ri·ng into a1-:y CE4 retngc1ncn t l·e fc r ~·ccl to in this subsec-
tion, to ~t n y patent, p3tcnt ~1 _pp1ic~ttio n~ or in·vention.. 
PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF I>TF OP. i'. l ,\T! O~,f 
SI_~C . 6. ( ;_~ ) ( 1) J'·Tothing COEta irtcd in th i:: ;\c t :;h8.H b:? cJ-.~ en1cd 
to requ ire the release of ~my information desc ribed b ; ~; ub~,cction (b) 
of ~~cctio11 552 ~ ti tte 5, United S tates Cede, or \\' ~~ic :1 i:·; cthc r' .. vi:;e .r->ro-
tcctecl by 10. \:/ f~·o~11 discl.osure to the - ~public. ~ . 
(2) }\Jl JnTOiT11 2t:on rcporteet to nr o t1"1c!.· \--:L-~~ ob t2incd by the 
C on1rnission o r its reprcSCi1tdtive Hilder th is i\ ct •,;.'hich i ~"I fo r nl a li on con-
tains or reta tes to a trZldc. secret or oth !.~r rn1ttcr .t\:f ~~ ri·cd to in :)cction 
1905 of ti tle: 18, U1~it~~d Stntcs Cede, sh31l be ·:on2,icl<.: rec} c>.~! n fid c ntial ~1nd 
s h ~1H ;-:~J t be disclosed, except thztt s~1ch 1nfor:-~1 ~ t i o n ~: : 0.y b::; d1 sc1osed 
tcJ c1thcr afficc ::s or e,lnplcf~ ... .. ee ~-; conccr:1cd vvith c~~ rry1nz Ol1t th1 s l\ct or 
\Vhcn re1 cvaEt in J lJ Y p roceedin g u n der this ;~_ct. l"·To t~ li ng ln th is f\ct 
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shall authorize tllc~ withholding of informa tion by the Commission o r any 
officer o r employee und•:.T its control fro m the duly authorized com-
mittees of the Congress . 
(b)( 1) Except ~1~, prc)\' idcd b y p aragraph (2) of this subsection, 
no t less than 30 clays pr ic,L· to its pu blic disclosure of any ir:.forma-
tion obtained u ~~- d cr thi ~:. :\ct V_i_. to be di scicscd to the public in co nnec-
tion th~~rC\V.i th ( un_l c:-;:; the c·~_--,r;__! -,J1i :;s } orl find:; OUt th 2t the pubLic ~1 C ~tlth 
a nd S~tf~_'ty r ~.:qt; i ~- ·~-· s :: h~· ".: :, _- ~ - :·-~t_' ri•./J c~ f llO t i c c)~ the C:on l !11i S~~ j :_ ~ .. n ~~ h ~ tit: 
to lfL~ l_'- .\ L;_~!:L p~- - ~ ( -~~ ,; ~ ~ ~; i:,_) ~~ -: .. ,-, .~ tel.:; a s ur!lrlL ;~-~\- - (_;f L :·:: !: , ; ·, i·-
Hl ~ l liOL tu , ~~i~. .. :i t ~ l~~Ll U f-_ t :._- ~ ·-~ i L~- \_ ,~- ~_; ; · i ··,· ~~ -~:_ ; i~tb,:.;lr~ r o[ l"L llY C 0il S Ld "~t:_; r p .. .__ .;_> 
l~C t to \~.: ii icL :_; L!Ch. i:~:: : :: ~ ·; · ; ~~~ ;_:;__~ ; -, ~>-~ rLJ i:i:~: ~f th \~ n1~1!! f"!C t· } ~~ \'-: hi e! ~ :: ~ : ·- -~ ~ 1 
con"UTI10 i" 1Jrn r1ll('f ; .. ~ l n hr-7\ ({.r·-~.1~ · ~ ·-t~"r! n r rle c::: ,...,ribed in Sllf"" h i r>L"'lrr!1 F1-
tio·n' will ·p~rmit"tl;e .pubk to a~l;~r ta ;;,·rc~~;dil; --th-e idcn-t i~y ~f ~ucl~ ma;~­
uf~cturer or. pri~-.- ~ ~- t~ LJ.L::L::~.-, ~l nr~i shall provi~e such lTiaD:ufacL; ..  E\·~~- u r 
pr1vatc l 8. b~lcr \Vltl1. a f (.: a :-;c na bl:2 opportuni ty to Sllb1n1t ccn1n1·:-nts 
to the Commission in re za rd Lo such information. The Commi ssion 
sh all take rcasona.b!e ste-ps to assure, p rior to its public disclosm c 
thereof, that information frorn which the identity of such m anufac-
turer or priv::lte Jabc ler :m ~ty be readily ascertained is accurate, and that 
such disclosure is bir in the circumstances and r easonably related to 
effectu2ting th e j)lEpos e'~ ol' this A ct. If the Commission finds th ~1 t , in 
the administration of th is A ct, it has made p ublic disclosure of inaccur-
ate or misleading infor mation which reflec ts adversely upon th e 
safety of any consumer product, or the practices of any manuf::tcturer, 
private labcler, distributor, or retaile r of consumer products, it shail , 
in a manner similar to that in which such disclosure was made, 
publ ish a rc t r ~1ction of such in~ccurate or rnislcading infvr rnatinn . 
( 2) P aragraph (1) (except fo r the last sentence thereof) shall 
not apply to the public disclosure of ( A) information about any con-
sumer product with respect to which product the Com mission h as f iled 
an action under section 12 ( rcl :l ting to im minently hazardous prod-
ucts ) , or '-'>'hich the Commis:;i:>n has rcasonctbl e cause to beE eve is in vi-· 
alation of section 19 (rebting to prohibited acts, o r (B) information 
in the course of or concerning any administrative or judicial proceed-
ing under this Act. 
(c) The Comn~issi~n sh 0.ll communicGte .to each .m,:mu fa~turc r of a 
consumer pn,duct, n·;,,ctcn· as mzty b e practJc::lble, mformat10n as to 
any significant risk of injury :1ssociated with such product. 
COl'iSU1.! E l< PRODUCT S,\ FETY STANfHRDS 
Sec . 7 . (a ) T he Comn; is::; ion may by rule, in accordance w1tl1 
this sec tion and section 9, promulgate consumer product sGfcty sta nd-
a rds. i-\ co::sumcr produc t ~;:.rkty stand ~1rd sln !l consist of one or JiJ.mc 
of anv of the fo !lcwiiH! t V!)CS of requirements: 
' ( 1) Rcqui;c t{ l~nt s as to perfor mance, composition, conknls, 
des ign , construct ion , fi r~_ ! s h , or p~1cl-~agir:g of a consun1er product. 
( 2 ) l~_cq nir~~ E1:2n t:; th~tt a consun1cr produc t b e n1~rked \Vi th 
or ~tcctJ in p~~n~ ~._'d b~:./ r.:l~~~ r and adcqu;1tc \VaLrUngs or instructions, 
or requirc r~1cnts rcsp~~cL ! r~g the forr:1 o[ '.VL1rnings or instructions. 
Anv rcqn ii:Cn}cnt cr~ snch ~l s t~tn cl:=-t r d s11:_l1l b e reason:1blv nccessar'/ to 
- "' : ·, · ~- ,· :-. ..- !- ·e" ·· ··. " 1'-,,. ,:->,-·c- , ..... n ·li ~.: .--. ~ - j .. J. - _ .c ~.~inr"; ~ ,...., :;tPd ~.;' -' _1 -.'i .·, pr CvcL t lL ,,_, _ ,~: .... <~ c\; , L"'' '~ <\ .o·-J~.c . . Jl .... ~" " · ·- Ul "'J--- J c.SSO'-'·t.- · .. \v"tn SLC! t 
product. Th,;. n:cC]ll irc: mcnts of :~uch a s t~md o. rci (other than reC!Uire-
ments relating to ~Ltbc lin g, \Va~·E i iJ gs, or instructions) sl1all, \Vhc1;c.ver 
feasible, be c:·~prr:: ss c: d in t C: tT;!::; of perform ance r·::quirements. 
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(b) A proceeding fo r the development of a consumer product 
safety sta nd ard under this Ac t sh a ll be commenced by the publication in 
the Federal Register of a no ti c<: which shall-
(1) identify the product and the nature of the risk of injury 
associa ted wi th the prod uct ; 
(2) sta te the Co mmis:;lo n"s determinatio n that a co nsum er 
product saktv standard i5 !K,:c~s sarv to elimina te or reduce the 
l.[' .::.: t- I")!~ l·l, jl-11· ~ ~ ·"" .... - . • .... \.. l l .: . l. ~\ ' 
( J) inciudL: in~~oruLtLiJ n \\"iLfl rL;:spcct to any cxi~t i ~~~ :::,t ~ l n...! ­
anl known [u the Com missiuu which ma v be rekv~u1 t Lo ih ·c::: u r u-
ccedin!!:; and · ' 
(4.) it>c luck :m iil\·itat ion for ~my person , includin g any St ~\L 
or Fcder~1! age ncy ( o ther th an the Commission), within 30 cl ays 
after the dak of publication of the notice (A) to submit to Lhc 
Commission an existing standard as th e proposed consumer proJ -
uct sa fety standard or (B) to offer to devel op the proposed con-
sumer product safety standard. 
An invitation under paragraph ( 4) (B) shall specify a period of time, 
during which the standard is to be developed, which shall be a period 
ending 150 days after the publication of the notice , unless the Commis--
s ion for good cause finds (and includes such finding in the notice ) 
that a different period is appropriate. 
(c) If the Commi s ~; i on determines th a t ( 1) the re exists a stand-
ard which has been issued or adopted by any Federal agency or by any 
other qualified agency, organization, or institution, and (2) such stand-
ard if promulgated under this Act, would eliminate or reduce the un-
reasonable risk of injury associated w ith the product, the n it m ay, in 
lieu of accepting an offer pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, 
publish such standard as a proposed consumer product safety rule. 
(d) (1) Except as provided by subsection (c), the Commission 
shall accept one, and ma y accept more than one, offer to develop a pro-
posed consumer product safe ty standa rd pursuant to the invitation pre-
scribed by subsec tion (b)( 4 )(B), if it determines that the offeror is 
technicall y com petent, is li kel y to develop an appropri a te star:cl ard 
within the period specified in the invita tion unde r subsection ( b), 
and will compl y with regul a tions of the Commission unde r paragraph 
(3) of this subsection. The Commission shall publish in the Federal 
Register the name and address of each p erson whose offe r it accep ts, 
and a summary of th e te rms of such offe r as accepted. 
(2) If an offer is accepted und er thi s subsection, the C ommiss ion 
may agree to contribute to the offe ro r's cos t in developing a proposed 
consumer product safe ty s tanda rd , in an y case in which the Commi s-
sion determines that such contribu tion is likely to r esult in a m ore sa tis-
factory standard than would be developed without such co ntribution , 
a nd that the offeror is Lnanc i,llly rcspunsible . R egul a tions of the Co m-
m ission sha ll set fo rth the items of cos t in which it m ay participate, 
and shall exclu de any ccntt·ib u tion to the acquisition o f land o r bui ld-
ings. 
( 3) The Com mi ssio n shall prescribe regulati ons govern ing the (k-
velopment of proposed consum er produc t safety standards b y persons 
whose offers are ~t cccptccl urtde r paragraph ( 1) . Such rcgula ticms 
shall include requ iremcnts-
(A) th a t s t m dards recommended fo r pro mulgati o n be suit-
able for prom nlga tio n uncler this A ct , be supported b y tes t d ata o r 
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such other documents or materials as the Commission may reason-
ably require to be developed, and (where appropriate) contain 
suitable test methods for measurement of compliance with such 
standards; 
(B) for notice and opportunity by interested persons (in-
cluding n~presentatives of consumers and consumer organizations) 
to particip~tte in the de\·c1oprncnt of ~uch SUlnd~trds; 
(c) l. ( ) J- '~'•' l-i''l:I.[''''''l1 '' · ' nf ... :.,: .. :1 " 11 '11't ]) •' .,. ,.-.1· 1 -/ .__ L~:-- H! I "-'l'-l l~"-~ • J• \'. ; , L '--r. ")L·'--~• v c~"·-1 I 
ablt:. t() L i ~~~ t~~u b ;ic , to ci i ~ L~lusc th(' cuursc ~_ : f ~i ;2 :.1·...:\·clopnle:nt of 
standarJ~ r ,_:cu rrti .il·,_·,;dcd fur pruinulgdtiun, L i >~ l~UL1ln~nts uuU 
othct· infornl ~lLi V ri ~; ubintttcd by ~;r:y ~lLt· .. ~. u ~ · l i;;. ~> ; ~_~_!tcction \Vilh 
such clcv:+,prncr't ( incluc!ir.g cli:.-.:,enting •:;·~··-. · · ~ :tnd comr;:,cnts 
ami information with rc:;pect to the need for such :·ccDmrnemlcd 
standards), and such other lJl~ittcrs as rr1a_y be L2l·:~'/~tnt to the eval-
uation oi such r•:commcnclecl standarcb: and 
(D) that the Commission and the Comptroller General of the 
United States , or any of their duly authorized r:::presentatives, 
have access for the purpose of audit and examination to any 
books, documents, papers, and records relevant to the develop-
ment of such recommended standards or to the expenditure of 
::my contribution of the Commission fer the development d such 
standards. 
(e) ( 1) If the Commission has published a notice of proceeding 
as provided by subsection (b) of this section and has not, within 30 
days after the date of publication of such notice, accepted an offer to 
develop a proposed consumer product safety standard, the Commissicn 
may develop a proposed consumer product safety rule and publish such 
proposed rule. 
(2) If the Commission accepts an offer to develop a proposed con-
sumer product safety standard, the Commission may not, during the de-
velopment period (specified in paragraph (3)) for such standard-
(A) publish a proposed rule applicable to the same risk of 
injury associated with such product, or 
(B) develop proposals for such standard or contract with 
third parties for such development, unless the Commission deter-
mines that no offeror whose offer was accepted is making satisfac-
tory progress in the development of such standard. 
In any case in which the sole offeror whc:;e of[er is accepted under 
subsection (d) (1) of this section is the manufacturer, distributor, 
or retailer of a consumer product proposed to be regulated by the con-
sumer product safety standard, the Commission may independently 
proceed to develop proposals for such standard during the develop-
ment p~CriDd. 
(3) For purposes of paragraph (2), the development period for 
any stand::ml is a period (A) beginning on the clzttc on which the Com-
rnission first accepts an offer under subsection ( c1) ( 1) for tf1e develop-
ment of a proposed stancbrd, and (B) ending on the earlier of-
(i) the end of the period specified in the notice of proceecl-
in'2 (except that the period soccified in the notice n;a\· be extended 
if ~good c'ause is shown anc'l the reasons for such ~extension are 
published in the Federal Register), or 
(ii) the date on which it determines (in accordance with 
such prccedwes as it m:_ty by ruic pre,~crib c') th~1t no offeror whose 
offer was accepted is ~1ble and willing to continue satisfactorily 
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the development of the proposed stand::trd which was the subject 
o f the offer, or 
(iii) the date on which ::tn o£Icror whose offer wJs accepted 
submits sucb a recommended standard to the Commission. 
(f) No t more tban 210 days aft er its publication of a notice of pro-
ceed ing pursuant to subsection (b) (which time rnay be cxtC-ndcd by 
t ;'; ·, r-·, .... ,. ": 1; ·c:on lD' ' · I1 ' )t;c· ~ '""' 'i 1 --. i1 <: ~ l .-"'lJ
1 ! ! ' t-}-:' F ., , - , c ~~' l ) P -.:_~1· , , -:-,--.. - · c:" t r l '"-i~ "lt"r Ll.. 1.._. \_lf t,t .. .:.. ~~ ~\. . ) _ ~..l • ..._ - -~~- 1../ ~-'\.. ·_ .._ , ,,_ .._. , , ,__.. ' · ~ . !, a...~ L- :~d . ..t'--~ • ...:.._ ~ ::;, J . _ _, J. ._ . _ ~,_ _ t\_ ._: · .:= 
~,_--,~.. ,( ~_ ; __ · ~ :L : :· .... : t i :c: L· c· l · l~ r ) ~ th e !... _. ~)! T! l1 1 ; ~: :::. !nn ~:; I~ :_ lil L~J ! 111 ·c :--::-~ .:,.r~cdc r at 1<. -
tc-i· (L n nt! ~i__· \V ithdt-~t\ving such .nuLic\_: u t: ~ ; ;_-c; { ~t>: di ng o r pub ti >~ h ~l. [ - = ~- G - ­
poscd rul·..: \Vhich either proposes ~l p rcduct : ~ :l [;:; ty sL:~i.nd ard ~tp ~ l ic~t L/c 
Lo any co n ~ un1cr product subj(:c t tu s~1 c ~-;_ ~1uL i c~ , ur propos:;..:.s Lc :._l,~ ._:l ~ ;<: 
any such ~ ubjcct product'-~ bLtnn ~.: d h~LZd rJu ~s ccrL~ :.!.G1Cr product. 
13.\N;-.iED }L\ZARDOUS PROD UCTS 
SEc. 8. Whenever the Commission fin ds that-
( l) a consumer product is being, or vvill be, distribu ted in 
commerce and such consumer product presents an unreasonable 
ri ~; k of injury; and 
(2) no feasible consumer p roduct safety standard under this 
A ct would adequa tely protect the public from the unreasonable 
risk of injury associated with such product, 
the Commission may propose and, in accordance with section 9, prom-
ulgate a rule declaring such product a banned hazardous product. 
Ail l'vliNISTRATIVE PROCEDURE APPL!C!dJLE T O i.'ROM ULG,\T!o;-; 
OF CONSUME R PRODUCT S,\ F ETY RULES 
SEc. 9. (a) (1) Within 60 days after the publication under sec-
tion 7 (c), (e) (1), or (f) o r sectio n 8 of a proposed consumer prod-
uct safety rule respecting a risk of injury associated with a consumer 
product, the Commission shall-
(A) promulgate a consumer product safety rule respecting 
the risk of injury associated with such product if it makes the 
findings required under subsection (c), or 
(B) withdraw by rule the applicable notice of proceeding 
if it determines that such rule is no t ( i) rcasom_bly nc:cessary to 
e iiminate or reduce :m unreasonable ri sk of injury associated \Vith 
the product, or (ii) in the public interest; 
except that the Commission m ay cxt<:nd such 60-clay period £or good 
cause shown (if it punishes its reasons therefor in the Federal Regis-
ter). 
( 2) Consumer product safety rules wi-;ich have been proposed u n-
der section 7 (c) , (c)( 1), or (f) or section 8 shail be oromu! g:tted 
pmsu:m t to sec tion 553 of title 5 , Uni ted SUrtes Code , ex~ept that the 
Commission sl:_::tll give ~nterested persons zm. oppo~-t\Jn.ity fo r the or:1l 
oresentat1on OI cLtta. 'llcws, or ar!:um'.~nts, m admtwn to an o p:Jor-· 
tunity to make writ~ten submissiOJlS . /'1~ tramcript slnll bG kci::t of 
any oral presenta tion. 
(b) A consumer product safety rul e sh:J.1l expre ::; s in the rule itj_' l!. 
the ri sk o£ injury vvhich the st andc;rcl i ~ designed to el imin:1te or re-
duce. In pron1ulgating such a rule the (~\Jn!i niss i c i~ sha11 con~; id c r r ~:lc ­
vant ~vail~1ble product data incluclin~:! th·.2 res-uJt:J cf research. d~\· c l op ­
n1cn t tr"' st iq cr and 1 1 1VC.;~tin-ation activT1ic:: c~~nrluc· 1-t ~r ! f'i e •"~ c~ · - ~-~llv, ... 1nri tJ'J-;·_ ~ ; ,_., .1 =:-~ ._1 -'-::;::: ·~ ._, ~., ~. -1.._. ... ~ b _l-=. .. _ ..._c.:. • .l !,. •• '-· _l_' , 
suant to this Act . 
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(c) (1) Prior to promu1g~> ti r; g :1 consumer produc t s::tfety rule, 
th ,; Commission sbzdl consider, ~md shall m::tke appropria te findings for 
inclusion in such rDle ... Nith respect to~ 
(A) the dcg;·ec and rutur,_:: of the risk of injury the rule is 
des!gncd to c liininat~~ or rcd~1 ce, : 
(B 1 the acmroxim atc 11 t~ r;cb·.'r o t' consumer nroducts. o r tvpcs 1 ~ ~ r , ,. _ 
ur cL!Cg·) t:;~(~~>:Gl, :::.u(,-[e~~l,:o l:; \1;'~ ,~~cn;. ~~j the comum2r prod ucts ~'ub-
_; ~,..: t t·~; ~~ ~- u.:h. i- ~:l .· > ~ :-: :-.. :-. <· ::· fi:·t:cL · ·,f ~~uc !~ rlt ~l~ upc1n :. h ~.: 
uL i li Ly, c!~:<~ t, !~· ::.· -~ ·-. ~ ti L-~ b:L~~;. · ·- i :_~·->~ t. :·, ·.d;:..~t'~ t :: -; :-: 1 ·--~ C' t ~: 1-~ ~-·:: !~ c~::d _: ~r:d 
(D) Jll )-' ~T'i. C ~l ~1~~ (~ t ~: :::.: i ,_. \' i ~~ ~ 'd 1 ·._: ~- · bj(·i_.'l i ' ... c of the o rdcr \\'h 1 ~ G 
;;ri!'lim!zing advc rs,:; effectc: :. ':1 unn [-J c.: Lit ion or disruption or dislo-
c~U~ ! on of nJanutuctu t· ing ar:d :Jthc r cornlTiercial p r ac tice:; consist-
crlt \Vith the p;..~bli c: 11 e ~~lth ~tr ·: d :--: ~ tt' · ~ ~ y. 
( 2 ) The Cornmission slnl i ~1o t promulgate a co n:, ume r product 
~ttfcty rules unless it finds (and incl ude :; such finding in the rule)-
(A) that the rule (inciudi ng its effective d ate) is reasonably 
necessary to elirninate or reduce an unre ason able risk of injury 
::tssociatcd with such product; 
(B) that the prornulgation of the rule is in the public inter-
est; and 
(C) in the case of a rule declaring the product a b anned 
hazardous product, that no feasible consumer product safe ty s tand-
mel under this Act vvould adeqmte ly protect the public from the un-
reasonable risk of injury associated with such product. 
(d) (1) Each consumer p roduct safe ty rule shall specify the 
date such rule is to take effec t n o t exceeding 1 SO days from the date 
promulgated, u nless the Cmnmission finds, for good cause shown, that a 
later effective date is in the public interest and publishes its reasons 
for such fi..-'1ding. The effective da te of a consumer product safe ty 
standard under tbis Act sh~:li be se t at a date at least 30 days after the 
da te of p t omu1 ::;a tion unless tb_ ,~ Commi~s ion for good caus~ shown de-
termines that an earlier effccti'.'e da te ; ~~ in the public interest. In no 
ca:<.e mav th e effective dJ.tc ly; set J. t a ela te which is earlier th a n th e 
d :::~ t e of -promulgation. A con';urncr p roduct s::tkty stand a rd shall be 
applicable only to C011SF>ncr p;otL!cts man ufac tured afte r the effective 
date. 
( ) 
n-·1 r'1 • • t 1 l '1 • .c I' 2 l ne ~on1n11 S SlOn t cE-L)' uy r lLC pro.l1101t a n1anu1acturer or a 
consun1er product frorn :::-.t:...~ ck~.: iti1~g ~l ny prcduct to \Vhich a consu.rner 
P.roduct s~1~ety yule app1ics, }·:o :_1_ ; to prC\lCnt :;uch 1nan~f~cture r fro n1 
c:rcl1n1ve nt!ng tne pttrpc, ~-;e Oi~ ~;l.!cn CGliSltrner product safety r ule . For 
purposes of this p :~~r agraph , th ~ t cr ~n " stockp iling" n1ea ns n1anufac-
lur ing o r impor ting a prod uct lJCt\\'CC: ::J. the date of promulgat ion of such 
consurn cr p roduc t s0.fcty r t~! c ~:r~d its cf t>~ct i~ie d~1te nt a rate \vhich is s.ig-
T1ificantly grc~1 te r ( zts dcti~rn~:.:i ~1 c d u. r:dc r t h ~2 rule under this p~~ ragraph ) 
th an the rate at -:,vh ich such p~· nLh..tct \~ .... Zts produced or intported during 
a base per.iod (p rescribed in t h~ rule under th is pa r ~tgraph) ending be-
for th e elate 1Jf p~·:Jrnulg2 ti011 c~ the cz-,r;sunJ.e r product sJ.fct;r ruh: . 
(c) The •Cornn1i s ~~ -i c i1 In ~ t) b~: .... r;_d~~ ;_: rncr~d or revoke any cn nsun1cr 
p roduct safety ru:e. Such ZilD Cnc!ment or revocatio n shall specify the 
d(:te on \vh ict it is to take c~frc ct \\·i:ic h ~hzdl not exceed 180 davs fro rn 
th e. date the arnencJrn cnt or rcvuc;:;_t ic n i :·; published 1Jn less the C-ornrtlis-
sion fi nds Ic.;r good ceruse ~:~; ~)\1-.tn. th:~~t a later eCf.cct ivc date is in tbc 
public in U:i.· c~; t ~lnd p~.1bli~;be s ~ t:_~ rc;.-: ~~nn s for suc h find ing. \'-/here an 
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amendment involves a material change in a consumer product safety 
rule, sectio ns 7 and 8, and subsecti o ns (a) through (d) of this sec-
tio n shail apply. I n order to revoke a co nsumer product safety ruk, the 
Commission shall publish a propos~d to revoke such rule in th e Federa l 
R eg ister, a nd allow o ral and written p rc~c nt :1tio ns in ~1ccord ~mcc with 
s ub:ccction (a) (2) of this sectio n. I t may revo ke suc h rule o nly if it 
dc.::t,~ :-:11ine3 that th e rule is not 1Tastm ;1hly ncc C'~ s: try to e limi1u tc o r 
,. \_du,~;:; :1n unt-cason:tbk ri sk of injur :. ; ~~ ~('L· i : t t ,.: d \< itll the p ro duc t. Sec-
~i ~ ·i.; [ l ~:ll~tll ~: p ply to ~lny ctrn~~ndr:>,::E ~ ~ t~· ~_ -; ;:_-:u ~·:::..:· prud LH.;t ~:- ~· rfct y 
r;Jk: \•;hi ;._·.h in·-.:ol\\.:s ~ l nlal,...: rial chan~~ ~1r~cl ~ ._) ~~~ ~- . r :...:-.. ·uc~tt~un uf ~ ~ cun-
S'' '.•' ·' r n·· r-d ltCt <" 'l't''e tl! J'" l c ]· :1 'the ~ ·< ~ \ ' l'l' '"'l· ' l' : •~n,! t r \ 'L l1 '' <; 't·;p.' I 'Y'·' '1 t , l•• • • '- f_ ; J_~ _ ; .) i..<. . ) 1...-l •--, • ' .">L; I t, _ ·' , : ! 1. 1.,. < , , , ,_ , ~\. '' " • ~. ,..._., ---•l•. J 
:\<; ~;wh ~cr:t i o n applies to the Comm i:-;~ ion · ~ Z\ •,:t in n in r w mu !gating such 
a rule . 
COi\JM ISS JON RESI'ONSJBILlTY- i' ETIT!CJ:--J FOR C00 SU .\lER 
PRODUCT S,\ fET Y RUL E 
SEc. 10. (a) Any interested person, including a con sumer or 
con c, umer o rganization, m ay petition the C o mmission to commence a 
p roceeding for the issuance, amendment, or revocation of a co nsumer 
product s::~ fe ty rule. 
(b) Such petition shall be filed in the princip al office of the Com-
mission and shall set forth ( 1) facts which it is claimed establish that a 
consumer product safe ty rule or an a mend ment or revocation thereof 
is neces sary, and (2) a brief description of the substance of the con-
sumer product safety rule or amendment thereof which it is claimed 
should be issued by the Commiss ion, 
(c) The Commission may hold a public hearing or may cof!duct 
such inves tigation or proceeding as it deems appropriate in order to 
determine whether or no t such petition should be granted. 
(d) Within 120 days G.fter fi ling of a pe tition described in subsec-
tio n (b) , the Commission shall eith er grant o r deny the petitio n . If the 
Commission grants such p etition, it shall promptly commence an ap-
propriate proceeding under sec tion 7 or S. H the Commission denies 
s uch petitio n i t shall publish in the Federal Register its reasons for such 
denial. 
(c) ( 1) If the Commission denies a pe titi on m ade ur~cl e !· this sec-
t io n (or if it fails to grant or deny such pe tition vvithin the 120-day 
p eriod) the petitioner may commence a ci vil ac tion in a United States 
dis trict court to compel the Commiss io n to in itia te a proceeding to take 
the action requested. Any such ac ti o n ~;i1al1 be fil ed within 60 clays 
aft e r th e Commissio n's den ial of the pr:t iti u n, o r (if th e C on1miss ion fail s 
to grant or deny the pe titio n wi thin J 20 chys after fi li ng the pe tition) 
\v'ithin 60 clttys after th e expiration oi' the 120-d: ty period , 
(2) IE the petitioner can dem o nstr:ttc to the satisfactio n of the 
cour t, by a preponderance o [ ev iclcnc; in a de no vo proceedi ng before 
such co urt, th a t the consumer product p resen ts an unreason able ri sk 
of injurv. ctnd that the failure of the (~o tTlnli s.s i o n to in it iate a rulenJ a},:-
ing 6ro,_: •~ eding under section 7 or S unrcason:t blv exooscs the pe tit ion er 
or- o'thc r consumers to 3. risk of injury p rese nt·.~ \.( by the co nsume;.· p;·od -
nc t, th e co urt sh all o rder th e Co mmi ssio n to in itiate the actio n requested 
by the pditioncr. 
(3) In a ny ac tio n u nder thi s subsection, th e d is tr ict co urt slwll 
ha ve no author ity to compe l the Co m mission to tal~e ~my act io n other 
· ~ 
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than the initiatio n of a rule-making proceeding in accordance with sec-
tion 7 or 8. 
(f) The re medies under this sec tion shall be in addition to , and 
not in lieu of, other remedies provided by law. 
(g) Subsection (e) of thi s sect ion shall apply only with re:; pcc t 
to petitions filed more than 3 year:; after the date of cn~1ctmcnt ot thi:; 
,\ct. 
SEc. 11. (a) Not Ll k:· th:m 60 days ::t t tcr a con 3um cr pn,j uc t 
:' ~:f: t y ruic jc prn mu! g:1tcd by th e Co mmi <;s ion, <111y pcro;; <> n acl versc !y :tf-
fccted by such rule, o r any consumer or con sumer organization, may 
fiic a petition with the United States co urt of appeals for the District of 
Columbia fo;· the circuit in which such person, consumer, or organiza-
tion resides or has his principal place of business for judicial review 
of such rule . Copies of the petition shall be forthwith transmitted by 
the clerk of the court to the Commission or other officer des ignated by it 
for that purpose and to the Attorney General. The Commission shall 
transmit to the 1\ ttorney General, who shall file in the court, the record 
o f the proceedings on which the Commission based its rule, as provided 
in section 2112 of title 28 of the United States Code. For purposes of 
this section, the term "record" means such consumer product safety 
rule; any notice or proposal published pursuant to section 7, 8, or 9 ; 
the transcript req uired by section 9(a)(2) of any oral presentation ; any 
written submission of interested parties; and any other information 
which the Commission considers relevant to such rule. 
(b) If the petitioner applies to the court for leave to adduce ad-
ditional data, views, or arguments and shows to the satisfaction of the 
court that such additional data , views, or arguments are material and 
that there were r easonable grounds for the petitioner 's failure to 
a dduce such d ata , views, or arguments in the proceeding before the 
Commission, the court may order the Commission to provide ad ditio nal 
opportunity for the oral presentation of data, views, or arguments and 
fo r written submissions. The Commission may modify its findings, or 
make new findings by reason of th e additional da ta, views, or a rgu-
ments so taken ar:.d shall file such modified or new findings, and its 
recommendation, if any, or the modification or setting aside of its orig-
inal rule, with the return of such additional data, views, or arguments . 
(c) Upon the filing of the pe tition under subsectio n (a) of this 
~ ection the court sh:tll have jurisdiction to review the consumer prod-
uc t sa fet v rule in accord ance vvith chapter 7 of title 5. United States 
C ode, a{ld to grant appropriate rel ief, including inti:rim relief, as 
provided in such chapter. The consumer product safety rule shall not be 
~tffirme d unlcs :; the Co mmiss ion's findings under section 9 (c) ar '~ sup-
ported by Sclbst:mtial cvick ncc on the record taken as a w1wlc. -
(d) The judgment ot the court affirming or sett ing ::-tsid e, in whole 
o r in p~trt, any con ::. ume r product safety rule shall be final , subject 
to review bv the Supreme Cour t of the United Sta tes noo n cert io rari 
or certific<Jt fon, a~; provided in secti on 1254 of titl e 28 ~f the United 
States Code. 
(c) T he remedi es provided fo r in this sec tion sha ll be in addi-
tion lo and Il(>t in lieu of any other remedies provided by !Jw. 
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S:::c. 12. (a) The Cornrnission n1~y lil~ 111 a U nited States dis-
tt·,:cl· '· .• ' I'J ll"c·· •L :'\1 ''C'·I,~ n f i) " 0 ";..,c+ '''c ;1-·"1 'l· ,,~~'L 1 Y '1 ~Z" ''(1 011 c e,~l1SU11l~,· • , ~ ct " l U! 'i "'bCchlJL e<H t lOLl !l.H • ! ' l a, ! '"' v,< • ,C . 
[YO' i""t fo• · ~C;71Jl'(; nf sn.~l1 '!f''ri'trt ,,,.,,-] !'"' cnbsPrti O'l (b \ ( ';n or ('I) 
~t~;:inc~~·- ~~,,;, l);~~;on ~:.;;, oc · ·i~ '~ ~--;n~l ~lf•~;~;;.,~r,'"~l :;~:ibu't-or, ~.~-/du1iler ~[ 
SUL'l1 ~Jroduct , ur (3) ;J.g~tin st both. ~;t:~:h Hli ~1cti0~1 rn ay be;. tl!cd not-
~> .;,' :.i,:: t: _ nr i i;l~;~ ;, tl~ ~:- , ~:{~~~.~~ ;·,:~;: :~;:: :~>:~~;·~1:~''.'~: ;: ·.· ,~~ ;· P~~-~~~l u~~l '· ,~ ~~~f~t~·., , ~·;~.~I~ ~1p ~ ~: ~ 
clici ~ ~ ( :··~ -c~:.>:>~cii;: .~~ ~. ur:d;:~l_· :Jny oth::r prn ~: ~ : ~~nr~ oi thi ::: _,-\cL. ;-\s lL·~t?d in 
thi~-~ ~·ct~i·,-:n .. ~!nd h r~~·e in~ll:tcr in thi s ;-\.ct~ tL·~~ tcrrrt ··j;T1iT1incntiy ha zC~ r ci ­
uu:; ~...:un ~;u tnc r prod uct'/ n;.eans a cDnS~LllTlc ~- p.:..·z-;duct v.,rhich. pr~scnts inl-
n1in•.=:nt and unrc~~son~:blc risk of cL;~1th_, s:.~ r.io us iHucss, o.c St.;\.:r.;rc p~r­
sc~na [ l ~~j ury . 
( b ) ( l) T he district cour t in which such action is fi led shall have 
jurisdiction to declare such product an imminently haz~1rclous con-
sumer product, and (in the case of an action under subsection (a) (2)) 
to grant (as aEcillary to such declaration or in lieu th ereof) such 
temporary or perm::ment relief as may be necessary to protect the public 
from such risk. Such relief may include a mandatory order requiring 
the notification of such risk to purch asers of such product known to the 
defendant, public notice, the recall, the repair or the replacement of, 
or refund for, such product. 
(! ' 'n "l•n C'lS'' ~f 'lQ ..,,.ti r·n pn ~1 G•• r" 1'·'e··"L:(,,_., (c.' ( ·1.) •),' ro. , ~- } ..:... L lv :.: •__, ·~'L t: ... u..~'.. ... ...;.,. u !. lU._. l J L IU.::.- ~ ..:.. ....;: 1 \~--) \, , l! 1C .... JJ-
SUD1Cl' product rnay be proceeded ag:::inst by process of libel for the seiz-
ure ar:d condemnation of such product in any United States district court 
within the jurisdiction of which such consumer produc t is found. Pro-
ceedings and cases instituted under the authority of the preceding sen-
tence shall conform as nearly as possible to proceedings in rem in ad-
miralty. 
(c ) \\lhc t~c app~·opr i~lte, concurrcnt1y v-1ith the filing of such ac-
tion or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, the Commission shall 
initi:1tc a proccccling to promulgate a consumer product sJ. fety rule ap-
plicable to the consumer product with respect to which such action is 
filed. 
( ~i) ~ 1) P rior to commcn~~in~ an ~c~ion l.'n?~r subsection. (a) , the 
CcllnmJ:>~lon m:1y con~;ult the r:·om:ct :::, 2re ty Aav1::ory Cmmc1l (estab-
lished lmclcr section 28) with respect L; its de termin<ltion to commence 
j ' 1 t t' " - ']' d L' l sUCtl act [Orl, ~~no rcques _ _ ne ·- --ouncL .. s rccon1n1e.r1 auons as to Lle type 
oE temporary or pcrm~mcnt relief \'/hich may be necessary to protec t 
the pub!..lc. 
( 2) T he Cou ncil sh8ll submit its recommendations to the Commis-
siOi1 -.,vit11in one \veel: of such req-:_~cs t. 
. (3). Subj ect to p:ctragt·aph ~~2 ), .the Council !11ay con~L1c t: s~tcl! hc~\1'­
l!lg o;· otfcr such opportumty ror tne pre:;ent2t1on of v1cw~' as 1t mav 
cons ider necessary or appropria te. -
(c) ( 1) An action. under sul.x:;cct ion ( 8) (2) of this section mav 
be. brOu.2ht in the tJ.nited St~ttcs district con!4 t for tl1e District of ·Colun1bi; 
Oi
4 in ~111-\. judicial district in v.rhj ch ::~ n\/ of the defendants is fou:1d , is 811 
inhc~bita{!t. or trans[;.Cts busi ~1ess ; t~ nd ~precess in such an act ion n!av be 
~~~;';X~~ c~-~lr· ~~ ";~ife~~ 2~~} L~~d ar:y s ~ ;~~;l~~~;si s t:.,;~l\: .i:~~:1 ;'h<\~t~, ;~X,~!~~r:cde~~n ~,~; i~ ~ 
..ncs ~..:.e:·~ in :~ uc~h ~ln action lll::iV run into ~;_n \-' cth ~.;i· district. ~~· 1 c.L~ tcr rn in-
;,~~~i:~~~: ;~~! '·i;~~\~~;j, ~~~;t;~~t.,,}l1~i;~~h~~~;h ~:~~: ~l~~~o;~;~~fc 1~;~_. .;~-;~~~?1~~ ,\\:~;~r ti~l~i~ 
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one judicial district, the Cummission shall take into account the conven-
ience of the parties. 
(2) Whe:1cvcl· prccccdi r~ g<: un der this section involving subs tan-
tially sin1ilar consurne t· producL~~ ;:Lr,-; pending in cour ts in t\VO or n1orc 
judicial d~s trictsJ th ey_ si1_all b . .; ce:n::.;uJ!cLttcd. ii~f trial by or?er. ot an_y 
such court upon ~~pptiC~l tl '-)l i ~-lr rr:(LC!·.; by ~-tny p:.1 rty 1n .!n tcrcst, 
ll ')0!1 ·1ot1"r 0 ~c- ,-, 11 r ~~- -~ =" · l-,· ~;-.~1 -·- :· · ~ : -·. : -. -~;- , -·q·.·c ~ l ~' L ._, l,..~ LJ ~t~_l '--) '- ~ ....... ~ _ L-'c._ ~--·-• 1.... .: ~ • • • 1.-. ·- '-J\... .J L. 
( t) ?'·T::.:tVi~ -f_ i l~-~: ~ ~-1( i y·: ( _ : ~; __ :_·~ _'· · 
under thi,; ::; -.:--~:ti:.o;·; , Lh.: ;:___·._,•:;•;,:_ 
LO ~tpp•2Lii.. dild rc-p r \~ S~i"lt i.L. 
(J:: ~~-t\\, ~ 1 n ~rn v ~tc L : (! il 
-" · ·--~ i~: ,_::;L ~~~u_·.:_-n :.;y:) ~·inpluy·~d i~' Y :L 
SEC . 13. (a). '"fh;~ (~>.::~· .. : ~·~: ::<ion rn:l \' , bv rule:, prescribe proc~.:: -
j f 
L ·' • • 1 1 "' '"' ~ . (' ( ures or t l1C purpo~G c1 t <:;:;,_;r ;;:g tn ~tt trY~ nwnu,ztcturer or any new 
consumer oroduct fur11i~) ; nu(icc ttl1d a dcscriotion of sucl1 product to 
the Commission before it;; cE:;tribu:ion in comm~rce . 
(b) For purposes of tl1is section, the term "11ew consumer prod-
uct" 1neans a consur~1c r nrod uc t \'v·hi ch incoroorates a design, material, 
or form of energy cxch~:nge whic h ( 1 ) has· not previously been used 
substantially in consumer products :md (2) as to wh ich there exists 
a lack of information adequ ate to ckterminc the safety of such product 
in use by consumers. 
PRODUCT C ERTIFICAT;0;-1 AND LAB E LING 
SEc. 14. (a)(l) Every nnnufacturcr of a product which is sub-
ject to a consumer prodt;ct salety standard under this Act and which is 
distributed in commerce ( <md the private la bcler of such product if 
it bears a private label) shctll is:oue a certificate vvhich shall certify 
that such product conforms to ,;11 app licable consumer product safety 
standards, and shall specil'y any standard which is applicable. Such 
certificate sh all accomranv the ,-;;·cdc:ct or shall otherwise b e f urnished 
to any distributor or ~ret;ikr to \vhom the product is delivered. Any 
certificate under this subse;::tiun slnll be based on a test of each prod-
uct or upon a reasonable <:c stin;; pror: r ~tm; shall s tate the name of the 
manufacturer or privz:te labclcr Is s-u: :i~ t)tc certificat·c; an d shall include 
the elate and olacc of m~mi..J c:cturc. 
(?) Tn ·.l'np C"r.t' ·)F .-, ,- , , ;-.. _. ,,.~, ,,,. ·jJ·r·o.r!;,ct f'or· '"h1'cl1 t'ncre 1's n1on• ......, .1. ....... 1 . "-' (.tJ ...... \- (.. ~ ..... .._. __ ._.. ... ~.._,_ ...... .l. .... ~ {!f.. ..l .... ......., 
than one manufacturer Oi" m ore th an one priva te ltlbeler , the Commis-
sion may by rule des ig n~:tc: o;L; ,;r nw;·c of such manufac turers or one 
or more of such priv:::.tc Libeler.:: (a :; th':; ca:>c may be) as the persons 
who shall issue the ccrtifi cJt<::. r•2Cji.li rcd by paragr<1ph ( 1) of this sub-
section, and may exemp t ~ dl oth·: r manufacturers of such product or all 
other private labclcrs of the p rud uct ( :1 ~; the cas<.:: rn::ty be) from the re-
ouiremcnt under p ar~<>.:: :· :_mh ( 1) to is::; uc a certificate, with resoect to 
s'uch product. ~ L L 
( b) The Ccmmi:::.sio n m:.tv lJ'; rule orcscribe reasonable tcstirw pro-... ~ ~ ~ 
grams for cons'..1mcr prod t:r:t:' wh ich :H··: subject to consumer product 
safety stanclads undc ~- th i,; i\_ct :l rd tor which a certifica te is required 
under subsection ( :t) . Any ;:~~·ct cr tc';t ic.g program on the basis of 
whi ch a certific?tc i ~ iss:.:cd ur!cL r subs·-:c tioD (a) nnv, at the ootion of 
th e person rcqu;rr.:d tc certify the i-)i'Ccl L:Ct, be Concll1C tCd by on inde-
pendent third p~l rty q:.! a! !ficd \: () r~c rforn1 such tests or t:.::st ing prograrns. 
(c) ,_fhc CcnEnission nl~~y b.J· r~t ic require the use. and prescribe th e 
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form and content of labels which contztin the following information 
(or that portion of it specified in the rule) -
( 1) The date and place of manubeture of any consumer 
product. 
(2) A suitable identification of the manufacturer of the 
consumer product, unless the product bears a private l::lbcl in which 
cztse it shztll identify th<: private Ltbc kr and shall also contain 
:t code mark which will perm it tiL· <c'i k r ui· such pwc! uct to idcn-
lify the n1anufaL turcr th ·..:rcut Lo ~ ;~\._· lJ Lil·,_: l tt t~.;LT upu n his rc.qucst. 
( 3) ln the case o£ a consum.: r prud uct subject to a consumer 
product sakty rule, a eenifi cctti u;: tilal the pruduct meets all ap-
plicable consumer product :~a fcLy ~; ~ :ln - . L: r d ' ~mJ a ~pecification of 
the standards which are applicable. 
Such labels, where practicable, may be cequireJ by the Commission 
to be permanently marked on or affixed to :tny ;-;uch consumer product. 
The Commission may, in appropriate ca s e :~, permit information re-
quired under paragraphs (1) and (2) of this subsection to be coded. 
NOTIFICATION AND REPAIR, REPLACEMENT, OR REFUND 
SEc. 15. (a) For purposes of this section, the term "substantial 
product hazard" means-
( 1) a failure to comply with an applicable consumer prod-
uct safety rule which creates a substantial risk of injury to the 
public, or 
(2) a product defect which (because of the pattern of de-
fect, the number of defective products distributed in commerce, 
the severity of the risk, or otherwise) creates a substantial risk of 
injury to the public. 
(b) Every manufacturer of a consumer product distributed in 
commerce, and every distributor and retailer of such product, who ob-
tains information which reasonably supports the conclusion that such 
product-
( 1) fails to comply with an applicable consumer product 
safety rule; or 
(2) contains a defect which could create a substantial prod-
uct hazard described in subsection (a) (2), 
shall immediately inform the Commission of such failure to comply or 
of such defect, unless such manufacturer, distributor, or retailer has ac-
tual knowledge that the Commission h~1s been adequately informed of 
such defect or failure to comply. 
(c) If the Commission determines (a fter affording interested 
persons, including consumers and C()nsumcr organizations, an oppor-
tunity for a hearing in accordance with sub:;cction (f) of thi s section) 
that a product distributed in commerce presents a s ub~;tantial product 
hazard and that notification is requir,_:ci in order to adequately protect 
the public from such substantial product hazard, the Commission may 
order the manufacturer or any d istr ibutor or retailer of the product to 
take any one or more of the followin~ ~tc ti o n s : 
( 1) To give public notice of the defect or failure to comply. 
(2) To mail notice to each person who is a manufacturer, 
distributor, or retailer of such prod uct. 
(3) To mail notice to every person to wh om the person re-
quired to give notice knows such pr,Jduct was dcli\'ered or sold. 
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Any such order shall specify the form and content of any notice re-
quired to be given under such order. 
(d) If the Commission determines (after affording interested p~tr­
ties, including consumers and consumer organiza tions, an opportunity 
for a hearing in accordance with subsection (f)) that a product distrib-
uted in commerce presents a subsuntia! prod uct h1 zard and t!n t 
~tction unclcr tl1i~; subsect ion is in the public interest, it may order th e 
::: , ~ :w 't' :! ctu:·c l· ur an v distributur ,,,. r•: tailcr o t suc_·ll prc' dc: ct l ' ·, : · _ 
·,'.; .l i-.:i iG\\.:r u~= the iu lJ u,ving action :~ [ l l(.: p;_; r:;u n LL) \:: l ::J tn Lh ~ : urdcr i:) '-~i · 
f i.: Cl t....:J :;.:l ~..:·L l:) : 
( 1) Tu bring :;uch prod uct imu conform ity with the r ·~quit:.: ­
lt lCllb uf L;ie applicable cu ;1sun:cr pruJuct s ~tlc L),. ruk: o r lu r~p:. t; t" 
the defec t in such product. 
(2) To replace such product with a like or equiv~llent prod-
uct which complie~' with the applicable consumer product safety 
rule or which does not contain the defect. 
( 3) To refund the purchase price of such product (less a 
reasonable allowance for use, if such prod uct has been in the pos-
session of a consumer for one year or more (A) at the time of 
publ ic notice under subsection (c), or (B) at the time the con-
sumer receives actual notice of the defect or noncompliance, which-
ever first occurs). 
An order under this subsection may also require the person to whom 
it applies to submit a plan, satisfactory to the Commission, for taking ac-
tion under whichever of the preceding paragraphs of this subsection un-
der wh ich such person has elected to act. The Commission shall spe-
cify in the order the persons to whom refunds must be made if the per-
son to whom the order is directed elects to take the action described in 
paragraph ( 3). If an order under this subsection is direc ted to more 
than one person, the Commission shall specify which person has the elec-
tion under this subsection. 
(e)( 1) No charge shall be m ade to any person (other than a 
manufacturer, distributor, or retailer) who avails himself of any rem-
ed y provided under an order issued under subsection (d), and the per-
son subject to the order shall reimburse each perso n (other than a 
manufacturer, distributor, or retailer) who is entitled to such a remedy 
for any reasonable and foreseeable expenses incurred by such person 
in ~wailing himself of such remedy. 
(2) An order issued under subsection (c) or (d) with n~ spect to 
a product may require any person who is a manufacturer, distributor, 
or retailer of the product to reimburse any other person who is a manu-
facture r, distributor, or retailer of such product for such other person's 
expenses in connection with carrying out the order, if the Commission 
determines such reimbursement to be in the public interes t. 
(f) An order under subsection (c) or (d) may be issued only 
after an opportunity for a hc~tring in accordance with section 554 of ti-
tl e 5, United States Code, except that, if the Commission cL:tcrmincs that 
any person who wi shes to participate in such hearing is a part of a class 
of participants who share an identity of interest, the Commission may 
limit sech person's part icipation in such hearing to p~1rtici;xct ion through 
a single reprcsent~Hive designated by such class (or by the Commis-
sion if :-;uch class fail s to des ignate such a represe ntative ). 
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IKSPECTIO N .H.JD RECORDKEEPING 
SEc. 16. (a) For purposes of implementing this Act, or r ules or 
orc.krs prescribed under this Act, officers or employees dt:ly cL:cs :gn:.lt·.~:J 
by the Commission, upon presenti ng appropriate credential::; and a v:rit-
tcn notice from the Commission to th·_; owner, opcr<ti.or, O'l <lgcn t in 
ch~1 rgc, a re 3.utborized-
( 1) to enter, at reason~blc tin1::;s , (f\) 
~-; l ~,u:.; ~~ ,_ -:r ._-~~~Ltb!i~hrncn t in \t..-·hf ·.~ h c~_·:-: ~ :..·: rn;.; r 
t'~ - ~ cturcd i_) r held: i n connccLinn \\' Ith di~t:- .i.h:.~·!:·, ~;~ ;_:.: c::·;;·I!2 -::~~·;· ·:._·;_~, 
or (8) anv convey:J.nce bein ~ n ~; ed to tr ansqc; ~· t ~: onsun1c~· rn·0d-
ucts in c0l1nection with distribtHion in commerce; and . 
(2) to inspcct, a t reasonable times L.tnd in J. ;,·,~ :ls~:mtbk: w~m­
ner such conveyance o r those acc:as ot such bstury, W::tl'eho1.2s•:, or 
estQblishment where such products 2re mmcutactu.red, held, or 
transported and which may relate to the safel.y or such products. 
Each such inspection shall be commenced and completd \Vith re<L-
sonablc promptness . 
(b) Every person who is a m anufacturer, pri··Jate labeler, or d is-
tributor of a consumer product shall establish and m uintain ~; lxh 
records, make such reports, and provide such information <:ts the Corn-
mission may, by rule, reasonably require for the pur1:coscs ot in1pk-
menting this Act, or to determine compliance with rule:; or orders pre-
scribed under this Ac t. Upon request of an officer cr ernployec dul y 
designated by the Commission, every such manuf,,cturer, private la-
beler, or distributor shall permit the inspection of appropri~1te books, 
records, and papers relevant to determining whether such manufac-
turer, p rivate label er, or distributor h as acted or is c_cting in compli-
ance with this Act and rules under this Act. 
IMPORTED PRODUCTS 
SEC. 17. (a) Any consumer product offered for importation 
into the customs territory of the United States (as ckfincd in g:::neral 
headnote 2 to the Tariff Schedules of the United States) shall be re-
fused admission into such customs territory if such procluct-
(1) fails to comply with an applicable coEsurner product 
safety rule; 
(2) is n ot accompanied by a certificate required by section 
14, or is not labeled in accordance with regulations under section 
14(c); 
(3) is or has been determined to be 2n ~mrninently h~\Z­
ardous consumer product in a proceeding brought under section 
12; 
(4) has a product defect which constitutes ~ subs tanti J l 
product hazard (within the meaning of section 15(a)(2)); or 
(5) is a product which was manufactured b:; a )X'.rson who 
the Commission has informed the Secretary of the T;\;csury is in vi-
olation of subsection (g). 
('o) Tl1e <;;ncr·"t 'lJ'Y of tl--, 0 'Tr·" :1·~ u ·t·y s1', '"1Jl obt··•;;·: '" :;J, r"'t' e",'l 'll ' f'_ '~ r·:v't U"-' "' ' (. . .LV ...1.. '-''-'-'-' • UL ... ~~~l ~ , o .~,, .,_J I. i,_ - (.. ... .....:..,''-" (l>t\,. 
deliver to the Commission, upon the latter's tequest, z,_ re ~\SO !lc1bl8' num-
ber of samples of consumer products being offered Ljr import. .t..\-
cept for those owners or consignees who are or l1:1V•::. been <CHorded 
~m opportunity for a hearing in 0. proceeding under scctic;n 12 with re-
spect to an imminently hazardous product, the O'V/!lec· m· consig''';e cf the 
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product shall be afforded an oooortunitv by the Corn .l1j issio n fo r a hear-
ing in accordance with sect io n' S54 of title 5 of the Unit::d State ~; Code 
with respect to the importation of such products in to the cus toms terri-
tory of tb c U nitcd S lcltcs . If Jt appears , from_exa~llill~\:iuncf sud i. sc:r;l-
ples or other\VlSe th~tt a product n1ust ue rctt!sea ::~OiTH S~\ lCJ i1 u nuer tnc 
tcrn1s of subsect-i•.J rl (~l)~ SUCh product shcdl be re[usc cl adrt1i:;sio n, Uil-
l ,.... -- ~· ~- --. ,... '-;( ' ( \ r-·-f' . :.: .. •' 0 ( .... ;0_.., ... ... , .-
1 ; c.s .-., .... r~ : ,... rn·- 1 ; -1 - • • : t;; C.:-,S ~ l~Ll~; v~.L ~ )_IJ C; , _, L t ~ : :.S .~.\...::....-L J t.~-;~q..~l:-' 1 .._ ~- - ~ u t.... :. !:; .... v .. np i.:. 8 U \\ ' J.L ~o. 
\O hi c: ~ ~ ~~ .l :~ \,~t 
1
'.}?': ~:~; ·< ~c~. ~ t~1:~ ' 1~~:~~ :1~~ ~~~ :-~~'~utt~;~:\~ .~~~~':. -~or: . n:c :· : ~) ~· ocl ~:~~ 
Cl0)l1 ;~;~-~~L:~l ~c(l);~ , ~;C ,.i/.','; ::~.~~ :u~: J i-,.(_:)) ·~L;,~ (~~~l~':~~~i h~~cJ~-~-:'2;._;-~'. \·~ :-.  ~ ; ~·~)~~~~ 
n1i s :~i o n n1av ciet'cr tina! clc tcrnt ination as to the :J.drniss ion of :~ l~ ch urod-
uct "'I1d :n' "Cro··rl ·l""= ._ ,_, : ti l S" r 11 r-e,~ut'''t ; o -r s ':"t~ th e> ,-, "'l"'' : ,-c; ,,,~ "'r~u' Ll. , 11 <... .. ._, 1.u ~ ._._,_.v • r l • '·~ '-1 t;; (.t .L ~ !. ._ ~ .,._L_...__,. Lv~-• . 1~ ! ~ ... ,\.. ..... J u t 
the Secr~tarv of the rT're~lsu rv shalJ join tly 8.gree to , 1J C;r nlit such Drod-
uct to be d~liverc d fro m CLI::i-toms c ustody un der bon~! for the pu~·oDse 
of permitting the OWliCt" Or consignee an Opportunity to SO modffy SUCh 
product. 
(d) All actions tJ.ken by an owner or consignee to modi fy such 
produc t under subsection (c) shall be subject to the supervis ion o£ an 
officer or employee of the C ommiss ion and of the Departm ent of the 
Treasury. If it 2.ppcars to the C ommission that the product car-mot be 
so m odified or that the ovmer or consignee is not proceeding satisfac-
torily to modify such product, it shall be refused admission into the 
customs territory of the United States, and the Commiss ion rn ay d irect 
the Secretary to demand r edelivery of the product .i...1to cu:s tcms cus-
tody, and to seize the product in accord ance with section 22(b) if it is 
not so rcdelivered. 
(e) Products refused admission in to the customs terri to ry of the 
United States under this section must be exported, except th at u pon ap-
plication, tlw Secretary of the Teasury may permit the c!estrucrion of 
the product in lie u of exportation. If the owner or consigGce doss not 
export the product with in a reasonable tirne, the Department of the 
Treasury may destroy the product. 
(f) All expenses (including travel, per diem or subsistence, and 
salaries of officers or e mployees of the U nited S tates) in coimcction 
with the destruction provided for in this sec tion (the amou nt of such ex-
penses to be determi 11c d in accord ance with r egulations of th e Sccl"ctary 
of the Treasury) and all expenses ia connection 1vith the storage, cart-
age, or labor with respec t to any consumer prod uct refus ed <ldi:1ission 
u nder th is section, shall be paid by the owne1· or consignee aml, i:1 de-
fault of s uch payment, s ball constitute a lien against <:ny Euture inmor-
t atiom maJ c bv ~-; uch owner o r consi2:nee . ' 
(g) The Com mission may, by ~ule, condit ion the im portation of <1 
consumer product on the manufacturer's compliance with the inspec-
ti on and recordi-~eepir;g rcqui rcrm:nts of this A ct and the Con.Eniss ion.'s 
rules vvith respec t to such requirements. 
EXPORTS 
SEc . 18 . '"!his t\ct sh a} l not apply to any con~n l"C.t.?r prud ~J ct if ( 1) 
it can be sho,.,vn th 8t such crod uct is rn anufactured. sa1d, or held for 
s~de fo r c:: Dort fron: the U nitCd States (or that such prOd uct '!J/::!s in:r::orted 
fo r export) , unl ess Sl!C:h consumer prsd'JCt is i i1 fz,ct distributed in 
con1n:ercc for -u ::. ~~ ~n the United Sta tes, ~!nd (2) such CO!~sun!et prcduct 
when di str ibuted in co nrn1crce, cr c:ny container i.n. •;:;hlc1l it is el}closcd 
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when so distribu ted, bears a stamp or label stating that such consumer 
product is intended for export; except that this Act shall apply to any 
consumer moduct manufactured fo r sale, offered for sale, or so ld fo r 
shipment t~ any install ation of the United States located outside of the 
United States. 
PRO III!l!TE D ACTS 
SE C. 19. ( a) I t sk\ll :' ·.· ~ :;,1:\wfu l fl)l' ~lf1Y pcr:;on to-·--
(1) m~Hllil<lCLU!'C i l>i S<lic . <Jffcr f,lr :-;ale, distribu te i11 C(>nl · 
merce, or import into the Un ited States any consumer p;·odc:cr 
which is not in conformity wi th an applicable consumer rw~)dtu: t 
sdcty sbncL.m.l unucr thi::; Act; 
(2) manubcture for sale, offer fo r sale, distribu te in cc,•;l-
merce, or import into the United States any consumer product 
which h as been dec lared a banned hazardous product by a rule 
under this Act; 
(3) fail or refuse to permit access to or copying of record~;, 
or fail or refuse to make reports or provide information, or fail 
or refuse to permit entry or inspection, as required under this Act 
or rule thereunder; 
(4) fa il to furnish information required by section 15(b); 
(5) fail to comply with an order issued under section 15(c) 
or (d) (relating to notific ation, and to repair, replacement, and 
refund); 
(6) fa il to furnish a certificate required by section 14 or is-
sue a fal se certific ate if such person in the exercise of clue care has 
reason to know th at such certificate is false or mislead ing in any 
m aterial respect; or to fail to comply with any rule under section 
14(c) (relating to labeling) ; or 
(7) fa il to comply with any rule under section 9(d)(2) 
(relating to stockpiling). 
(b) P aragraphs (1) and (2) of subsection (a) of this section shall 
not apply to any person (1) who holds a certifcate issue in accord-
ance with section 14( a) to the effect that such consumer product con-
fo rms to all applicable co nsumer product safety rules, unless such per-
son knows th at such consumer product does not conform, or (2) who 
relies in good faith on the represe ntation of the m~mufacturer or <1 dis-
tributor of such product that the product is not subject to an applicable 
product safety ru le. 
CIVIL PENAL TI ES 
SEc. 20. (a) (1 ) Any person who knowingly violates section 19 
of th is Act sh all be subject to a civil penalty not to e:~c·~ecl $2,000 fo e· 
each such violatio n. Subject to pa r<1graph (2), a violation of sect ion 
19(a)(l), (2) , (4), (5), (6), or (7) shall const itute a separate o f-
fense with respect to each consumer product involved, except that the 
maximum civil pen:!lty shall not exceed $500,00() for ~tny related seric:; 
of viol ations. A violation of section 19(a)(3) shall constitute a s·e rn·-
rate violation with respect to each failure or refusa l to allow or l)ertorm 
an o.ct reouired thereby: and . if such violat ion is n ccntinui1w one_ each 
day of S U~h violtction sJ~aJl C~)!l Stitute a c;eparate offe nse, CXC<~pt th,at th:; 
maximum civil penalty shall not exceed $500,000 fo r any rebtecl series 
of violations . 
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(2) The second sentence of paragraph (1) of thi s subsection 
sh nll no t npply to viobtions of paragraph (1 ) or ( 2) o f sect ion 19 (a)-
(A) if the person who viola ted such par::tg raphs is not the 
m anufacturer or private labelc r or a distributor of the products 
involved, and 
(B) if such pcT;on did not h2cve e ither (i ) act u ~d kn mvkclgc 
tlwt his dis tributi on or sa le of the pruducr \ icllatccl such pan-
gr Ltphs o r (ii) nc> ticc.: fl -\llll the..' C> mmissic:n th~li: q:ch d! ~ , u i hut io n or 
s .. dl.: \VOUld b(: ~t \·;~_ _< ~~L; ( r !1 ~__·,f :) lJi_-;1 p~t i'~t~ r:k~t)l-1 ::: . 
~ U) I\ny civil p~~ ~~dt y unLL:r Llli :; :~.c ~~L ilJ fi 111;~<\ b-..: Lu rt: r) ~· u : ui:.:.cJ by 
the: Ccn1un ission. Tn dl~tc cn1iu i ng the ~un;J un t u[ :· ..  U('ll p·~ iLdty c-~r \\·i12Lher 
it should b e remitted or mitig~ttecl ~1 lld in '.vhat ;lno(' l!nt- :he arr'ropri-
ateness o f such penalty to the si ze of ti1 e bu ~;i n ess of the pcrsun cl :<Lrged 
and the gravi ty of the vioiaLion shall be consi d.;rc:J. T he ::inuunt of 
such penalty when fin ally de termined, or th e ctmOLH1 t agree d un com-
promise, m ay be deduc ted fro m a ny sums mving by the United Sta tes 
to the person charged. 
(c ) A s used in the firs t sentence of subsection (a ) ( I ) o f this 
sec tion , the term "knowingly" means ( 1) the having o f ~1ctu a l knowl-
edge, o r (2) the presumed having of knc\vleclgc deemed to be pos-
sessed by a reasonable m an who acts in the circumstances, including 
knowledge obtainable upon th e exercise of due care to ascertain the 
truth of representations. 
CRIMINAL PE N ALTIES 
SEc. 21. (a) Any p er son who knowingly and wil! fully viola tes 
sec tion 19 of this A ct after h aving received notice of r;oncompliance 
from the Commission shall be fined not more than $50,000 or be im-
prisoned not more than one year, or b o th . 
(b) Any individual direc tor , officer, o r agent of a corporation 
who knowingly and wi llfully au tho ri zes, orders , o r performs any of the 
acts or pr actices constituting in whole or in p~1r t a violation of section 
19, and who h as knowledge of notice of noncom plia nee rece ived by 
the corporation fro m the Commi ss ion, shall bc subject to penalt ies u nder 
this section wi thout regard to any pe nalties to which that corpora tion 
m ay be sub ject under subsection (a) . 
INJ UNCTIV E El"' FO RCO.IE NT AND SEiZU RE 
SEc . 22 . (a) T he United States district cou:· ts sh:!ll h ave juris-
dictio n to restrain any viobtio n of sect ion 19, or to res!r:1i n any person 
from distributing in comme rce a prod uct wh ich doc-s J; ot com;-; ly wit h 
a consumer product safety rule , o r b oth_ Such ac tions m ~1y be brought 
by the Commissio n (wi th the concurre nce of th e f\tto rncy General) o r 
b y th e A tto rney G en eral in any United States dist r ict cour t for a dis -
trict wherei n a nv ac t. o miss ion, or tr :ms"cLinn co nst itu tin 2. the vio la tio n 
occurred, or in J such cour t for th e distri ct wli ercin the~ defendant is 
found or trans<~cts bus iness . Tn any ~:ct i on un der this section process 
may be served on a defendant in any ot her dist ri ct in wh ich the de-
fendant resides or may be found. 
(b) Any consum er product whi ch bi !s to ccnform to an appli-
cable cons ume r p roduct safety rule whcn inLroc! uccd in to o r whil e in 
com merce or while held for sale a fte r shipment in commerce sh ~1 1l b e li-
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able to be proceeded against on libel of informatio n ~nd condemned 
in anv United States district court within the jurisdiction of which such 
co nst~mer product is found. Proceedings in cases institu ted unde r the 
authority of this subsection shall conform as nearly as possible to pro-
ceedings in rem in admiralty. Whenever such p rocculings invo lving 
substantially similar consumer products arc pe nding in courts of two or 
more judicial districts th ey sidi be con:,o lid:>tcd to r trd by cmkr of 
:.~ny ~~-. ~l ·~:h COllrt upon 2pp1ic( t~it'•:·; r~~~t scn l ~th1 y nLtcL: by ~:ny p~n· t y i i·: in~­
t~ r~ :__; ~ t1pu :1 nutice lO ~d i uLL ~-.: ~· p:t~\ :. ~. :·:.; in i; ·~~ ~ :.:r ~..:~; ~. 
S UITS F Oi<. D.\:-.L\. Ci ES .BY PL l\.Su:: :::; lL\J lJRLD 
SEc. 23. (a) Any person \Vho :;hall sustain injury by re a ~. (lil of 
~my knowing (inciuding wil!fu!) viohticm o f a co nsumcl· prod uct sa fety 
tule. or anv other rule or order issued bv the Com.rnission mav sue anv 
pers.on wh; knowingly (including willft~lly) viola ted any such rule oJr 
order in any district court of the United States in the dist rict in which 
the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, subject to the pro-
visions of section 1331 of title 28, United States Code as to the amount 
in controversy, and shall recover damages sustained, ar.d the cos t of 
suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee, if considered approp riate in 
the discretion of the court. 
(b) The remedies provided for in this section shall be in ~lddition 
to and not in lieu of any other remedies provided by common law or 
under Federal or State law. 
PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF PRODUCT SAFETY RULES AND 
OF SECTION 15 ORDERS 
SEc . 24. Any interested person may bring an action in any 
United States district court for the district in which the defendant is 
found or transacts business to enforce a consumer product safety rule 
or an order under section 15, and to obt:lin appropriate injunctive re-
lief . Not less than thirty clays prior to the commencement of such ac-
tion, such intere3ted person shall give notice by registered mail to the 
Commssion, to the Attorney General, and to the person agains t whom 
such action is directed. Such notice sha ll state the nature of the al-
leged violation of any such standard or order, the relief to be re-
quested, and the court in which the action will be bro ught. N o separate 
suit shall be brought under this sec tion if at the time the suit is brought 
the same alleged violation is the subject of a pending civil o r criminal 
action by the U!lited States under this Act. In an y acti o n under this 
section, such interested person m ay elect, by a de mand for such r e-
lief in his complaint, to recover reasona ble attorney's fees, in which 
case the court shall award the costs of suit, including a re asonable at-
torney's fee, to the prevailing party. 
EFFECT ON PRIVATE REMED IES 
Sec . 25. (a) Compliance with consumer product safety rule s or 
o ther rules or orders under this Act slnli not relie ve any person from 
li~tbility at common law or under Stctte stat utory l<nv to any other per-
son. 
(b) 1l1e failure of the Commission to take any ac tio n or com-
mence <c proceedi ng with respect to the safe ly of :1 consumer product 
1973] COI\'SUJ\1.ER PRODUCT SAFETY ACT 975 
shall not be admiss iblG in evidence in litigation at common Llw or un-
der St ~1te statu torv l :J. \V rc ]8.tin::.~ to 5uch consumer product. 
(c) Subject - to sc~:· tions~ 6(3)(2) and 6(b) but not\vithstancli ng 
section 6(a)(l) , (I) any acc ident or investigation report nnclc un-
der this Act by an oft:cer or employee of the Commission sln !i bG made 
ava ilable to th e publi~ in ~l rnanncr \Vhicl1 \Vi il not iclent i\\r ~ t·!;y injured 
person or a ~1 y pc r:_,nn L.··-~ ~ ttin g h ir:1 ~ \'.: i thout the consent c: f the tJ ~ rscn 
sn id '.~tlt i~ - i ~~d . ::1 nd (~-~-! :::l r ·. :t ·:: · ·~ : -t:< e n I"\...'~~c~tr (;h nto i c: :t~~ ~- ~ --·; : ~, - ;i:<~_ } - :? ~i(_ ~n 
~ • - , ' •' 'I '11 l . \ 'I . . > •' '' r , ). 1- , ·, : :I • '; ; ': ; t; 1>•...: c· l·. ,-,; l I ,':'\ 1 1 l-! ·j ,..... ; .·_ ~ .... ,. ;'•") ' :;: •. :, pl ( 'j \~ Ll ...... . Ltt"\... ( . L [lv~ [.._ , , .. t.~ · . t . .. _ ... ~ . . L .......... ·,l li · .. ll {/ ,_.. :)-.. lu ... ..... lll , ..,l lll• '-~ '•'· ' ' · 
E!·TE CT n >.: ST ATE STANDARDS 
SEc . 26. ( a) Whcnc.vc r a consumer product sdctY :;uncbrc! 
lln dcr this .:\.c t is ~n cff~,.? ~. :t ~tn d applies tn 2 risk of injury a<-:.~:::.c~:~~i ~_ lt~.~d ;,v it11 
a consumer product, no State or political subdivis ion of '~ St :ct ::; sh:: Jl 
have any authorit y ei ther to establisb or to continue in cf[cct any <KG -
vision of a safety St?nclard or rc f!Ulation which prescribes anv' re-
quirements as to ·the perform ance, ~composition , contents, des ign: fin-
ish, constructior1, pacbgin g, or labeling of such product which 0rc de-
signed to deal with the same risk of injury associated with such con-
sumer product, unl ess such requirements arc identi cal to th e requirl:'-
ments of the Federal standard. 
(b) Nothing in this section sln11 be construed to prevent the Fed-
eral Government or the governm ent of any State or political subd:vis io n 
thereof from establishing a sGfety requirement applicable tn a con-
sumer product for its own use if such requirement imposes a }Jigher 
standard of performance than that required to comply with the other-
wi se applicable Federal standard. 
(c) Upon applicJtion of a State or political S"!.lbd!vision thereof, 
th e Com mission may by rule, 2fter notice :mel opportu nity fo r oral 
presentation of vi ews, exempt from th e provisions of subsectio n (a) 
(under such condit ions as it may impose) a proposed safety sta nd ard 
or regu lation described in such application, where th e proposed st:md-
ard or regul ation ( 1) imposes a higher level of perform ance than 
the F ederal st:tncl:lrcL (2) is required by compelling loc::t! condit ions, 
and (3) does not unduly burde:! inters tate commerce. 
ADD!TiO>.:.',L F Ut<CTI ONS OF CO"M.M TSS!ON 
SEc. 27 . (a) The Comm ission may, by one or more of its mern -
bers or by such agents or agency clS it may des ignate, conduct any l:e:lr·· 
ing or other inqui!·y necessr1.ry or appropria te to its fuGc tions ~1 n y\vhere 
in the United St~ctcs . A Com mission<:r who p1rticipates in sucl1 :1 hear-· 
im: or other inouirv sh 2ll not b;:: disc;ualifiec! scleb bv rec::son cf such 
p;~·ti c i patio n fro'm subseq uently p2r ticipating in a decision of the Com-
mission in the SJ. me mat ter. T he Conmissicn shall r:ubli5h notice of 
any pro posed hearing in the Fede n1 l Register 2nd sh,al! Z1ffe:rcl a rea-
sonabl e nppor tuni ty for int e ~· c s ted persons to present rc L;v : n~t tcsti-
monv ~!ncl d<tta. 
0 
(b) The Commission :;hall :llo,o have the povver-
(1) to rcqnire, by spcc i ~>.I or ge;!eral orde rs, ::.ny person to 
~ub mit in wri ting such rc:Jorts an d c<.nswers to questions :',:; the 
Co n1nli~sion 1ll~1V prescr ibe: ar:d sur:h subn!.i~~s ion sh::dl b,; !i1~lde 
\vithin suc11 r c~Lr.; ~J n .8. bi e pcj·jod and llncler oath or other\'•/ise as the 
c:ornnllss ion n~ay detcrn1:ne; 
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(2) to administer oaths; 
(3) to require by subpena the attedancc and testim ony of 
witnesses and the oroduction of all documentary evidence re l<tt-
ing to the cxccution'or its duties; 
(4) in any proceeding or investigation to order tc ~t im ony 
to be take n by de position before any person who is design ~ttL'd by 
the Commissio n and h:~s the power to adm ini ste r oaths :tnd . in 
such i n st ;:~n c c ~: , t<.> cum r• ·-~l kst im ony ~tn d the p roduct iu n u!· _\·i -
d~- ! ~ .: ~ i:1 t h ~; :' ~ t;·~ ::: : it~ ~ - ! : ~:__: j _ · ~: ~ authori zed uncL:: r p~tr~lg ~·~ t~< . (_ ~J · ... ~ r 
:_;; ~ ~--. ;) ub.:lcc tion; 
(5) to pay wi~n .~· :<> -' s the s:tn>c fees and mil eage :ts :. tr .:: ~:.:tiJ 
in like c ircl!m <:ta ncc:-; in the co urts of th e United States; 
(6) to accept gifts :mJ volunta ry a nd uncompens ~ttcd serv-
i·.::es, notwithstanding the provisions of section 3679 of tll.:: R·.::-
vised Statutes (31 U.S.C. 665(b)); 
(7) to initiate, prosecute, defend, or appeal any court ac-
tion in the n a me of the Commission fo r the purpose of enfo rcing 
the laws s ubject to its jurisdiction, through its own legal repre-
sentative with the concurrence of the Attorney General or thro ugh 
the Atto rney Gener::tl ; and 
(8) to delegate any of its functions or powers, other than 
the power to issu e subpenas under paragraph (3), to an y officer 
or employee of the Commission. 
(c) Any United States district court within the jurisdictio n of 
which any inquiry is c2:rricd on, may, upon petition by the Com!11 issio n 
with the concurrence of the Attorney General or by the Attorney Gen-
eral, in case of refusal to obey a subpena or order of the Commiss ion 
issued under subsec ti o n (b) of this section, issue an order requiring 
compli;:mce the rewith ; and any failure to obey the order of the court 
may be punished by the court as a contempt thereof. 
(d) No person shall be subject to civi l liability to any p e rson (other 
than the Commission or the United States) for disclosing inform at io n 
at the reouest of the Co mmission. 
(c) ~fhe Commis:>ion may by rule require any manufacturer of 
consumer products to provide to the Com mission such performance ;.md 
technical data related to performance and safety as may be required 
to carry ont tl;e purposes of this Act, and to give such notific atio n of 
such performance and technical data at the time of original purchase 
to prospective purch<Eers a nd to the first purchaser of such product 
for purpo~es other tl1 an resale, as it de termines necessary to c:1rry o ut 
the purposes o f this Act. 
(f) For pui·poses of carrying out this Act, the Commissio n m ay pur-
chase a:1 y consumer p rod uct :::ncl it may require any ma;-;uLlct ure r , 
di st ributor , or retai ler of a co nsumer product to sell tl1e product to the 
Commi~;sion at m c1nuhciurcr's. distributor's . o r retailer's cost. 
(g) The Co mmis:> i(i n is cmthorized to enter into contr <lcts with 
governmental ent ities, nrivate organiza tions , or individuals fe r tl~c 
~onduct of <tctivities a ut;1o rized by this Act. 
(h) The Commi~:s ion may phm, const ruct, and opcr~1te a hcilrty 
or facilities ~: uit zcble fot· research. clevelo c ment. u.nd te stin~r of co n-
sumer prc1duc ts in order tn cc:rry m;t this .A. 1~ t. · o 
(i)( l ) Each reci p ient cf as:-;ista nce under thi s Act purs u ~!nt to 
grants o r co ;1tracts e nte red into under ot he r than competitive bidd ing 
procedures sh a ll keep such records as the Commission by rule sha ll 
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prescribe, including records which fu lly disclose the amount and dis-
position by such recipient of the proceeds of such ass istance, the total 
cost of the project undertaken in connection with whicb such ~t::;sistance 
is given or us ed, and the amount of that portion of the cost of the proj-
ect or undertakin g supplied by othe r sou rces, and suc:h ot her records <~s 
'Hil l hcili ta te an effec tive audit. 
(2) The C ommissio n <l nd the Comptroller Gcncr ~!l of the United 
~;~ ~l te s , or their ch1\y :: t' thorizcd representatives, s!u\1 ki\'C <~cccss for 
1!11. .. ~ purp!~l ~: c of ~ ~ u cLt ; ::~ ~i ~.: ."< ~ : ;n ~ ! L rt ~ P i i L·c ) ~!i l> bl_i \ i~::-:_. t..L'~ . .'~liiL: : ·tt. ~; pct p·~· i" ~~ ~ 
~uH.l rc:curds c E the r(: --:i r< · .... :H.:; th ~1t :. :r ~: p ~rti n ·~.:n t tu t iL.~- ~ :- ~Hi ts o r, cl) /1 -
tracts entered int () u:: ck· ~ · r h i~. / \c r un de r C'! t h,~·r t h ~u1 ·:_· c: :~-:p cL i t i vc 1--.i d--
clin~~ oroccdures . 
~· (j) The Co mmission shall prepare and submit to the President 
a r;,d the Congress on o r befo re Octobe r 1 of each year a co mprehen-
sive report on the administrati on o£ thi s 1\ct for the preceding fisc~l 
year. Such report shall include-
(1) a thorough appraisal, including statistical analyses, 
estimates, and long-term projections, of the incidence of injury 
and effects to the population resulting from consumer products, 
with a breakdown, insofar as practicable, among the various 
sources of such injury; 
(2) a list of consumer product safety rules prescribed or in 
effec t during such year ; 
(3) an evaluation of the degree of observance of consumer 
product safety rules, including a list of enforcement actions, court 
decisions, and compromises of alleged violations, by location and 
company name; 
( 4) a summary of outstanding problems confronting the 
administration of this Act in order of priority; 
(5) an analysis and evaluation of public and private con-
sumer product safety research activities; 
(6) a list, with a brief statement of the issues , of completed 
o r pending judicial actions under this Act; 
(7) the extent to wh ich technical information was dissemi-
nated to the scientific ~mel commercial communities and cousumcr 
informatio n was made ;tvailable to the public ; 
(8) the extent of cooperation between Commission officials 
and representatives of industry and o ther interested parties m 
the implementation of this Act, including a log or summary of 
meetings held between Commission officials and representatives of 
industry and other interested parties ; 
(9) an appra is:d o f sign ificant actions of St ~'.te and local gov-
ernments relating to the resoonsibilities of the Commission; and 
. (10) such ~recommen~lations for acldition~ll legisL:ltion as 
the Commission deems necessary to carry out the purposes of this 
A. ct. 
(k)(J) Whenever the C ommission sub mits any budget estimate 
or r ec!uest to the Pre;iclcnt or the Office of ivf:magcment :me! Budget, 
it shdl concurrently transmit a copy of that estimate or request to the 
Congress. 
(2) Whenever the Commission submits any legisbti·'ie recom-
mend ation s, or tes tim o ny, o r co mments on legislation to the Pres ident 
or the Office of Ma n::tgcm ent ;.me! B udget, it shall concurrently tr;:ms-
mit a copy thereof to the Congress, I'Jo officer or agency of the United 
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Sl~~tcs sh rdl ha·ve ~u: y ;.J.uthority to require the C::>n1 In i~; s icn to st.!brP it i_t:) 
leqisL:tvc r::cc ~:.i:nendatiort?.) or testi n1.ony, or comn1c n ts o n legislation, 
to~ any officer cl· ~1g~~ncy o.f the TJn1ted States for approv2.L corn rn e nt~~- '~:r 
rcvie\v ~ pr ier to the subn1is~;ion ot such recon1n1enda t io n~~, tcst irnony, \)r 
CG.lT~rncn-t :) ·to tl1c (::\;ngi·ess . 
~·): ·: ·i· .:.;r·,~· t .~\ r ;_~:c ;:;;_- t;_l 1-~1~!:~.:~ ~ 1c~1 ~Jn ur~d cr rh~ ~  !·\ct . ·rh\~· {\ ~ ~ .. ;~~ ~_-· J 
sh :...:1l b~.; a;.ii.:n in~ed b-y the C ..\.;! · ~ 1: 11·~s s i~; n 8.nd shall be con;.p· o~·,c J (Jl. rifc ~ ·c:i 
n1::rr:bc !·s~ ;:o ;_tch c.~f \vhon1 sh:~tn be quaiit icc! by lrain!!lg a nd '2xpc !'i c~ n cr:.: 
1n c:nc CJi.. n ~ ~~r ·;; of the fi~-:ld :·.; ~~pplicablc to th e s2.t'f~ty ot produc Ls \'\: ithii~ 
ttL~ juL·j sd1~..:tion of t1J.e 12ornrn i:~si on . The Council shall be c(--.nstjt ut:.:.:d as 
f.Jll mvs : 
(1) five members sh<cll be selected from governme ntal ~gcn­
cics including Federal, State, and local governn1cnts; 
(2) five members shall b e selected from consume r p roduct 
indust ries including a t least one representat ive of smali bu~; inc:-;s; 
and 
(3) five members shall be selected from among consumer 
orga n izations, corj)__rnunity organizatior.s, and recognized consumer 
leaders. 
(b) The Council sh3.ll meet at the call of the Commission, but not 
less often than four times during eu.ch calendar year. 
(c) The Council may propose consumer product safety rules to 
the Commi:;sion fo r its consideration and m ay function t hrough sub-
con1n!.ittccs of its n1einb~rs. A .. ll proceedings of the C::ouncil shall be 
public, and a record of Cclch proceeding shall b e available for p ubEc 
inspeccion. 
~cl! r:·k;nbers ?f .~he c.~ uncil w~o are n~t officers or employees of 
t lv~ 1.JGtt(~d St~1.t r:s •;na! l, Vihue ;:t tenchng meetmgs or conf,~rences of th e 
C~ouncii cr \Vh3 le oth ervvisc engaged in the business oE the Council , be 
eniitle~i to rccei,v~. comp_ensation }tt. a r ate fixed by t~1e Commiss_ion,. ~10 t 
cxcce~nng the G~u~y cquiv:J. ~ -:: nt OT tne annua.l r ate ot b ~1.s 1c p~lY 111 cttcct 
fo r grad e GS-18 of the Gener .(1.l Schedule, including traveltin1c, n1ay 
be aHo\~/cd trcrvel expenses, including per diern i.n l ie u of s ubsis tence: 
as <: u th ori zc d ty ~;cc>ion 5703 of tit le 5, United St<:2tes Code. P:.1ymcnts 
under this subsection ~h2.ll net render Tt1Ctt1be r s of the Co unc il officer~~ 
or err:ploy:; t2s of the rJ.nitcd States fo r any purpose. 
COOPEi~ATION W iTH STATES AND WITH OTHER FED E RAL AGENCI ES 
SEC. 29. ( a ) The c:o rn.rniss io n sha11 establish a progr~ti11 to pro -
TI10te Fcdcr :.l] -St:Jte C~Jcpc ~-a ~jcn r ~:Jr the p~1rposes of carrying out this 
Act. In irnplc!ne nting such progrn1r1 the ~Con1rniss~on n~ay-
(1) accept Lom a ny State o r local authorit ies en :;z;gccl in JC-
tiv·iti e~ rel::~ ~in($ t'J . 1-le~.:.itb). sy.fcty,, or cons tn_neL· .prc:t ~~.~liL)l.l ~tssist­
ance 1n s u~n runctlcns as Ht_;ury oat~ collectton : Jnvestlg?t tron; a nd 
ec~ !..lC~itiona1 prcgr ~1 rns , as >.v~l1 as other ~l ssi~ t [lnce in the adE1ii1i~;­
~T : l t!tJi-. ' lilcl Pn.Fr·\~' ('Pl~r1Pq !· r•f ~· h;t:· .l\ (" t' 'Vhich S t ·l t f~'=' cr l or")1;t;~ .. ~· r"''l" 
I:;;c~;[;l-.:, : !.":, d- ~:;;i; '!i;lg .. :.~!· - _,_ '-··-' ;I;d: if- ;o agr';,;d, 'm,~/j;~~Y:-in ,~~~(_ 
\/~incc or ot l-:.er\vi:;e for rca::ona.blc cos t of such ass istance, a11cl 
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(2) commission any qualifie d officer or employee of any 
State or local agency as an officer of the Commission for the pur-
pose of conduc ting cx~H1l in ~ttion s , inves tig2tions , and inspections . 
(b) In de termining whether such proposed State and local pro-
grams are appropriate in imp1cmcming the purposes of this Act, the 
Commission shall gi\·c favor~1 blc consickration to orograms v.;hich cs-
ta. bii'sh SC [' '1rat·~ St...,~tP ' 111([ i' •) c'"·d 'l<'enc ·; ,,o tr, ,~(''' "~'J l it1•t\,, .t.'' l' ' r' ' ' ·-·P'' r··''t··-~L; .t10' ~ J "-•- '-' U V • \. ( .. ..._ .._ .:::;,-' .._ . . _.J ',_/ ...., ' -~ ...... -.. · - '-'-L ... v \,. ~ l,_.l1VL.l,J v 1..- l .. ,:)' 
to product safety ~1nd ~. ~ L1icT consu:n:2r prct~ction ~lctiv.it i cs. 
(c) ~rhc Curn! : ;i :<-~~- -\ I~ ~ -~1 ~~y c:· b~ : - ~ _ :!1 l' i_- (_1 !~1 ~ tny F~~ d '.._' :· -. d. : ·tt·~_:c'L1t 
or agt:ncy such ;:.; E~ tti .) Li~;~; ~ i..l~t;_ ~l , pt· ~·,;;rt~t!l f;:.:_put·ts, and ·...) thcr rn~~t c ri ~ ~L~ 
~ LS it rna_y J(;~I"il llL' t.:C~~ : ; ~try ~0 C~ i rry OUt its £~ll1 Ct ~ C.:n~:_; U~ldCr th!:~ / \Cl. .~: ~~ t~-~ fl 
such departn1cnt o t· ~: g c- n cy i11 -~lY COOflCr<.l t c \Vith the Cort1 n1i ssitl n and=" 
to the extent permittee! by lavv , furnish such materials to it. The Com-
mission and th e h eads of otih.:r dGpartmcnts ~lild <'gcnc i <.~~ engaged in 
administering prograrns r,::Jatt:d to product safety shali, to the nnx[-
mum extent practicable, coope rate and consult in order to insur~ fully 
coordinated efforts. 
(d) The Commission shall , to the m aximum extent practicable, 
utilize the resources and bcilities of the National Bureau of Standards, 
on a reimbursable basis, to perform research and analyses related 
to risks of injury associated with consumer products (including fi re and 
flamm ability risks) , to develop test methods, to conduct s tudies and 
inves tigations, and to provide technical advice and assistance in con-
nection with the functions of the Commission. 
TRANS F ERS OF FUNCTIONS 
SEc. 30. ( a ) The fun ctions of th e Secretary of Health, Educa-
tion, and \Velfare under the F ederal Hazardous Substances Act ( 15 
U.S.C. 1261 et seq.) and the Poison Prevention P ack aging Act of 
1970 arc transferred to the Commission. The functions of the A dminis-
trator of the Environmental Pro tec tion Agency and of the Secretary of 
Health, E ducation, and Welfare under the Acts amended by subsec-
tions (b) through (£) of section 7 of the P oiso n Prevention P ackaging 
Act of 1970, to the exte nt such functions relate to the administration 
and enforcement of the Poison Prevention P ackaging A ct of 1970, arc 
transferred to the Commission. 
(b) The functions of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Wel-
fare, the Secretary of Commerce, and the Federal Trade Commission un-
der the Flammable Fabrics Act (15 U.S.C. 1191 et seq.) are trans-
ferred to the Commission. Tl1e functi ons of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion under the Fcckral T rade Comm ission A ct, to the extent such func-
tions relate to the administ r ation and enforcement of the F lammable 
Fabrics Act, arc transferred to the Commiss ion. 
(c) The functions of the Secretary of Commerce o.nd the Federal 
Tracie Commission under the Act of August 2, 1956 (15 U .S.C. 1211) 
arc transferred to the Commission. 
(d) A risk of injury wh ich is associated with consumer products 
and which could be elimina ted or reduced to a suffic ient extent by ac-
tion taken unckr the Feclcr~d H:nardous Substances Act, the P oison 
Prevention Packaging Act of 1970, or the FL\mmable F~brics Act 
may be regulated by t he Commission only in ~,ccorcla nce with the pro-
visions of those Acts. 
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(e)(l)(A) All persOtmcl, property, records, obligations, and 
commitments, which are used prim.arily with respect to any function 
transferred under the provisions of subsections (a), (b) and (c) of this 
section shall be transferred to the Com mission, except those associ-
ated with fire and flammability research in the Nat ional Bureau of 
Standards . The transfer of personnel pursuant to thi s paragraph shaH 
be without reduction in cla~~s ific ~1lion or compensation for one yc~tr af-
ter such transfer, e\:ccpt th~~ l the: Ch~1irm a :1 l )E the Commrs ':. io n (.!: a ll lu\T 
full authority t c'~ ~ t.':'i::_: n ~ ; (· : · ·: \_li ! ~ -1 . :! l_:uri: ~~ ~:L t· .. :h e rh:-yc:Jr p"": ri:.: c~ i!l ,_··;--
dcT to cffic i.:-nt ly c~lrry ~~~)u ~ t'u: : ~·ti c · n · ~ t~·:. : i ~ _< f·-.:rr~·d L~_) ~h·..; C~ u iiln1i J:_;i U il ~iii ­
clcr th is sec tio n. 
(B) Any comrnissi,1ncd 0fficcr 0f the Public He~1lth Service who 
upon the day before the effect ive date of th is section, is servin~.: cts sucl: 
office r primari ly in the pcrfuml:tncc o f fu nctions tr ansferred by this 
Act to the Commission, may , it such officer so elects, acquire competi-
tive status and be transfetTccl to a compet itive position in the Commis--
sion subject to subparagraph (A) of this p aragraph , under the terms 
prescribed in paragraphs ( 3 ) through ( 8) (A) of section 1 5 (b) of the 
Clean Air Amendments of 1970 (84 Stat. 1676; 42 U.S.C. 215 nt). 
(2) All orders, detcrminzo,tions, rules, regulations, permits, con-
tracts, certificates, licenses, and privileges (A) which have been issued, 
made, granted, or allowed to beco me effective in the exercise of func-
tions which are transferred under this section by any department or 
agency, any functions of which are transferred by this sectio n, and 
(B) which are in effect at the time this section t akes effect, shall con-
tinue in effect according to their terms until modified, terminated, 
superseded, set aside, or repealed by the Commission, by any court of 
competent jurisdiction, or by operation of law. 
(3) The provisions of this section shall not affect any proceed-
ings pending at the time this sect ion takes effect before any depart-
ment or agency, functions of which are transferred by this section; ex-
cept that such proceedings, to the extent th at they relate to functions 
so transferred, shall be continued before the Commission. Orders shall 
be issued in such proceedings, appeal s shall be taken therefrom, and 
payments shall be made pursuant to such orders, as if this section h ad 
not bee n enacted; and others issued in any such proceedings shall con-
tinue in effect until modified, terminated, superseded, or repe:1led by 
the Commission, by a court of competent jurisdic tion, or b y operation 1)[ 
law. 
( 4) The provisions of this section shall not affect suits commenced 
prior to the date this section takes effect and in all such suits proceed-
ings shall be had, appeals taken , an d judgments rendered, in the same 
manner and effect as if this section had not been enacted ; except tha t 
if before the date on which this section takes effect, any department 
or agency (or officer thereof in his official capacity) is a party to a suit 
involving functions transferred to the Commission, then such suit sh all 
be continued by the Commission. No cause of action, and no suit, ac-
tion, or other proceeding, by or against any department or agency (or 
officer thereof in his oHici ~tl capacity) fu nctions of which me transferred 
by this section, shall ~tbate by reo.son of the enactment of this section. 
Causes of actio ns, suits, actions, or other proceedings m ay be asserted 
by or ag~lins t the United States or the Comm ission as may be appro-· 
priate and, in any l! tig ~tti on pending when this section takes effect , the 
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court may at any time, on its own motion o r that of any party, enter an 
order which will give effec t to the provisions of this paragraph. 
(f) F or purposes of this section , (1 ) the terrn " function" includes 
power and duty, and (2) the tr ~msfer of a functio n, under any provi-
sion of law, of an agency or th e head of a depa rtment shall also b e 
a trans fe r of all functions under such Llw which are exercised by any 
o ffi ce or ofi'ice r of such agency or dep<lrt me n t. 
Sr: c . 3 1. The Commiss ion sha ll lnvc rw au thc) ri l': under thi s Act 
to regulate anv risk of injury assoc iated with a CC'ilSLmF:: r oroduct if such 
risk could be' eliminated o-r reci uccJ tu a s ui:f i"·i c nt ex t~nL bv actions 
taken lrncler th e O cc upation al Safet y and Hc ~tlth 1\ct of (970; the 
Atomic Energy Act of 1954; or the Clean Air /\ c t. T he Commission 
sh all h ~tve no authority unde r thi s Act to rcgu l<:tc 'my ri';k of injury as-
sociated with electronic prod uc t radi a. tion emitted fro m an electronic 
product (as such terms are defined by sect ions 3 55( 1) and (2) of the 
Public Health Service Act) if such risk of inju:·y may be subjected to 
regulation under subpart 3 o f part F of title HI of the Public Health 
Service Act. 
AUTHORIZATION OJ. APPRO I'RIAT JO NS 
SEc. 32. (a) There arc h ereby auth orized to be appropri a ted 
for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of th is Act (other than 
the provisions of section 27(h) which authorize the planning and con-
struction of research, developmen t, an d tes ting fac ilities), and for the 
purpose of carrying out the functions, powers, and duties transferred 
to the Commission under section 30, not to exceed-
(1) $55,000,000 fo r the fi scal yea r ending June 30, 1973; 
(2) $59,000,000 for the fi scal year ending June 30, 1974; 
and 
(3) $64,000,000 for th e fi scal year ending June 30, 1975. 
(b)(l) There a re authorized to be appropriated such sums as 
m ay b e necessary for the pl anning and construction of research, devel-
opment and testing facilities described in sectio n 27(h); except that no 
appropriation shall be mad e for any such planning or construction in-
volving an expenditure in excess of $ 100,000 if such planning or con-
struction has no t been a pproved by resoluti ons adopted in substantially 
the same form by the Com m ittee on In tersta te ~mel Fore ign Commerce of 
the H ouse of R epresent atives , and by the Comm:ttee en Commerce of 
th e Senate. For the purpose of secur ing conside ration of such Cipprova l 
th e Commission shall transmit to Congress a prospectus of the proposed 
L!cility including (but not limited to)--
(A) a brief descri ption of the Ltdity to be planned or con-
str ucted; 
(B) the location of th e fcc ility, and an estimate of the max-
imum cost of the faci lity; 
(C) a statement of those <1gencic ~: , private and public, wh ich 
will use such facility, together with the contribution to be made 
by each such agency toward the cco.t c f :;uch tx ility ; and 
(D) a sta tement o[ justific a tion of th e need fo r such fzlc ility. 
(2) The es timated maxi mum cos t of any h tcili ty approved un-
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der this subsection as set forth in the prospectus may be increased by 
the amount equal to the percentage increase, if any, as determined by 
the Commission, in construction costs, from the date of the transmittal 
of such prospectus to Congress, but in no event shall the increase au-
thorized by this paragraph exceed 10 per centum of such estimated 
maximum cost. 
SEc. 33 . it an y provi sion ot th is ;\ct . nr t ih · :t;>!1iictt ion of such 
provision to any perso n or circumstance . slnli be hel d irr :alicl, the rc-
mZtindcr of this Act, or the application c1f such pruvision.s to persons or 
circumstances other than those as to which it i:-; hdd invalid, shall 
not be affected thereby. 
EFFECDVE DATE 
SEc. 34. This Act shall take effect on the sixtieth day following 
the date of its enactment, except-
(1) sections 4 and 32 shall take effect on the date of en-
actment of this Act, and 
(2) section 30 shall take effect on the later of (A) 150 
days after the date of enactment of this Act, or (B) the date on 
which at least three members of the Commission first take office. 
Approved October 28, 1972. 
